

# Eastern European Borders Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2015

Q1

**Q2**

Q3

Q4







# Eastern European Borders Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2015



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union



Plac Europejski 6  
00-844 Warsaw, Poland  
T +48 22 205 95 00  
F +48 22 205 95 01  
frontex@frontex.europa.eu  
[www.frontex.europa.eu](http://www.frontex.europa.eu)

Warsaw, September 2015  
Risk Analysis Unit  
Frontex reference number: 14528/2015

OPOCE Catalogue number TT-AJ-15-002-EN-N  
ISBN 978-92-95205-36-9; ISSN 2443-8375; DOI 10.2819/740049

© Frontex, 2015  
All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

## **DISCLAIMERS**

This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited.

Throughout the report, references to Kosovo\* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The EB-RAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and from the EB-RAN contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

# Table of contents

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>#5</b>
<b>I. Situational overview</b>	<b>#6</b>
<b>Summary of EB-RAN indicators</b>	<b>#7</b>
<i>Situation at the border</i>	<b>#8</b>
<b>Border surveillance</b>	<b>#8</b>
<b>Border checks</b>	<b>#10</b>
<i>Situation in the Eastern European region</i>	<b>#11</b>
<b>Illegal stay in EB-RAN countries</b>	<b>#11</b>
<b>II. Featured risk analysis</b>	<b>#12</b>
<b>Sustained irregular movements of Ukrainian citizens amid the conflict</b>	<b>#12</b>
<b>Statistical annex</b>	<b>#15</b>

## List of abbreviations used

<b>BCP</b>	border-crossing point
<b>CIS</b>	Community of Independent States
<b>EaP</b>	Eastern Partnership
<b>EB-RAN</b>	Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network
<b>EDF</b>	European Union Document-Fraud
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	euro
<b>FRAN</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
<b>Frontex</b>	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>ICT</b>	Information and communications technology
<b>ID</b>	identification document
<b>n.a.</b>	not available
<b>PLN</b>	Polish zloty
<b>Q/Qtr</b>	quarter of the year
<b>RAU</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
<b>RUB</b>	Russian rouble
<b>UAH</b>	Ukrainian hryvnia
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>VIN</b>	vehicle identification number
<b>VIS</b>	Visa Information System

# Introduction

## Concept

The Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) performs monthly exchanges of statistical data and information on the most recent irregular migration trends. This information is compiled at the level of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and analysed in cooperation with the regional partners on a quarterly and annual basis. The annual reports offer a more in-depth analysis of the occurring developments and phenomena which impact the regional and common borders while the quarterly reports are meant to provide regular updates and identify emerging trends in order to maintain situational awareness. Both types of reports are aimed at offering support for strategic and operational decision making.

## Methodology

The Eastern European Borders Quarterly statistical overview is focused on quarterly developments for the seven key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, (2) detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs, (3) refusals of entry, (4) detections of illegal stay, (5) asylum applications, (6) detections of facilitators, and (7) detections of fraudulent documents.<sup>1</sup>

The backbone of this overview are monthly statistics provided within the framework of the EB-RAN (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) and reference period statistics from common border sections of the neighbouring EU Member States (Norway, Finland,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). The data are processed, checked for errors and merged into an Excel database for further analysis.

## Structure

The first part offers a general **Situational overview** broken down by main areas of work of border-control authorities and police activities related to irregular migration. The second part contains more in-depth **Featured risk analyses** of particular phenomena. As the current issue of the Eastern European Borders Quarterly is the second following a new approach adopted for risk analysis quarterlies, the structure of the report may still be subject to some readjustments.


---

<sup>1</sup> Please note that the analysis of this indicator is now limited to EB-RAN countries only, given that EU Member States have transitioned to the European Union Document-Fraud (EDF) reporting scheme.

# I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW

Figure 1. **Geographical scope of the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network**

Note on definitions: in the text 'common borders' refers both to borders between EU Member States and EB-RAN countries (covered by both sides) and borders of EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries with the Russian Federation (covered only by the EU/Schengen Associated Country side of the border)





# Summary of EB-RAN indicators

Table 1. Summary of FRAN, EB-RAN and selected EU Member State indicators for Q2 2015

Indicator	EU total	EU Member States (eastern land borders only)**	% of EU total	only EB-RAN countries*
	Illegal border-crossing between BCPS	170 155	506	0.3%
Clandestine entries	804	1	0.1%	6 177
Facilitators	3 162	18	0.6%	14
Illegal stay	147 841	2 804	1.9%	6 445
Refusals of entry	28 285	9 284	33%	15 788
Applications for asylum	204 151	40 838	20%	120
False travel documents	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	131
Return decision issued	72 454	10 718***	15%	n.a.
Effective returns	43 907	7 878***	18%	n.a.

Source: FRAN data as of 15 August 2015

\* Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

\*\* Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

\*\*\* Total numbers reported in FRAN by Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

# Situation at the border

## Border surveillance

### Illegal border-crossing

During the second quarter of 2015, 1 411 persons were detected for illegal crossing of the regional and common borders between BCPs. Almost half (47%) were regional nationals (of CIS and EaP countries), mostly Ukrainians, Georgians and Moldovans.


The remaining half (53%) was composed of non-regional nationals, mainly Vietnamese and Afghan citizens. The Hungarian border with Ukraine and the Latvian border with the Russian Federation were the top common borders with the highest number of detections of illegal border-crossing recorded in Q2 2015.

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs increased by 82% compared to the first quarter of 2015 and by 74% in relation to the same quarter of 2014. The most significant growth was linked to Vietnamese and Afghans, while a drop of 17% was observed for Syrian nationals.

Although Ukrainian citizens were the most numerous nationals detected for the illegal border-crossing between BCPs in Q2 2015, only 10 cases were related to irregular migration, the rest being linked either to smuggling (41%) or to other reasons (56%).

Figure 3. Detections between BCPs at the common borders and EU Member States' land borders with the Russian Federation (data only from EU side) show that the pressure in Q2 2015 as compared to the same quarter last year was the highest at the Hungarian-Ukrainian and Latvian-Russian border sections

Detections of illegal border-crossing at common and regional borders between BCPs in Q2 2015




## Facilitators

The number of detected facilitators decreased by 38% in the second quarter of 2015 compared to the first (from 52 in Q1 2015 down to 32 in Q2 2015) but was 60% higher than in the same period last year (20 in Q2 2014).

As regards nationalities, over 72% of all facilitators detected in the analysed period were citizens of the countries of the region, with Russians ranking top, followed by Latvians, Tajiks, Belarusians, Armenians and Ukrainians.

Figure 4. **Over 72% of all facilitators detected in Q2 2015 along the eastern European land borders were regional country nationals, with Russians ranking top, followed by Latvians, Tajiks, Belarusians and Armenians**

The top nationalities of facilitators apprehended along the eastern European land borders in Q2 2015 when compared to Q2 2014



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 15 August 2015

# Border checks

### Clandestine entries

In the second quarter of 2015 there was only one clandestine entry attempt reported at the eastern European borders. It involved a Moldovan national detected by Romania at its border with Moldova.

### Refusals of entry

The number of refusals of entry reported during the second quarter of 2015 at the common and regional borders increased by 23% when compared to the first quarter of 2015 and by 17% in relation to the same period last year.

Similarly to the previous quarter, the majority of refusals was reported at land borders (88%), while the remaining 12% – at air and sea borders. The highest number of refusals was issued by Ukraine, Poland and Belarus.

The top five refused nationalities, as in the first quarter of 2015, were citizens of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Ukraine mostly refused entry to Russians, Uzbeks and Tajiks, while Poland and Belarus – to Ukrainians.

### Document fraud

In the second quarter of 2015 detections of persons using fraudulent documents reported by the three EB-RAN countries (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) increased by 68% when compared to the first quarter of 2015. Higher figures were observed mostly in Ukraine, which reported 83% more document fraud cases.

With regards to nationalities, Moldovans were the most frequently detected among

fraudulent document users followed by Ukrainians and Armenians. The vast majority of commonly used fraudulent documents were Moldovan passports, while visas accounted for only 10% of fraudulent documents reported by EB-RAN countries.

It is worth mentioning that similarly to the previous quarter, an ongoing phenomenon of visa fraud among non-regional migrants was reported by EU Member States in Q2 2015. Apart from cases of visa applications made under false pretences detected in migrants' countries of origin, an increasing number of such attempts is observed in the transiting countries (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation).

### VIS launched in Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries

As part of the worldwide introduction of the Visa Information System (VIS), the Schengen States launched the VIS in Ukraine (and in other Eastern Partnership countries) on 23 June 2015. It has been already introduced in Africa, the Middle East, the Americas, Australasia, South-East Asia, Central Asia, Western Balkans and Turkey. By the end of November 2015 all Schengen consulates worldwide will be connected to the VIS.

Source: European External Action Service

## Situation in the Eastern European region

# Illegal stay in EB-RAN countries

In the second quarter of 2015 there were 6 445 detections of illegal stay reported by the three EB-RAN countries, which represents an increase of 12% when compared to the first quarter of 2015 a 61% rise in relation to the same quarter of 2014.

Similarly to the previous quarter, the top five nationalities detected for illegal stay in EB-RAN countries were Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans and Azeris. Citizens of the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan were mostly detected by Ukraine, while Ukrainians, Georgians and

Moldovans were by and large reported by Belarus.

Almost 99% of detections of illegal stay was reported on exit, out of which 53% of cases were recorded by Ukraine and 41% – by Belarus. The Ukrainian border with the Russian Federation and Belarus were the most affected ones, followed by Belarusian and Ukrainian airports.

In order to prevent and combat illegal activities related to smuggling of irregular migrants, the State Border Guard Service

of Ukraine came up with the initiative to launch the operation 'Frontier-2015' on 15 June 2015. The operation was also meant to improve collaboration in combating irregular migration at interdepartmental, interagency and international levels. In general, according to open sources, during the first week of the operation 'Frontier-2015' 50 irregular migrants were detected. In addition, measures are being taken to identify offenders involved in the facilitation of irregular migrants' movements and stay.

### Operation 'Frontier-2015'

On 15 June 2015, the joint operation 'Frontier-2015' was launched at the initiative and under coordination of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, in close cooperation with the Interior Ministry, Security Service, State Migration Service and State Fiscal Service of Ukraine as well as neighbouring EU countries' border authorities.

'Frontier-2015' has the status of a national and long-term operation to combat irregular migration and human trafficking. The main objective of the operation is to check the most frequent places of stay of irregular migrants and identify the routes of their movement and existing channels of irregular migration flows on the territory of Ukraine.

The operation should help to reduce illegal activities connected with facilitation networks smuggling irregular migrants and to improve interaction in combating irregular migration at interdepartmental, interagency and international levels.

Source: State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

# Sustained irregular movements of Ukrainian citizens amid the conflict

## Common eastern European borders

### Abuse of legal travel channels on the way to the EU


In Q2 2015 there were 163 Ukrainians detected for illegal border-crossing; however, only nine cases of Ukrainian citizens were reportedly linked with irregular migration, while 55% was connected with smuggling and 39% with other reasons. When compared to Q1 2015, the number of detected cases related to irregular migration of Ukrainians was at a similar level, while the cases linked to smuggling and other reasons were on an increase.

In contrast to the low number Ukrainian nationals detected at the eastern European borders for illegal border-crossing between BCPs, refusals of entry to Ukrainians accounted for over 60% of the total issued by the EU countries along the eastern EU borders (5 806 out of 9 284). The vast majority of Ukrainians (84%) were refused entry to Poland.

Importantly, to counter visa abuse, it was necessary to implement new measures, including legislation amendments and ICT solutions. The latest adjustments expected to influence future irregular migration flows from Ukraine include:

Figure 5. In contrast to a low number of illegal border-crossings between BCPs made by Ukrainian nationals at the eastern European borders, refusals of entry to Ukrainians accounted over 60% of the total issued by EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries in Q2 2015

Ukrainian nationals reported at the common borders under indicators of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, illegal stay and refusals of entry



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 15 August 2015

### 1. Legislation changes introduced by Poland effective as of 1 June 2015

The latest legislation changes<sup>1</sup> introduced by Poland to the Regulation on the specimen of the invitation and the application form to be registered in the invitation registry, introduced a new template of the invitation, which from now on will be generated from a national set of registers, records and inventory of the Residence System.

<sup>1</sup> Regulation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as of 20 May 2015 amending the Regulation on specimen of the invitation and the application form to be registered in the invitation registry as well as on the amount of funds to be in the possession of the inviting person (*Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland*, 28 May 2015, item 741).

Verification of the invitation will take place with the use of ICT tools, which will increase its efficiency and streamline the whole procedure.

### 2. VIS launched in Ukraine as of 23 June 2015

On 23 June 2015, the Visa Information System (VIS) was launched by the Schengen States in Ukraine (and in other Eastern Partnership countries). The major change for Ukrainian citizens from 23 June 2015 is that all applicants need to appear in person in order to provide biometric data (fingerprints and a digital photograph) in the case of applications for short-term Schengen visas (max. 90 days in 180 days). Fingerprints can be then copied from the first

application file in the VIS for subsequent applications made within five years.

The VIS implementation will better protect applicants against identity theft and prevent document fraud and visa shopping. The use of biometric data to confirm the visa holder's identity will also result in more accurate, faster and more secure checks.

### **Possible unlawful use of Ukrainian passports**

On the internet, there are dozens of advertisements offering original Ukrainian documents for sale (see examples in the box). Some Ukrainian citizens planning to move abroad or already living in another country sell their passports, identification numbers and even birth certificates. A full set of such documents can be bought for around USD 2 200, and the passport alone for USD 1 000. According to open sources, the Ukrainian internet is flooded with this kind of advertisements.

Passports, together with large amounts of money, are also transported through the separation line between the Ukrainian-controlled and uncontrolled areas of Donbas. In May 2015, for example, in the Donetsk region State Border Guard Service employees, serving at one of the temporary checkpoints, stopped a Ukrainian citizen driving a car. Upon control, ten passports of other persons, 75 cards of several banks and cash in the amount of USD 155 400 were found in the car.

Importantly, not only civilians are involved in passport selling. According to a statement made by the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office on 25 May 2015, a range of

### **Extra import taxes triggers growth of smuggling in Ukraine**

An additional import duty on goods was introduced in Ukraine starting from 1 January 2015. Extra import charges on 100 commodity groups (at a rate of 5–10%) were intended to increase the budget revenues by UAH 17.6 billion.

The decision on the introduction of extra duties was temporary (12 months) and was considered as a justifiable measure in the difficult economic situation. So far, it has not brought expected effects. According to Deputy Chairman of the State Fiscal Service, additional import duties have provoked an increase in smuggling across the Ukrainian border. Moreover, an additional tax burden pushed entrepreneurs towards using various tax evasion schemes when importing goods to the country.

Source: ukrainiancrisis.net

illegal activities and corruption cases had been disclosed among Ukrainian officials of the armed forces, other military units and law-enforcement agencies involved in anti-terrorist operations in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as local officials.

For example, during a three-day operation of the Security Service of Ukraine run in May 2015, military prosecutors arrested the Head of the Migration Service in an undisclosed city in the Donetsk Oblast for selling Ukrainian passports to resi-

### **Sale of Ukrainian passports advertised on the internet**

'In connection with the departure overseas I am selling my Ukrainian passport. Passport clean. I give it for the minimum price' – dozens of such advertisements can be found on the internet. The person who posted the advertisement told the reporter that he was leaving to Germany for good, and he no longer needed his Ukrainian passport.



© vesti-ukr.com

The author of another ad offers a passport, a birth certificate and a diploma. 'I will sell the whole set for USD 2 200. These things are of no further use for me, I need the money'.

Sources: vesti-ukr.com, ukrainiancrisis.net

## II. FEATURED RISK ANALYSIS

dents of Russian-controlled territories in Ukraine. The suspect was charging UAH 8 000 (or EUR 322 as of 20 August 2015) for each passport. However, it was unclear how many passports he had sold.

### Inside the EU/Schengen area

#### Applications for international protection

In Q2 2015, there was a slight increase in the number of applications for international protection submitted by Ukrainian nationals, when compared with Q1 2015. The top five receiving countries were Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands. Only a small percentage of applications were made in the EU Member States neighbouring Ukraine (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania).

#### Illegal stay

With regards to illegal stay, in the second quarter of 2015 there were 2 068 Ukrainians reported by Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hun-

Figure 6. **The crisis in the eastern Ukraine with all its indirect effects (worsening economic conditions, military conscription, etc.) significantly contributed to raising the level of illegal stay in Q2 2015 when compared with Q2 2014**

Ukrainian nationals detected for illegal stay reported by EB-RAN neighbouring countries



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 15 August 2015

gary and Romania, which represents an increase of 46% compared with the first quarter of 2015 and 75% in relation to the same quarter in 2014 (from 1 179).

The long-term seasonal trend of illegal stay was significantly affected by the crisis in

the eastern Ukraine with all its indirect effects (worsening economic situation, military conscription, etc.). In Q2 2015, the number of Ukrainian illegal stayers was much higher than in the same period of 2014.



# STATISTICAL ANNEX

## LEGEND

**Symbols and abbreviations:** **n.a.** not applicable  
: data not available

**Source:** EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 15 August 2015,  
unless otherwise indicated

**Note:** 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member  
States, including both 28 EU Member States  
and three Schengen Associated Countries

Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by purpose of illegal border-crossing and top ten nationalities

	2 014				2 015 Q2		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	previous Qtr	
<b>Purpose of Illegal Border-Crossing</b>									
Irregular migration	408	344	503	613	372	759	121	104	54
Other	389	353	352	238	241	322	-8.8	34	23
Smuggling	84	100	99	113	86	169	69	97	12
Not specified	11	14	46	54	75	161	1 050	115	11
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Ukraine	278	245	252	215	201	335	37	67	24
Vietnam	33	35	181	96	99	283	709	186	20
Afghanistan	79	44	37	196	66	212	382	221	15
Georgia	59	60	108	149	68	106	77	56	7.5
Moldova	139	129	111	67	56	88	-32	57	6.2
Russia	83	79	104	68	57	82	3.8	44	5.8
Syria	63	29	40	56	66	55	90	-17	3.9
Somalia	6	21	1	0	7	34	62	386	2.4
Iraq	7	0	13	18	12	33	n.a.	175	2.3
Belarus	26	27	25	22	28	24	-11	-14	1.7
Others	119	142	128	131	114	159	12	39	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>892</b>	<b>811</b>	<b>1 000</b>	<b>1 018</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>1 411</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 2. **Illegal border-crossing at BCPs**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by purpose of illegal border-crossing and top ten nationalities

	2 014				2 015 Q2		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	previous Qtr	
<b>Purpose of Illegal Border-Crossing</b>									
Other	245	228	223	205	3 049	6 035	2 547	98	n.a.
Smuggling	84	86	65	65	91	98	14	7.7	n.a.
Irregular migration	33	17	20	39	35	44	159	26	n.a.
Not specified	0	7	8	1	1	1	-86	0	n.a.
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Ukraine	148	141	158	117	2 948	5 893	4 079	100	95
Moldova	118	132	96	126	158	207	57	31	3.4
Russian Federation	18	11	10	20	9	19	73	111	0.3
Romania	9	20	11	9	16	13	-35	-19	0.2
Armenia	0	0	1	0	1	8	n.a.	700	0.1
Belarus	1	3	5	4	7	6	100	-14	0.1
Not specified	9	5	4	3	3	5	0	67	0.1
Azerbaijan	0	1	1	0	6	4	300	-33	0.1
Iraq	1	0	2	1	2	3	n.a.	50	0
Poland	1	0	1	0	1	2	n.a.	100	0
Others	57	25	27	30	25	18	-28	-28	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>3 176</b>	<b>6 178</b>	<b>1 728</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

Place of Detection	2014				2015 Q2		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	previous Qtr	
	Land	9	20	49	32	49	31	55	
Air	0	0	0	0	3	1	n.a.	-67	3.1
Inland	2	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Russian Federation	0	3	8	3	16	13	333	-19	41
Latvia	0	1	0	3	0	4	300	n.a.	13
Belarus	1	1	12	1	12	2	100	-83	6.3
Tajikistan	0	0	0	2	1	2	n.a.	100	6.3
Armenia	0	0	0	0	1	2	n.a.	100	6.3
Ukraine	3	7	1	6	0	2	-71	n.a.	6.3
Georgia	0	0	1	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	3.1
Not specified	0	0	8	2	1	1	n.a.	0	3.1
Estonia	0	0	3	2	2	1	n.a.	-50	3.1
Lithuania	0	2	3	3	0	1	-50	n.a.	3.1
Others	7	6	13	10	19	3	-50	-84	9.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>-38</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

Place of Detection	2014				2015 Q2		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	previous Qtr	
	Land	4 359	4 315	7 604	7 395	5 996	7 423	72	
Air	2 604	1 025	1 188	1 616	1 558	1 640	60	5.3	18
Sea	61	46	105	76	55	101	120	84	1.1
Between BCPs	8	33	46	54	109	60	82	-45	0.6
Inland	422	416	176	15	37	25	-94	-32	0.3
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Ukraine	1 405	1 989	3 017	3 413	2 135	3 060	54	43	33
Russian Federation	1 348	802	2 209	1 781	1 962	1 828	128	-6.8	20
Georgia	794	388	443	840	627	792	104	26	8.6
Moldova	444	455	520	718	549	775	70	41	8.4
Azerbaijan	332	131	147	188	286	330	152	15	3.6
Belarus	249	300	549	296	288	316	5.3	9.7	3.4
Armenia	209	137	190	103	152	198	45	30	2.1
Poland	99	107	215	143	132	177	65	34	1.9
Hungary	120	85	94	109	159	157	85	-1.3	1.7
Turkey	312	167	115	102	150	153	-8.4	2	1.7
Others	2 142	1 274	1 620	1 463	1 315	1 463	15	11	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>7 454</b>	<b>5 835</b>	<b>9 119</b>	<b>9 156</b>	<b>7 755</b>	<b>9 249</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2014				2015 Q2		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	previous Qtr	
<b>Border Type</b>									
Land	17 269	18 651	21 166	20 192	18 410	<b>21 949</b>	18	19	88
Air	1 827	1 720	1 312	1 093	1 204	<b>2 190</b>	27	82	8.7
Sea	736	991	1 055	1 095	811	<b>933</b>	-5.9	15	3.7
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Ukraine	4 760	5 295	6 331	5 384	6 095	<b>7 606</b>	44	25	30
Russian Federation	5 148	7 034	7 178	5 048	3 832	<b>6 006</b>	-15	57	24
Moldova	1 904	1 416	1 744	1 699	1 521	<b>1 589</b>	12	4.5	6.3
Uzbekistan	1 078	618	476	884	1 969	<b>1 340</b>	117	-32	5.3
Tajikistan	531	287	218	737	1 428	<b>1 291</b>	350	-9.6	5.1
Belarus	1 131	1 241	1 490	1 393	890	<b>1 106</b>	-11	24	4.4
Azerbaijan	343	335	326	352	628	<b>832</b>	148	32	3.3
Georgia	1 051	1 147	1 384	2 202	346	<b>756</b>	-34	118	3
Lithuania	1 014	1 147	1 051	898	702	<b>696</b>	-39	-0.9	2.8
Kyrgyzstan	227	114	141	626	613	<b>625</b>	448	2	2.5
Others	2 645	2 728	3 194	3 157	2 401	<b>3 225</b>	18	34	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>19 832</b>	<b>21 362</b>	<b>23 533</b>	<b>22 380</b>	<b>20 425</b>	<b>25 072</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 6. Document fraud

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries, by border type, document type, top ten nationalities and top ten countries of issuance

	2014				2015 Q2		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	previous Qtr	
<b>Border Type</b>									
Land	38	18	38	31	31	72	300	132	55
Air	47	25	17	35	37	53	112	43	40
Sea	16	8	7	4	7	6	-25	-14	4.6
Not specified	0	4	1	2	3	0	n.a.	n.a.	
<b>Document type</b>									
Passports	85	49	47	58	61	113	131	85	86
Visas	2	4	7	2	3	13	225	333	9.9
Not specified	9	0	1	6	9	3	n.a.	-67	2.3
ID cards	4	1	2	3	3	2	100	-33	1.5
Stamps	0	0	6	2	2	0	n.a.	n.a.	
Residence permits	1	1	0	1	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Moldova	17	18	16	19	16	60	233	275	46
Ukraine	19	13	14	10	9	13	0	44	9.9
Armenia	3	2	0	2	1	6	200	500	4.6
Syria	13	1	5	8	10	5	400	-50	3.8
Russian Federation	6	2	2	4	2	5	150	150	3.8
Afghanistan	5	0	0	1	4	3	n.a.	-25	2.3
Azerbaijan	0	0	3	0	1	3	n.a.	200	2.3
Bangladesh	1	0	0	0	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	2.3
Not specified	0	0	0	0	6	3	n.a.	-50	2.3
Iran	7	1	3	3	0	3	200	n.a.	2.3
Others	30	18	20	25	29	27	50	-6.9	21
<b>Top Ten Countries of Issuance of Documents</b>									
Moldova	5	5	15	11	11	54	980	391	41
Ukraine	20	15	15	9	9	15	0	67	11
Russian Federation	6	2	1	4	0	5	150	n.a.	3.8
Romania	6	8	6	5	2	4	-50	100	3.1
Spain	0	0	1	2	0	4	n.a.	n.a.	3.1
Azerbaijan	0	0	1	0	0	4	n.a.	n.a.	3.1
Tajikistan	0	0	1	2	2	4	n.a.	100	3.1
Israel	3	0	1	3	2	4	n.a.	100	3.1
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	4	n.a.	n.a.	3.1
Lithuania	5	0	0	2	1	3	n.a.	200	2.3
Others	56	25	22	34	51	30	20	-41	23
<b>Total</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100</b>

## Explanatory note

Detections reported for Member States for indicators Illegal border-crossing between BCPs, Illegal border-crossing at BCPs, Refusals of entry and Document fraud are detections at the common land borders on entry only. For Facilitators, detections at the common land borders on entry and exit are included. For Illegal stay, detections at

the common land borders on exit only are included. For Asylum, all applications (land, sea, air and inland) are included.

For EB-RAN countries, all indicators – save for Refusals of entry – include detections (applications) on exit and entry at the land, sea and air borders.

Each section in the table (Reporting country, Border type, Place of detection, Top five border section and Top ten nationalities) refers to total detections reported by EB-RAN countries and to neighbouring land border detections reported by Member States.





European Agency for the Management  
of Operational Cooperation  
at the External Borders of the Member  
States of the European Union

Plac Europejski 6  
00-844 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00  
F +48 22 205 95 01

[frontex@frontex.europa.eu](mailto:frontex@frontex.europa.eu)  
[www.frontex.europa.eu](http://www.frontex.europa.eu)



**For Public Release**

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 14528/2015

TT-AJ-15-002-EN-N  
ISBN 978-92-95205-36-9  
ISSN 2443-8375  
DOI 10.2819/740049

Warsaw, September 2015