

FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 4 • OCTOBER–DECEMBER 2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 4 • OCTOBER–DECEMBER 2012



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1
00-124 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, May 2013
Risk Analysis Unit
Frontex reference number: 6257/2013

DISCLAIMERS

This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used on the maps.

The contents of open-source boxes are unverified and presented only to give context and media representation of irregular-migration phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

Table of contents

Executive summary #5

1. Introduction #7

2. Methodology #8

3. Summary of FRAN indicators #10

4. Situational picture in Q4 2012 #12

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing #13

4.2. Routes #17

4.3. Clandestine entry #28

4.4. Detections of facilitators #29

4.5. Detections of illegal stay #30

4.6. Refusals of entry #32

4.7. Asylum claims #34

4.8. Document fraud #34

4.9. Returns #38

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border #40

5. Statistical annex #47



List of abbreviations used

ARA	Annual Risk Analysis
BCP	border-crossing point
CeCLAD-M	Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée
CIR	Italian Council for Refugees
CIRCA	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa)
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EFCA	European Fisheries Control Agency
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
fYROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICONet	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
ID	identity document
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
JO	Joint Operation
MS	Member State
NM	nautical mile
OCG	organised crime group
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SIS	Schengen Information System
UK	United Kingdom
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USD	United States dollar
WB-ARA	Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis
WB-RAN	Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Note

As some Member States are unable to distinguish between the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) and Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), 'Congo' and 'Congolese' are used as collective terms for these two countries throughout this report unless otherwise indicated.

Executive summary

During the final quarter of 2012, several FRAN indicators varied radically compared to previous reporting periods. For example, there were just 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is the lowest ever recorded figure for any quarter since data collection began in early 2008. In contrast, both clandestine entries and asylum applications were at by far their highest levels since data collection began and, although falling slightly compared with the previous quarter, refusals of entry at the external border remained at one of the highest levels since 2009.

The reason for fewer detections of illegal border-crossing were the combined deterrent effects of the Greek operation Aspida, which involved the deployment of large numbers of additional police officers to the Greek land border with Turkey, and also the Greek operation Xenios Zeus that targeted irregular migrants in Athens and other urban areas.

The widespread effects of these operations are demonstrable with analyses of FRAN indicators. For example, detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land border with Turkey fell from being an undisputed hotspot for illegal entries during the first half of 2012, to almost negligible levels during the final quarter of the year. Detections of all nationalities fell to almost the same degree, which suggests that the effect was due to decreased vulnerability at the border, rather than changes to a push factor.

Following the Greek operation Xenios Zeus, the number of effective returns performed by Greece increased dramatically in Q4 2012, particularly of nationalities previously associated with detections of illegal border-crossing.

The well-publicised operations were also followed by increased detections away from the operational areas, which probably represent displacement effects away from the Greek land border with Turkey. These included increased detections of:

1. illegal border-crossing at the Greek sea border with Turkey;
2. illegal border-crossing at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey;
3. document fraudsters on flights from Istanbul, rather than Athens.

Despite the effect of these operations in reducing detections at the Greek land border with Turkey, there is currently no evidence to suggest that the absolute flow of irregular migrants arriving to the region has decreased in any way, although it's reasonable to assume that this may occur in the medium-term. Instead, reports suggest that migrants are currently waiting in Turkey, with some nationalities starting to integrate with Turkish society, while others consider alternative migration options. Moreover, most routes of secondary movements from Greece did not show signs of significant decline. These included detections of:

1. Afghans and Pakistanis as illegal border-crossers and clandestine entries across the Western Balkan region;
2. Afghans and Pakistanis arriving in Calabria and Apulia on pleasure boats from Greece;
3. fraudulent document-users on intra-Schengen flights from Greece (declining trend).

Elsewhere of the Eastern Mediterranean, there were more detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route from North Africa than during any other quarter of 2012, mostly Eritreans, Somalis and Gambians departing from Libya,



followed by Tunisians and Egyptians departing from their own countries. These journeys are increasingly dangerous because many arrived on very flimsy and often unseaworthy vessels due to the reported reduced availability of sturdy boats in Libya. Also significant to the safety of the migrants is the poor treatment they received from facilitators, who leave them uniformed and poorly equipped.

Across a wide range of indicators, irregular migration of Syrian migrants increased more than any other nationality during the final quarter of 2012, hence reflecting their desperate plight. For example, detections of Syrians illegally crossing the external border doubled to 1 200 in Q4 2012, mostly in Greece and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria, where they were also increasingly subject to decisions to leave. Also at the external border, Syrians were increasingly detected using fraudulent documents, such that they were ranked top among all nationalities, mostly departing from Istanbul. One result of the large flow of Syrian migrants across the border was a massive influx of Syrian asylum applications, which increased threefold to nearly 9 000, mostly in final destination countries such as Sweden and Germany. In fact 11% of all asylum applications in Q4 2012 were submitted by Syrians, amounting to more applications submitted by a single nationality in any given quarter since data collection began for this indicator.

With an overwhelming 31% of all applications submitted in the EU/Schengen area and following nearly a 43% increase compared to the previous quarter, Germany received by far the most applications for international protection and more than reported by any Member State in a single quarter since data collection began in early 2008.

Of all nationalities migrants from Afghanistan continued to represent the largest proportion of the threat of irregular migration to the EU in Q4 2012. For instance, Afghans ranked first among nationalities for illegal border-crossing and illegal stay both mostly in Greece, clandestine entries at BCPs mostly in Slovenia. As well as these indicators of irregular migration, migrants from Afghanistan also ranked second for asylum applications mostly in Germany.

The use of fraudulent documents continued to increase during the last few months of 2012. This was particularly the case for Albanian migrants who were the nationality most frequently detected using fraudulent documents at the external border. Specifically, they were using counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel history and extend periods of stay. In this case they were nearly exclusively detected on entry at the Greek-Albanian land border. Albanians were also the nationality most commonly detected with fraudulent documents between the Schengen area and the UK sometimes via Ireland. In this case they were detected on flights arriving in the UK but also while attempting to board flights leaving Italy and other Schengen states.

Refusals of entry were at an exceptionally high level in Q4 2012, with about 60% of refusals being from the land border and most of the remainder being from the sea border. As is usually the case, Poland refused the most migrants. The two most common refusal phenomena were Ukrainian nationals refused entry at the Polish land border with Ukraine, followed by Georgians refused entry at the Polish land border with Belarus. Ranked third was Albanians refused entry at the Greek land border with Albania. In total these three phenomena accounted for nearly a third of all refusals of entry at the EU level.

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

- feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
- a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and
- material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second, to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities undertaken by Member State border-control authorities to secure different border sections and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN Members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of RAU and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines, and the growing volume and complexity of data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.



2. Methodology

This, the 18th issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between October and December 2012 and exchanged between 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The release of this report coincides with a wide range of other Frontex risk analysis products including the Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) and the European Union Document-Fraud Annual Risk Analysis (EDF-ARA). For this reason the Q4 reports are shorter and less detailed than at other times of year, and do not include the chapter on third-country monitoring.

The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 document fraud (EDF-RAN)
- 7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 12 February 2013

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN Meeting, a proposal for a harmonised definition of the return indicator was outlined and several questions were presented in order to motivate discussion among FRAN Members in view of establishing the regular collection of monthly return data by Frontex. Subsequently, an online survey of FRAN Members was conducted to gather information and further motivate discussion to fine-tune the proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN report (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions of these indicators are included in an annex to that report. Data collection commenced in January 2011.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2007. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end of year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 18th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 15 January 2013. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to the FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which was added as part of the regular data exchange within the FRAN at the beginning of 2011.

In January 2012 the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud to illegally cross the external borders, and on all international flights. Data were backdated and joined with exchanged in a pilot phase.

The EDF-RAN data are checked for inconsistencies and corrections are made to reported totals to bring them in line with reported breakdowns. Corrections are also made to any three-letter nationality codes not present in the reference ISO list of nationality codes.*

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices. Nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active for at least a portion of Q4 2012. Namely, for sea borders they were JO Poseidon Sea 2012, JO Focal Points Sea 2012, JO Indalo 2012, JO Aeneas 2012, JO Hermes 2012, JO Hera 2012; for land borders – JO Poseidon Land 2012, JO Focal Points Land 2012; and for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2012.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express thanks to all FRAN and EDF-RAN Members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, and the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State representatives who responded to requests for additional information on key topics and emerging trends.

* <http://www.iso.org>



3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1. **Summary of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases as reported by Member States


FRAN indicator	2011		2012			2012 Q4		
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on	
							prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	38 530	28 325	13 636	23 095	22 093	13 613	-52	-38
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	64	84	116	126	168	195	132	16
2 Facilitators	1 546	1 614	2 105	1 785	1 712	2 118	31	24
3 Illegal stay	88 037	93 834	88 461	84 891	86 759	84 817	-9.6	-2.2
4 Refusals of entry	30 325	29 011	24 636	28 237	31 993	30 439	4.9	-4.9
5 Applications for asylum	67 413	71 874	56 857	59 591	72 314	83 446	16	15
7A Return decisions issued	57 389	67 310	69 904	67 891	71 129	61 025	-9.3	-14
7B Effective returns	37 639	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 258	42 157	1.4	10

Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between third and fourth quarters



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013



4. Situational picture in Q4 2012

- During Q4 2012 several FRAN indicators varied radically compared to previous reporting periods.
- There were 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is the lowest ever recorded figure since data collection began in early 2008.
- Asylum applications were at by far their highest level since data collection began in early 2008, with Syrians ranking first among nationalities, followed by Afghans.
- In Q4 2012 more Syrian migrants submitted claims for asylum than any other nationality in a single quarter since data collection began in 2009.
- Refusals of entry at the external border fell slightly compared with the previous quarter, but remained at one of the highest levels since the peak of 2009, mostly involving Ukrainians and Georgians refused entry to Poland, and Albanians refused entry to Greece.
- Detections of clandestine entry at BCPs continued to rise, once more reaching the highest level since data collection for this indicator began in 2009.
- Greek operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey continued throughout the reporting period, causing three weak displacement effects:
 - Illegal border-crossing at the Turkish sea border with Greece; in the Eastern Mediterranean region there were more detections at the sea than at the land border for the first time since late 2009, mostly of Afghans and Syrians;
 - Illegal border-crossing at the land border with Bulgaria, mostly Palestinians and Syrians;
 - Document fraudsters increasingly on flights from Istanbul rather than Athens.
- Despite fewer detections at the Greek land border with Turkey, there is no evidence to suggest that absolute flow of irregular migrants arriving in the region decreased. Instead, migrants were probably waiting in Turkey and considering other options.
- Most routes of secondary movements from Greece did not show signs of significant decline. These included:
 - Afghans and Pakistanis detected for illegal border-crossing and clandestine entry across the Western Balkans. In Q4 2012, Serbia detected more cases of illegal border-crossing than any EU Member State;
 - Afghans and Pakistanis arriving in Calabria and Apulia on pleasure boats from Greece;
 - use of fraudulent documents on intra-Schengen flights from Greece (declining trend).
- In Q4 2012, Afghans ranked first among nationalities for illegal border-crossing, clandestine entry at BCPs and illegal stay, and ranked second for asylum applications.
- Compared to the same period in 2011, most indicators increased significantly for Syrian nationals across a wide range of Member States reflecting their desperate plight. These included:
 - illegal border-crossing doubled in Greece and also increased in Bulgaria;
 - asylum applications increased threefold to nearly 9 000, mostly in final destination countries such as Sweden and Germany;
 - illegal stay increased nearly threefold, in Sweden (asylum seekers) and Greece;
 - number of migrants that were subject to decisions to leave increased nearly threefold, in Greece and Bulgaria (illegal border-crossers);

- use of fraudulent documents – increased throughout 2012, now ranking top among nationalities, mostly departing from Istanbul.

■ There were more detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route from North Africa than during the pre-Arab Spring peak of 2011, mostly involving Eritreans, Somalis and Gambians departing from Libya, followed by Tunisians departing from their own countries.

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

Overall in Q4 2012 there were 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which was the lowest figure since data collection began in early 2008. The low number of detections compared to other quarters was due to vastly increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where in recent years the majority of migrants were detected (operation Aspida, see next section). Reduced detections were also in part due to the overlapping effects of the end of the Arab Spring in its initial countries (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) and far fewer detections of Albanian circular migrants detected illegally crossing the land border into Greece.

For the first time since 2010 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the external sea border (59%) than at the land border, which reflects the increasing importance of the Central Mediterranean route, and increased detections in the Aegean Sea in response to Greek operational activity at the land border with Turkey. Of the top five reporting border sections, two were in Greece. The border sections reporting the most detections in Q4 2012 were:

1. the Italian Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa), where there were increased arrivals of Eritreans and Somalis;

2. the Greek Aegean Sea, to where Afghans and Syrians were increasingly displaced from the Greek land border with Turkey;
3. the Greek land border with Albania with a significant trend of Albanian circular migrants, now ranking second at the EU level;
4. the Spanish land border with Morocco, where there was a steady trend of unknown nationalities (probably sub-Saharan) and Algerians;
5. the Bulgarian land border with Turkey, to where Palestinians and Syrians were increasingly displaced from the Greek land border with Turkey.

4.1.1. Greek operations Aspida and Xenios Zeus

On 30 July 2012, the Hellenic Police Headquarters announced the temporary deployment of 1 881 additional police officers and technical equipment to the Evros region for a planned period of two months of the operation Aspida (Greek for 'Shield'). The operation was extremely successful in reducing the flow of irregular migrants across the border (see FRAN Quarterly Q3 2012) and so was first extended until 2 January 2013 and subsequently until March 2013. At the time of writing, this operation is still active and, in combination with JOs Poseidon Land and Sea 2013, which were concurrently active during the reporting period, is having very significant effects on detections of irregular migration across the Eastern Mediterranean region and beyond.

Specifically, the well-publicised enhanced surveillance and patrolling activities at the Greek-Turkish land border, as well as an extension of the detention period to up to one year, resulted in a drastic drop in the number of apprehended irregular migrants from approximately 2 000 during the first week of August to fewer than ten per week in each of the last few weeks of October and beyond.



Immediately after the deployment of the operation Aspida detections of illegal border-crossing at Turkey's sea border with Greece and land border with Bulgaria both began to increase, indicating weak displacement effects from the operational area. Furthermore, according to EDF-RAN data, there was also an increase in detections of migrants using fraudulent documents on flights from Istanbul, where many migrants are apparently waiting for the conclusion of the operation Aspida.

In order to cope with the new situation the Bulgarian authorities initiated a specialised police operation including the reinforcement of manpower and the deployment of technical assets. Regular bilateral joint meetings for the prevention and resolving of border incidents are taking place under the signed agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey. At this moment, the Turkish authorities only accept the readmission of Turkish citizens and documented Syrians.

In turn, the operation Xenios Zeus is focused on detecting migrants in land in urban areas around Athens. In Q3 2012 this operation

did not have any detectable effects within the scope of the FRAN indicators, but in the current reporting period there was a rise in the number of effective returns performed by Greece.


4.1.2. EU summaries

While useful for summary purposes, EU-level figures conceal considerable variation within and among Member States, nationalities and the major irregular-migration routes. For example, in contrast to the overall decline, in Q4 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing significantly increased at a wide range of border sections. Hence, the overall decrease was driven by far fewer detections just at the Greek land border with Turkey.

More detections were reported by Italy than any other Member State, and more were reported from the Italian Pelagic Islands than any other border section. Somalis continued to arrive in Lampedusa in increasing numbers, but this development was overshadowed by a massive increase in the number of Eritreans arriving in Lampedusa and Malta from October onwards.

Figure 2. **Despite fewer detections of illegal border-crossing in Q4 2012 than during any other quarter since data collection began in 2008, detections at the sea border were actually at the highest level for over a year**

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders
Horizontal lines indicate yearly average



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2010. The final quarter of each year is usually influenced by weather conditions less favourable for both approaching and illegally crossing the external border of the EU. Correspondingly, poor conditions for illegal border-crossing also render it more difficult to detect such attempts. The combination of these two effects means that the final quarter of each year has usually been associated with fewer detections than during the summer months.

In Q4 2012 detections were particularly low compared to other quarters of 2012 and also compared to previous fourth quarters. The former comparison is explained by the deterrent effect of the Greek operation Aspida, while the longer-term decline illustrated by the horizontal lines in Figure 2 (yearly average) is more to do with the absence in 2012 of two disparate but overlapping phenomena:

1. In 2010, nearly a third of all detections were of Albanian circular migrants illegally entering Greece. This flow was reduced by 85% in 2011 and 2012 since Albanians were granted visa-free access to the Schengen area;
2. In 2011 there was a temporary surge of illegal border-crossing in response to the Arab Spring uprising in several North African countries.

Consistent with the majority of reporting periods both before and after the 2011 Arab Spring, at the EU level the migrants most commonly detected illegally crossing the external border were from Afghanistan (1 969); however, following a massive decrease at their most common entry point, this was the lowest figure for this nationality since early 2011. More than half of all Afghans were detected illegally entering Greece from Turkey, while much of the remainder were detected

making secondary movements either across the land border into Hungary or across the Ionian Sea to southern Italy. Albanians, who ranked second at the EU level, were also mostly detected in Greece but at their own land border and still in much reduced numbers since they gained visa-free status in late 2010. Migrants from Eritrea, ranked third following steep increases at the end of the year, were mostly detected arriving in Lampedusa and Malta on boats from Libya.

Other nationalities in the top five were migrants from Syria, who were detected in lower numbers at the Greek land border with Turkey, where they were increasingly common prior to the Greek operation Aspida, and migrants from Somalia, who continued to arrive in Lampedusa in significant numbers.


The 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing in Q4 2012 were the result of combined detections in 15 Member States, many of which experienced differing trends. Figure 3 (overleaf) illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing among ten Member States during the fourth quarters of both 2011 and 2012 (size of circles), and also the degree of change between the two reporting periods (slopes). In the current reporting period Italy reported the most detections of illegal border-crossing, closely followed by Greece. Together these two Member States accounted for over 60% of all detections in the EU.

In Q4 2012, most (nine) Member States reported increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period of the previous year, albeit from relatively low bases (Fig. 3). For example, detections in Malta rose sevenfold, from Q4 2011 to Q4 2012, mostly due to increased detections of Eritreans, who also played a major role in doubling the number of detections in Italy compared to a year previously. A large percentage increase was also reported by Bulgaria, particularly at the land border, to where Palestinians and Syr-



Figure 3. In Q4 2012 there were far fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than during the same period in 2011, driven almost entirely by fewer detections in Greece following increased operational activity at the land border with Turkey


Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q4 2011 and Q4 2012 for the top ten Member States shown by size of circles; gradient of the lines indicates the percentage change



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

Figure 4. In Q4 2012 there were decreased detections of nationalities normally associated with the Greek border with Turkey, contrasting with increased detections of nationalities that tend to arrive via the Central Mediterranean region

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q4 2011 and Q4 2012 for the top ten nationalities shown by size of circles; gradient of the lines indicates the percentage change



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

ians were displaced by operational activity in Greece.

In contrast to increases in most Member States, just five reported reduced detections: Greece, Spain, Romania, Hungary and Lithuania. Spain reported significant reductions but these were mostly in line with seasonal expectations. However, it was the 81% reduction in Greece that drove the overall decline in illegal border-crossing, as Greece tends to report the most illegal border-crossers and was subject to by far the biggest reduction in detections in terms of both percentage and absolute change.

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these trends by nationality of migrants. Figure 4 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing of the top ten nationalities during the fourth quarters of 2011 and 2012 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes).

Despite an over 73% reduction compared with Q4 2011, at 1 969 detections, migrants from Afghanistan still ranked first among nationalities, followed by circular migrants from Albania (Fig. 4).

Despite recent decreases associated with the operation Aspida, migrants from Syria ranked third at the EU level, representing a major issue during the second half of 2012. There were twice as many detections in Q4 2012 compared with a year previously but this vastly understates the flow of Syrians towards the EU in response to the civil war in Syria. For instance, there was more than a sixfold increase between the third quarters of 2011 and 2012, and Syrians were also increasingly detected among a range of other indicators of irregular migration such as illegal stay, document fraud and being subject to decisions to leave the EU.

During the final quarter of 2012, the nationality with the fastest growing number of detections of illegal border-crossing in terms of absolute increase was Eritreans: up almost threefold from 352 in Q4 2011 to nearly 1 300 in the current reporting period. Detections of migrants from Mali increased more sharply but from a lower base: from 37 to 379 over the same period. In both cases, these migrants were almost exclusively detected in Lampedusa having left on small fishing boats from Libya.

As regards the distribution of nationalities among key border sections in Q4 2012, detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level were no longer dominated by detections in Greece, with more detections and a wider range of nationalities reported by Italy. For the first time since 2010, detections in Greece more commonly involved Albanian circular migrants detected at the Greek land border with Albania than any other nationality. Also commonly detected in Greece were Afghans and, to a lesser extent, Syrians, both at the sea border with Turkey. The detections of Eritreans and Somalis in Italy surged compared to Q4 2011.

Not all of these detections represent initial entries to the EU at the external borders, as they sometimes capture secondary movements of migrants that had previously entered Greece. For instance in Apulia and, to a lesser extent, in Calabria, Pakistanis and Afghans were detected after having crossed the Ionian Sea on pleasure boats from Greece, and Afghans were also detected crossing the Hungarian land border from Serbia.

4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes, relating to regions of detection rather than linear



routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 5, during the final quarter of 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing on the three main irregular migration routes converged to very similar levels with only 2 000 detections separating the three main routes.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, detections tend to be characterised by Asian and some North African migrants illegally crossing the border from Turkey into Greece. In the second half of 2012, detections were much reduced following increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey (Aspida), where most detections were previously reported. In response, detections increased elsewhere in the region, though to a much lesser extent, resulting in an overall decrease in Q4 2012 (Fig. 5).


On the main Central Mediterranean route, which includes the Italian Pelagic Islands (e.g. Lampedusa) and Malta, detections tend to be of migrants arriving on boats from North Africa. In some cases migrants arrive from their

countries of origin such as Tunisia or Egypt, whereas other migrants, typically from sub-Saharan countries depart from countries in which facilitation is available and affordable and where detection by national authorities is thought to be low. Currently, Libya fulfils these criteria for most long-distance migrants to the area.

During Q3 2012 detections in the Central Mediterranean were higher than at any point during 2009 or 2010, following increased detections of Somalis and Eritreans and a steady and significant trend of Tunisians. In Q4 2012 there was an overall decline in the number of migrants arriving in the region mostly due to fewer North African nationalities such as Tunisians and Egyptians. However, there was a surge of migrants from sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea, the Gambia and Mali, all of which were detected in much higher numbers than during the previous quarter – hence opposing seasonal declines expected at this time of year and observed for many other nationalities.

Figure 5. **Towards the end of 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing fell in the Eastern Mediterranean but followed a steady trend elsewhere, resulting in a much narrower range of detections between major irregular migration routes**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013

4.2.1. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a major hotspot of irregular migration into the Schengen area. Detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern invariably peaking in the third quarter of each year (Fig. 6) and concentrated at the border between Greece and Turkey, with a shift from the sea border to the land border visible in late 2009.

In recent quarters the most commonly detected have been migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria and, more recently, Syria. In Q4 2012 the most commonly detected migrants in this region were from Afghanistan, Syria and Palestine but all in much reduced numbers than previously reported.

A new trend among the migrants from Greece has been recently noticed: the voluntary return to Turkey, either through the legal chan-


nel (having a laissez-passer issued by the national embassy and trying to cross through the BCP Kipi), or illegally by trying to cross the Greek-Turkish border. They are mainly Syrian nationals and, to a lesser extent, nationals of Somalia, Iraq or Egypt. They may be returning to Turkey either to facilitate more migrants (as many of them have been waiting in Greece for a long time and are in desperate need of money), or to find another route to reach their final destinations.

Secondary movements

Despite decreased detections at its land border with Turkey, Greece was still a major entry point for detections of illegal border-crossing in Q4 2012. However, as Greece is a Schengen exclave and mostly a transit rather than destination country, a similar composition of nationalities were also detected making secondary movements from Greece, and attempting to re-enter the Schengen area heading for their final destination countries.

Figure 6. **Following the launch of the Greek operation Aspida at the Greek land border with Turkey, in Q4 2012 detections at the sea border of the Eastern Mediterranean region exceeded those from the land border for the first time in more than three years**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs at the Greek land and sea border with Turkey



Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2013



In Q4 2012, these movements tended to be reflected in the detections of:

- illegal border-crossing and clandestine entries throughout the Western Balkan land borders;
- migrants landing at the blue border of the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria;
- clandestines and document fraudsters on board ferries to Italy (Ancona, Venice);
- document fraudsters travelling on flights from Greek airports to many major EU airports.

Western Balkans

There were more than 10 500 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported at borders between Western Balkan countries themselves or at their borders with the neighbouring EU Member States. The number was 24% higher than during the same period in 2011 and 19% higher than during the previous quarter, which is surprising given the poorer weather conditions at this time of year. Nearly all of the increase was due to more detections reported by Croatia. In fact, under the framework of the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network, there were more detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Croatia and Serbia than by any EU Member State.

The growth of detections at the Croatian and Slovenian borders also appears to be resulting from a partial westward shift in the routing as the irregular migrants were increasingly attempting to cross from Serbia to Croatia and further to Slovenia rather than to Hungary or Romania.

Italian Ionian coast

For some time there has been a steady flow of Afghans and, to a lesser extent, Pakistanis arriving at the southern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia, with some very large


increases during Q3 2012. Apparently, many of them had been previously resident in Greece for several years, while some Afghan nationals claimed to have worked in Pakistan for six years, but due to the bad social and working conditions decided to return to Afghanistan and then to move to Europe to improve their economic situation.

In contrast, in Q4 2012 other nationalities, such as Syrian, Bangladeshi and Egyptian, responded to the seasonal weather changes and were correspondingly detected in much lower numbers than during the previous quarter.

The JO Aeneas 2012 in Apulia and Calabria started on 2 July and was extended until 2 January 2013. Overall, the percentage of incidents which involved departures from Greece was as high as 78% (Fig. 7). According to operational reports, the decrease in the number of arrivals in Apulia and Calabria from August 2012 was due the implementation of the Greek police operation Aspida stemming the flow of migrants. However, adding to the flow were Greek police operations against irregular migration in the centre of Athens and in other cities of Greece which continued to push irregular migrants out of Greece.

Most of the boats departing from Greece are pleasure boats as opposed to fishing boats

Figure 7. **Total number of vessels detected during JO Aeneas (2 July–25 November 2012) by country of departure**



Source: JO Aeneas 2012

that arrive from North Africa. For example, Figure 8 shows two boats that were detected in November, a white luxury twin-engine speed boat arrived in Calabria from Greece with a smaller black dinghy in tow for disembarkation. There were 20 migrants on board.

Intra-Schengen flights

In Q4 2012, there were nearly 900 detections of migrants travelling on intra-Schengen flights with fraudulent documents. These intra-Schengen document fraudsters were mostly detected by Italy (entry and exit) and Greece (exit), where numbers were increasing throughout 2012, and, to a lesser extent, by Germany (entry), where numbers were decreasing. Syrians continued to be the most detected nationality particularly on flights between Greece and Germany, followed by increasing numbers of Somalis on flights both ways between Italy and Denmark.

4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean massively fluctuated in size and composition during 2011, largely due to the political and civil unrest across North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. Since Q4 2011, the situation has significantly improved following better cooperation between Italian and Tunisian authorities concerning the return of Tunisian nationals.

According to FRAN data, in Q4 2012 there were 3 476 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route (Italian Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Malta), almost exactly the same number as in the previous quarter and significantly higher than any other quarter both before and after the Arab Spring. However, this figure concealed seasonal decreases for some commonly nationalities and significant increases for others.



Figure 8. **In November, a luxury twin-engine speed boat was detected carrying 20 migrants from Greece to Calabria, with a dinghy in tow for disembarkation**

Since early 2011, migrants from Tunisia have been among the most commonly detected migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean region. During the previous quarter they ranked first among nationalities detected in the region with around 1 000 detections. However, in Q4 2012 detections of Tunisian migrants in the Central Mediterranean fell to just 230, which can probably be interpreted as a seasonal decline. Based on this interpretation, an increase in the number of detected Tunisians should be expected in 2013.

In accordance with the 'Processo Verbale' of 5 April 2011 (an agreement between Italy and Tunisia on cooperation in the field of migration policy) in November and December 2012, Tunisian nationals were returned to Tunis or were recovered by the Tunisian authorities in international waters. In 2012, Italian authorities delivered two patrol boats to the Tunisian authorities in order to improve the fight against the trafficking of human beings and irregular immigration. Consistent with declining numbers of Tunisians, detections of Egyptian migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean region also fell, in this case from 287 in Q3 to just 135 in Q4 2012.



Figure 9. Sub-Saharan migrants arrived in the Central Mediterranean aboard inflatable boats from Libya, where there is now a shortage of wooden and metal boats

In contrast to decreased detections of migrants from North Africa, there were significant increases compared to the previous quarter, in detections of migrants from several sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea (+200%), the Gambia (+90%) and Mali (+350%), as well as a steady and significant flow of migrants from Somalia, now ranked second in the region behind Eritreans. Most of these migrants departed from Libya, where, due to a paucity of ground vehicles and boats, low technical and professional levels of the new police forces, the situation of the migration management by

the Libyan authorities remains critical, both on land and at sea (Fig. 9).

In 2012, Italy conducted a series of training programmes for the Libyan police in the framework of the SAH-MED Project; in November a meeting was held at the IMO headquarters in Rome under the framework of the implementation of the SAH-MED Project, with the aim of involving the Italian Council for Refugees (CIR), in relation to the issues of humanitarian assistance and protection of rights, taking into account the changed needs of Libya at the end of the war.

There was also a very large increase in the number of Syrians detected in the Central Mediterranean region from just five in Q3 to nearly 100 in Q4 2012, which is consistent with widespread increased detections of this nationality across border sections. However, there is currently no evidence to suggest that the Central Mediterranean area is likely to become the main point of entry for Syrian migrants.

The JO Hermes 2012 was originally scheduled to finish on 31 October 2012, but after requests from the hosting Member States and based on risk analyses, decisions were taken to extend the JO first until 15 December 2012 and further on until 31 January 2013. The JO Hermes 2012 Extension was established to support the Italian authorities in tackling maritime illegal migration on the coasts of Sicily, Pantelleria and the Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa, Linosa, Lampione).

Prices for the facilitation from the Horn of Africa towards Italy range between USD 1 200 and USD 1 500 per person. Migrants reach Khartoum/Sudan by themselves and start to pay facilitation networks from there. Migrants from West Africa and sub-Saharan countries often do not use the help of facilitation networks until they reach the border of Libya and pay significantly less.

There are still reports about extreme violence against black African nationals in Libya. Most of the migrants reported to have been beaten by Libyan police after being arrested and also by members of the facilitation networks.

The big Somali community in Abu Slim/Tripoli is the main gathering point for migrants originating from the Horn of Africa. From there, a second destination close to the beach is the final stopover before embarking the boats for the crossing to Italy. Some migrants reported that they got afraid when seeing the relatively small rubber dinghies and refused to enter them. Armed guards beat them and forced them to board the boats, not letting anyone leave.

4.2.3. Western Mediterranean route

In Q4 2012 there were nearly 1 900 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, where almost exactly half of all detections were reported. Going into the final quarter of the year there were vastly increased detections of migrants from Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Guinea arriving in the region of Cadiz.

As has been the case for several years, the most commonly detected migrants were from Algeria, followed by migrants of unknown nationality (presumed to be sub-Saharan Africans), both of which were mostly reported from the land borders with Morocco.

Since the beginning of October there were several attempts to cross the fence in Melilla. The most serious involved around 300 sub-Saharanans, of which around 100 succeeded in passing the fence but were subsequently found and returned to Morocco. According to open sources the incident occurred in the Gold River area unusually in broad daylight and, as a result, the top of the six-feet high



© Noelia Ramos

Figure 10. In October a group of around 300 sub-Saharanans attempted to enter Melilla by jumping the fence

fence was visibly damaged. The incident is the largest on a single day on the Melilla border since 2005. These reports are consistent with growing migrant settlements in the region which indicate an increasing likelihood of further events.

The JO Indalo 2012 started in this region on 16 May and ran until 31 October 2012 covering five zones of the south-eastern Spanish sea border and extending into the western Mediterranean. Consistent with previous years, the operational area of the JO Indalo continued to be affected by migratory flows mainly originating from North African and sub-Saharan countries, which follow a similar seasonal pattern. Overall there was a 4% decrease in



© Frontex 2012

Figure 11. During the JO Indalo 2012 there was a steady trend of migrants detected arriving along the Spanish coast, often in inflatable boats



the number of irregular migrants detected compared to the JO Indalo 2011.

There were almost equal numbers of irregular migrants claiming to be from North African countries and the sub-Saharan region. According to the operational data, sub-Saharan migrants claimed to originate mostly from Chad, Guinea Conakry and Mali, whilst most of the migrants from North African countries claimed to be from Algeria and Morocco.


4.2.4. Western African route

In the final quarter of 2012, there were just 91 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, which is more than double the number reported during the previous quarter and goes against expected seasonal declines at this time of year. This increase was almost entirely due to migrants from the Gambia, who arrived in the Canary Islands in December significantly adding to the consistent but relatively low flow of Moroccans arriving in this area.

Despite the arrivals of Gambians, the total number of 91 detections was still lower than during the same period in 2011 (i.e. 112, almost exclusively Moroccans). The high level of cooperation between the Spanish, Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities performing joint patrols at sea and on the coastline of these countries has been a significant deterrent factor to prevent irregular migration flows from Senegal and Mauritania towards the Canary Islands.

According to information collected during interviews, Moroccan migrants were:

- mainly lower-class single adult males who were lacking opportunities of work, welfare and access to public health services;
- mainly Arabic-speaking migrants who were undocumented to avoid repatria-



© Frontex 2012

Figure 12. **Most migrants arriving in the Canary Islands were Moroccans aboard small patera-type boats**

tion after their disembarkation to the Canary Islands;

- in contact with relatives or friends in EU Member States, mainly in France and Spain, who would help them to find a job and to settle within ethnic communities already established in these countries.

Most migration incidents in 2012 involved migrant boats targeting the Canary Islands without facilitators on board.

4.2.5. Eastern borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and many countries of origins. Also according to several bi-monthly analytical reports shared at the end of 2012, visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate on this route, as opposed to detections of il-

legal border-crossing (see Section 4.8. Document fraud).

In Q4 2012, there were just 437 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which is almost exactly the same figure as for the previous quarter. However, this stable trend in the total number conceals much variation between nationalities. For example, there was a sharp increase in detections of migrants from Vietnam, coinciding with stable trends of migrants from Georgia and Somalia, and fewer detections of migrants from the Russian Federation and Moldova.

According to open sources, 56 Vietnamese migrants were caught in 2012 while trying to cross to border from the Russian Federation to Estonia. Starting from the autumn of 2011 there was a significant increase in detections of illegal border-crossing committed by Vietnamese observed by Estonian, Lithuanian and Polish border guards. In all these cases their destination countries were Poland or Germany (see Section 4.4. Detections of facilitators).

The Action Plan of the Ministry of Education of Belarus (2011–2015) suggests that the number of foreign students in Belarusian universities should grow to three times the current level such that Belarusian high schools would accommodate some 15 000 foreign students. According to state statistics for 2011, only 2% of all students of universities in Belarus were foreigners, mostly citizens of Turkmenistan, China and Syria.

The size of the Syrian diaspora in Belarus is estimated to be approximately 70 000 persons, which is probably a strong pull factor for Syrians hoping to move towards the EU. Most are citizens of Belarus or have dual citizenship, gained automatically as they were living in Belarus while it gained independence from the Russian Federation. This is



Figure 13. According to open sources, in early 2013 a group of 27 Vietnamese nationals and one Armenian were caught trying to cross Estonia's southern border from the Russian Federation; below Estonian border guards patrolling the green border

also the main reason why official statistics about foreigner residents living in Belarus vastly underestimate the actual size of foreigner communities.

At the Latvian border with the Russian Federation, the Russian Federal Border Guard Service continued to detect Africans with forged travel documents heading towards the Schengen area. On some occasions, migrants whose travel documents were in question were denied boarding trains.

The situation in Syria is used by other third-country nationals who arrive at BCPs, identifying themselves as Syrian nationals in order to ask for asylum.



4.2.6. Western Balkans route

There were 10 699 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported at both common and regional borders. The number was 24% higher compared to corresponding quarter in 2011 and 19% higher when compared with the previous quarter.

At the regional level the picture is mixed. The total number of detected cases reported by EU Member States (Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece) decreased by 12% (2 846) in Q4 2012 compared with the previous quarter, but at the same time Serbia reported the highest quarterly figure since the start of the WB-RAN in 2010. Moreover, Croatia reported a very strong growth (+80%) in comparison with the previous quarter. It is notable that the numbers of detections by Serbia and Croatia in the fourth quarter were higher than of any EU Member State, including Greece.

These observations would indicate that the Xenios Zeus and Aspida operations in Greece, that resulted in plunging numbers of detections at the Greek-Turkish land border, did not yet have the expected corresponding impact on the secondary movements from Greece through the Western Balkans. A possible explanation may be that those irregular migrants detected in Western Balkan countries had stayed in Greece for a longer period of time before opting to leave the country due to lack of job opportunities and/or increased inland activities by the Greek police. The Western Balkans route may have become more popular also due to increased controls at Greek ports on the route towards Italy.

Considering the trends in the Western Balkans, the trend of detections on the route from Greece via the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Serbia remains relatively stable with a 17% rise compared to the previous quarter and a 7.9% decrease

in comparison to the fourth quarter of 2011. However, the pressure grew substantially at the northern end of the route compared with the previous quarter, particularly at the Croatia-Serbia (+66%) and Croatia-Slovenia (+98%) border sections. The difference might result from a time gap in the movement of migrants from the southern part of the area towards the north.

The growth in detections at the Croatian and Slovenian borders also appears to be resulting from a partial westward shift in the routing as the irregular migrants were increasingly attempting to cross from Serbia to Croatia and further to Slovenia rather than to Hungary or Romania.

In terms of nationalities, two-thirds of all detections (over 6 600) continued to be linked to migrants who had entered the Western Balkans en route from Greece (i.e. Afghans, Pakistanis, Somalis, Syrians, Eritreans and Algerians). Despite a slightly lower number of Afghans, they remained the largest nationality. The number of detected Syrians continued to rise steeply compared to the previous quarter (+141%). Of the top ten nationalities, nationals of Eritrea and Mali were the fastest growing group of migrants in comparison with the previous quarter.

Detections of Albanian nationals remained relatively stable in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 2011 (+3.8%), though grew (+22%) in relation to the previous quarter.

Hiding in vehicles

Detections of migrants hiding in vehicles continued to increase during the fourth quarter of 2012, both compared to the third quarter (+8.4%) and the corresponding quarter of 2011 (+56). More precisely, there were 803 migrants detected illegally crossing the border at BCPs, mostly reported by Serbia, followed by Croatia and Slovenia. The border

section between Croatia and Serbia became the top reporting section with a 26% share of the regional total.

Similar to detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, Serbia also detected the largest share (40%) of all cases of illegal border-crossing at BCPs.

Afghans remained the top detected nationality with a 26% share (207). Similar to detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, the number of Syrians detected at BCPs increased significantly (+480%, 116) against the previous quarter.

There is considerable variation in the *modus operandi* as regards the points of departure (either non-stop from Greece or over several legs through the Western Balkans) and types of vehicles used (cars, buses, cargo/passenger trains). In some reported cases irregular migrants were found in cargo carriages of international trains departing from Greece, hidden in containers.

The direct route from Greece via Western Balkan countries to the EU appears to be more costly and requires better organisation, while the journey made over several legs through Western Balkan countries is cheaper and probably more improvised. Inside Western Balkan countries, migrants most probably board lorries at truck rest stops.

These trends suggest that more migrants en route from Greece still opt for crossing the regional and common borders hidden in vehicles (as reported in previous Western Balkans Quarterlies and WB-ARA 2012). It should be pointed out that this *modus operandi* involves a high risk of loss of life, especially when closed hidden compartments are used in cars, buses, trains and freight containers.

Claiming asylum to circumvent entry provisions

The share of the six Western Balkan countries rose from 1 012 in the third quarter to 1 220 in the fourth quarter. In conclusion, claiming asylum in the Western Balkans itself and absconding afterwards continues to grow as a part of the well-known *modus operandi* to move from Greece towards other EU Member States (secondary movements).

Overall asylum applications increased substantially both compared with the previous quarter (33%) and the corresponding quarter of 2011 (+39). However, there was a considerable variation between the countries considering the trends and top nationalities. There was a strong increase in asylum applications in Greece (50%), which was for the most part due to an increased number of applications by nationals of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Hungary, Afghan nationals were the largest group, followed by Kosovans*, Pakistanis and Syrians.

In Bulgaria, asylum applications more than doubled. Applications of Syrian nationals – mostly made inland – grew more than twice in the fourth quarter and accounted for 40% of the Bulgaria's total. This is most probably due to the shift of detections of illegal border-crossing from the Greek-Turkish land border towards the Bulgarian-Turkish border. In Romania, however, the trend was quite opposite with decreasing numbers of applications both by Pakistani and Syrian nationals.

Considering the nationalities of the region, Kosovans* increasingly applied for asylum in Hungary.

A steep increase in asylum applications in Montenegro that started in the second quarter continued in Q4. The phenomenon was

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

largely driven by applicants from Algeria who were en route from Greece through Albania.

The number of asylum applications in Serbia was at a very low level compared with other indicators. This is due to the fact that most migrants expressed their wish to claim asylum but later absconded without formally submitting an asylum application.

4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections confirmed to be clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport) results in extremely low detections for the whole of the EU especially compared with other indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs. For example, in Q4 2012, only 195 detections were reported from the whole FRAN community (see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans route). Nevertheless, this was the highest number of clandestine entry detections since data collection began for this indicator in 2009, and, following steady increases throughout 2012, it was more than double the number reported a year previously in Q4 2011.



© Frontex 2012

Figure 14. **Well-prepared migrants were detected with equipment to assist in attempts of clandestine entry**

Some of the increase throughout 2012 was due to increased detections reported by Slovenia and Bulgaria. In the case of Slovenia, which reported more detections in Q4 2012 than any other Member State, most of the increases were due to Afghan migrants increasingly detected at the border with Croatia. Nearly all of these Afghan migrants were making secondary movements after initially entering the Schengen area in Greece (see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans route). In Bulgaria the increased detections of clandestine entries at BCPs were due to more migrants from Syria and Palestine, who were increasingly detected at the land border with Turkey – probably as a displacement effect from the Greek land border with Turkey.

According to data collected during Focal Points Land 2012, hiding aboard cargo trains has become one of the most common *modi operandi* of illegal border-crossing from Greece into Western Balkan countries. Specifically, irregular migrants hide on cargo trains in Thessaloniki or close to the railway BCP Idomeni at the Greek border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The migrants jump off cargo trains at the first stop in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and then continue towards Serbia either as:

1. regular passengers aboard passenger trains;
2. regular passengers aboard other public transportation; or
3. hidden aboard other trains.

In Q4 2012, safe houses in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, organised by Afghan, Pakistani and Arabic-speaking facilitators close to the border with Serbia, were offering irregular migrants shelter for a couple of days when weather conditions prevented crossing the border to Serbia on foot (Fig 15).

In contrast to the low number of detections of clandestine entry at the external border, there were more detections within the EU/



Figure 15. **A safe house close to the city of Lojane in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, close to the border with Serbia, where migrants were able to shelter**

Schengen area (470). Although higher than at the external border, this figure was a reduction of around a half compared to the previous quarter. The geographical distribution of these 'internal' detections sheds light on the direction of secondary movements and the final destination countries selected by each nationality. For example, the UK (247) and Italy (172) reported the greatest number of internally detected clandestine irregular migrants. The most significant trends were increasing numbers of Albanians detected attempting entry to the UK (probably using the ferry connections and the Channel Tunnel), and fewer Afghans arriving in Ancona, (Italy) hidden on ferries from Greece.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding an increase during the first few months of 2011, detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which allows facilitators to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.



Figure 16. **An organised crime group was detected applying for Czech residence permits for non-EU citizens based on sham marriages**

In contrast to this long-term decline, in Q4 2012, there were 2 118 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, which is an increase of 24% since the previous quarter, and the largest number of facilitators detected in a single quarter for over two years (Fig. 1).

The total EU-level detections of facilitators of irregular migration tend to be made up of several disparate trends involving unrelated nationalities detected for a range of activities in different Member States. For example, much of the increase during the last quarter of 2012 was due to more detections of Moroccan and Spanish nationals inland in Spain, whereas significant decreases were reported in the number of Italian facilitators detected in Italy.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; very often most of the top reporting countries for this indicator tend to report their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. However, on this occasion Spain reported more Moroccan, Hungary detected more Serbian and Greece detected more Albanian facilitators than domestic ones.

© ifado.consilium.europa.eu




Figure 17. **In Q4 2012 Spain reported more facilitators of irregular migration than any other Member State, and more than double the number compared to the same period in 2011**

Spain reported more facilitators of irregular migration than any other Member State, and more than double the number reported a year previously in Q4 2011 (Fig. 17). A lot of this increase was due to more Moroccan facilitators detected inland, as well as more Pakistanis, Dominicans and Iranians.

4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q4 2012, there were nearly 85 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is more or less a stable trend compared to the year

before and compared to most recent reporting periods. This is consistent with a stable but slightly declining long-term trend over the last two years (Fig. 1). However, this long-term decline masks much variation among Member States.

The vast majority of migrants staying illegally were detected inland (68 319) and so are presumed to be long-term illegal stayers as, at the time of detection, they were making no attempt to leave. The next most common location for detections of illegal




Figure 18. In Q4 2012, Germany detected the most illegal stayers in Q4 2012, with Syrians, Brazilians and Georgians showing the most increasing trends

stayers was on exit at the air (8 472), followed by the land borders (4 754) whereby illegally staying migrants were leaving the EU or Schengen area, which may have included those that were overstaying by short periods.

Germany reported by far the most detections of migrants staying illegally, followed by Sweden. However, in Sweden nearly all reported illegal stayers were actually asylum seekers, and so are not considered further here. In Germany there was a 24% increase

in the number of detections of illegal stayers with a steady trend of Afghans as the most commonly detected nationality. In contrast, detections of Syrians (inland), Brazilians (air border) and Georgians (inland) all increased significantly in Germany throughout 2012.

Of the exchanged data that were suitable for analysis (Swedish data included asylum seekers and all inland detections in Switzerland were of unknown nationalities), the most significant phenomena relating to illegal stay were Algerians detected inland in Belgium,




Figure 19. In Q4 2012, nearly a third of all refusals of entry were issued by Poland, where Ukrainians and Georgians were most commonly refused entry at land border with Ukraine and Belarus, respectively

Moroccans detected inland in Spain and Pakistanis detected in Greece. What is surprising is that, despite reporting the most illegally staying migrants, Germany does not appear high up in the list of phenomena (linked to single nationalities) – this is because in Q4 2012 Germany detected over 130 different nationalities of illegally staying migrants in relatively low numbers per nationality, whereas Austria only reported around 90 nationalities but in average higher numbers of each.

4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q4 2012, there were nearly 32 000 refusals of entry at the external border, with about 60% refused from the land border and most of the remainder being refused from the sea border. In the context of recent years this figure has only been exceeded in a single quarter on two occasions since data collection began in early 2009. One of those occasions was in the previous quarter, suggesting that refusals of entry are currently in a period of extremely high frequency.




Figure 20. In Q4 2012, nearly half of all asylum applications were submitted either in Sweden or in Germany, where more applications were submitted than in any other Member State in a single quarter since data collection began in 2008

Note: For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the Netherlands, inland asylum applications in Q3 and Q4 2012 and the breakdown by nationality for inland asylum applications for all of 2012 are not available at this moment.

As has been the case for most other reporting periods, Poland refused the most migrants (Fig. 19), mainly Ukrainian nationals at their land border. Overall more than two-thirds of all refused Ukrainian nationals were refused entry by Poland but the percentage was even higher for Georgians, 94% of whom were refused entry by Poland. Indeed, Ukrainians refused entry at the Polish border with Ukraine, and Georgians refused entry at the Polish land border with Belarus were the two

most common phenomena at the EU level. Ranking third were Albanians refused entry at the Greek land border with Albania. In total these three phenomena accounted for nearly a third of all refusals of entry at the EU level.

Although from rather low bases, there were three trends that increased dramatically during 2012. The first was Armenians refused entry at the Polish land border with Belarus, which increased tenfold from Q1 to Q4 2012.



The second was Russians refused entry at the Latvian land border with the Russian Federation, and the third was Syrians refused entry at Charles de Gaul airport.

Refusals of entry increased dramatically in Latvia compared to the year before, almost exclusively at the Latvian land border with the Russian Federation, where significantly more Russian nationals were refused entry. The reasons for refusals were (E) no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay, and (C) no valid visa or residence permit.

4.7. Asylum claims

In Q4 2012, there were far more applications for asylum in the EU since data collection began in early 2008. The number of claims increased steadily throughout 2012 from just over 55 000 in Q1 to a staggering 83 446 applications in the current reporting period (note – the FRAN data do not include asylum applications submitted inland in France). As previously reported, much of this increase resulted from many more applications submitted by Syrian and, to a lesser extent, Serbian and Russian nationals with particularly strong increases toward the end of the year. As well as the nationalities that submitted increasing numbers of applications, there was also a steady but very significant trend of claims submitted by Afghan nationals – ranking second at the EU level.

With an overwhelming 31% of all applications submitted in the EU/Schengen area and following a nearly 43% increase compared to the previous quarter, Germany received by far the most applications for international protection, and more than reported by any Member State in a single quarter since data collection began in early 2008.

Without question, the most significant trend throughout 2012 as a whole and during the

final quarter of the year was increased applications submitted by Syrian nationals, which in Q4 2012 increased to nearly 9 000 applications and 11% of the EU total. This amounted to more applications submitted by a single nationality in any given quarter since data collection began for this indicator. Given that Syrians are still highly detected illegally crossing the border of the EU and as document fraudsters, and that the civil war shows no signs of abating, this flow of asylum seekers is likely to continue.

4.8. Document fraud

In January 2012 Frontex and the FRAN community embarked on a detailed and ambitious information-sharing project in the field of document fraud, to be overseen by a new specialist sub-network of the FRAN known as the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN). The following section utilises these data for a situational picture of the final quarter of 2012.

The migrants most associated with document fraud to enter the EU or Schengen area from third countries in Q4 2012 were from Albania, Syria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia and Nigeria. With the exception of Nigerians, all these nationalities were detected in increasing numbers throughout 2012, especially Syrians, detections of whom, on entry from third countries, increased 14-fold between the first and final quarters of the year.

Document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen countries was also dominated by increasing numbers of Albanian nationals throughout 2012, mostly associated with travel to the UK from the Schengen area. Within the Schengen area document fraud was characterised by increasing numbers of Syrians and Somalis, and fewer Afghan migrants on flights from Greece.

Migrants from Syria

Migrants from Syria were increasingly detected as document fraudsters across Member States, such that there was an overall sixfold increase since the beginning of the year (including all travel types). More than half of all detections were on extra-Schengen flights, which is a complete reverse from the previous quarter when most were detected on intra-Schengen flights from Greece. In the final quarter of 2012 the most common embarkation point for Syrian document fraudsters was Istanbul, from where detections increased massively from three or four per quarter during the first semester to 133 in Q4 2012.

4.8.1. Entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries

According to a sample of 24 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, in Q4 2012 there were 2 572 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries. Although long-term comparisons were not possible for Member States new to the EDF-RAN (Sweden and Slovenia), or for those currently unable to meet the strict reporting protocols (France), it is clear that at the EU level document fraud to enter the EU and Schengen area from third countries was increasing throughout 2012.

A large proportion of the increase in detections of document fraud was due to a single phenomenon; the use of counterfeit border-crossing stamps by Albanian nationals to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. These migrants were almost exclusively detected on entry to Greece, at the BCP Kakavia and, to a lesser extent, at the BCP Kristalopigi. Of all Albanian migrants detected on entry to the Schengen area from a third country, nearly all were detected with otherwise authentic Albanian passports, containing counterfeit Greek border-crossing stamps (Fig. 22).

Table 2. In Q4 2012, Syrian document fraudsters were mostly detected using documents issued by their most common destination country (Germany) and their place of embarkation (Turkey)

Top four documents detected being used by Syrian migrants on entry to EU/Schengen BCPS from third countries, by type of fraud, issuing authority and document category


Fraud	Issuing authority	Document	2012 Q4
Stolen blank	German	Passports	49
Counterfeit	Turkish	Passports	47
Counterfeit	Turkish	ID cards	42
Forged	Syrian	Passports	18
Others			256
Total			412

Source EDF-RAN data



© Frontex Reference Manual

Figure 21. Turkish ID cards, blue for males and orange for females, were among the most common documents used by Syrian nationals to attempt illegal entry to the EU/ Schengen area



© Ifadi.consilium.europa.eu

Figure 22. Greek border-crossing stamps were the most commonly detected fraudulent document in Q4 2012



Ukrainian biometric passport law comes into force

In December the president of Ukraine signed a new law in which the introduction of electronic passports was announced. Although the implementation rules have not yet been finalised, the government hopes to start issuing the passports in January 2013. However, several aspects of the new law and the new passport have already come under considerable criticism. For example, a revision to the law suggests that people with certain religious beliefs be able to opt out of having their personal information on the electronic chip. To exercise this right, individuals need only submit an application for exemption. According to several Member State analyses, this is exactly the type of loophole that could be exploited by criminals so that they can continue to move around with fraudulent identity documents without the possibility of being checked against biometric data on the chip.

This new law stipulates that the passport will be in the form of a card containing a contactless electronic carrier with biographical information as well as biometric identifiers and so does not comply with international standards. The new law also stipulates that passports are to be issued to all individuals from birth regardless of age, for a period of 10 years.

There are suggestions that Ukrainian legislators have not considered those that require extra protection in Ukraine, as some citizens will not be granted biometric travel documents.

4.8.2. Between the EU and the Schengen area

In Q4 2012, there were 1 213 detections of document fraudsters made at the borders between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States, which is a 50% increase since the previous quarter and the highest level since basic data collection began in 2009. As was the case in previous reporting periods detections were equally split between the two directions of passenger flow (entry/exit) even though the UK does not perform any exit checks. Most of the flow was on exit from the Schengen area towards the UK, which correspondingly reported the most detections overall and on entry.

The overwhelming majority of migrants detected using fraudulent documents between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States were from Albania, with more than 50% of the total share. This route of document fraud started in 2011 once Albanians were granted visa-free access to the Schengen area.

Albanian migrants were most frequently detected using forged, counterfeit and stolen blank Italian ID cards, followed by counterfeit and forged Greek ID cards. The only passports detected on this route were forged Greek and Bulgarian, in which new biopages were most frequently found.

Migrants from Ukraine were also detected in significant numbers travelling between the Schengen area and the UK, as were migrants from Iran and increasingly Syria but all in much lower numbers than migrants from Albania.

4.8.3. Intra-Schengen

Throughout the first half of 2012 there was a major flow of migrants using fraudulent documents to fly from Greece to other Schengen

states. As most of these migrants originally entered Greece illegally via the land border with Turkey, these journeys are known as secondary movements and shed much light on flows of nationalities, documents used and destination countries.

During the first six months of 2012 nearly 500 migrants were detected on flights between Greece and other Schengen states, either on exit from Greek airports or upon arrival mostly in Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy. However, since the deployment of the Greek operation Aspida there has been a decline in document fraudsters arriving on flights from Greece, suggesting that the lower number of migrants entering Greece from Turkey is having an impact on detections of document fraud elsewhere in the Schengen area.

In contrast to the decline in the number of migrants arriving on flights from Greece, Italy has been detecting more document fraudsters on ferries from Patras.

4.8.4. Legal channels

Although lacking a systematic data exchange among Member States, many reports conclude that the abuse of legal channels to illegally enter the EU is increasing.

In Poland there were several cases of fraudulently obtained business or work visas being used by Ukrainian migrants. In addition, since May 2012 there was a significant increase in detections of Ukrainian (and, to a lesser extent, Moldovan and Belarusian) nationals using fraudulently obtained Greek visas. Above mentioned migrants were in possession of visas entitling them to attend sport events and tourist visas issued in Ukraine by Greek consulates, but organised by travel offices in Kiev. However, the migrants whose destination country was Italy did not have any documents relating to room reservations or other logistical arrangements.



Figure 23. Italian ID cards were the most common fraudulent documents used by Albanians to attempt entry to the UK on flights from the Schengen area – many were detected on entry to the UK and on exit from Italy

Visa fraud detected in Brussels

In Q4 2012 there was an increase in the number of refused irregular migrants arriving in Belgium with Italian D-Visa for labour. In many cases, the migrants cannot give any explanation about their employer, their job contract, their wages, the working schedule or how long they will stay in Italy to work. Mostly the contacts with the employer go via friends or family who already reside in Italy.



Sham marriage mastermind jailed for 10 years

In February 2013 a solicitor was jailed for 10 years in London for running an immigration sham marriage scam. The solicitor and two immigration advisers were found guilty of conspiracy to breach immigration law.

The judge said it would be hard to find a similar scam of the same scale and sophistication. He added: 'A heavy responsibility for upholding the law rests with the lawyers. If the public cannot trust them, who can they trust? You have destroyed that trust by driving a coach and horses through these rules.'

An estimated 1 800 men, including members of the Albanian mafia, were able to live in Britain by taking part in sham marriages over eight years. Women from eastern European countries were flown to Britain to marry men from outside the EU. They turned up at register offices having never met, and were sometimes unable to speak a common language. Men would pay up to GBP 14 000 to the solicitors for a marriage package. This would include fake tenancy agreements, employer's references and forged documents.

Clients would travel from as far as Devon and Scotland and marriages would take place in a number of registrars' offices. Only GBP 2 million of unexplained income had been found in bank accounts. The rest is thought to have been smuggled out of the country. The racket was uncovered after British police cracked an Albanian drugs and money laundering gang in London. The brothers at the head had undergone marriages arranged by the firm.

Source: www.bbc.co.uk 18 February 2013 and other open sources

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Return decisions

New definitions applied to this indicator by Italy in early 2012 resulted in a huge increase in this single Member State, now ranking third at the EU level. However, despite this administrative increase, there was a 9% decrease in the number of third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision in Q4 2012 compared to the same period in 2011. Most of this decrease was due to the situation in Greece, the Member State that reaches more decisions than in any other. In this Member State, where a fifth of all decisions were reached, the number of decisions more than halved, following similar declines in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing resulting from operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey.

It is worth pointing out that the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, inter alia, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached.

Hence, in Italy the number of return decisions rose by more than 7 500 compared to the same quarter in 2011 following the administrative change, and also the number of decisions in Greece fell by more than 15 500 due to fewer illegal border-crossings from Turkey. Given these significant changes, it is not surprising that the nationalities that were subject to the biggest changes in the number of decisions reached were associated with these two Member States. For example, migrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan – ranked first and fourth among nationalities, respectively – were subject to far fewer decisions to leave Greece, as they were detected as illegal border-crossers in far fewer

numbers than a year ago. Similarly migrants from Albania were subject to more decisions to leave Italy following reporting changes.

In the final quarter of 2012, Syrians were the only nationality that was subject to significantly more decisions to leave than a year previously (+165%), although few Syrians would have left following these decisions. Most of these decisions were reached by Greece with some decline following the launch of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012, but still massively increased compared to the migration and return situation for Syrians a year before in Q4 2011.

At the Member State level there is often a discrepancy between the number of return decisions reached and the number of effective returns carried out. Some of the differences may be due to time lags between judicial decisions and physical returns, while other differences may be due to the disappearance of migrants once a decision has been reached. The largest discrepancy was in Italy, where far more decisions were reached than carried out, and, to a smaller extent, in Greece. In contrast, more Albanians were returned from Greece than were subject to return decisions, suggesting that the time lag was having an effect on the figures in this case.

4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q4 2012, there was a steady trend in the number of third-country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU compared to a year previously in Q4 2011. The total number of 42 157, however, represented a 10% increase compared to the previous quarter but does not include effective returns between Member States. As has been the case during every quarter of data exchange so far for this indicator, the UK was the Member State conducting the largest number of returns, in this case up by 5% compared to the

previous quarter, with steady trends of returned nationals from India and Pakistan. As regards the top combinations of the returning Member State and the returned nationality, ranking first and second at the EU level, with steady but slightly increasing trends, were Albanians returned by Greece and Indians returned by the UK. In contrast, massive increases were reported for the number of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis returned from Greece. The previously reported trend of increased returns of Ukrainians from Poland continued into the final quarter of the year.

The number of returns from Greece increased dramatically between the third and fourth quarters of 2012, following the launch of the operation Xenios Zeus, which has been underway since 2 August 2012 targeting illegal stayers mostly in Athens but also in some other urban areas. Albanians were the most returned nationality from Greece but with a steady trend over the year possibly unrelated to the operation as Albanians are very integrated in Greek society and are unlikely to be associated with conspicuous groups of migrants gathering in urban areas. In contrast much of the increase was due to more migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh (ranked second and third in Greece) being forcibly returned in much higher numbers during the fourth quarter of 2012, almost certainly as a result of the operation Xenios Zeus.

Consistent with these figures, open sources suggest that the operation Xenios Zeus is still very active. For example, in January 2012 there were reports of Greek police arresting 100 migrants in old factories in the port city of Patra. Apparently, migrants who did not possess proper residence papers were expected to be taken to a detention centre in the port of city of Corinth. Much of these widely-publicised activities will also probably be contributing to the deterrent effect of the operation Aspida at the Greek land border with Turkey, as migrants will be aware



that even if they successfully cross the border they are still likely to be picked up by the authorities inland. In fact some open sources claim that Greek police reports have come to the same conclusion.

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

4.10.1. Smuggling of drugs

The smuggling of drugs continues to be a serious concern for law-enforcement agencies along the external borders of the EU. Information from EU border authorities show that the characteristics and extent of contraband of illicit substances along the traditional routes into the European markets is not subject to fundamental changes. However, seizures, treatment demand and drug market characteristics point to a slow diversification in terms of origin countries, *modi operandi*, routes and types of illicit substances smuggled.


Cannabis products

Most of the cannabis resin consumed in Europe traditionally comes from Morocco, but data gathered by UNODC show that the country's importance as a supplier might be on the decline, while the large yield of Afghanistan's cannabis crop leads to growing exports from that country. At the same time, the Albanian cannabis production is not subsiding despite of increased law-enforcement action against the cannabis farms and plants. While in 2009, 3 425 kg* of cannabis herb was seized by Albanian police, the number grew to around eight tonnes in 2012.** Also the Italian authorities seized large amounts of Albanian marijuana on the way to the Italian coast.

Detections reported at the EU external borders mirror this development. The JO Focal Points Land could report a strong increase in the amount of drugs seized in Q4: at the bor-

ders to the prospective EU Member Croatia, border guards were able to confiscate more than 100 kg of marijuana, which is a strong increase compared to the 4.6 kg found in Q3. The number of drug detections, however, decreased slightly, which means that the dimensions of the drug shipments – all detected at the BCP Obrezje – were significantly larger. On 1 October 2012, the JO Focal Points Land reported the most significant seizure being made during the forth quarter at the land borders, when 492 kg of marijuana were found at the Hungarian BCP Kelebia. The illicit substance was transported behind double walls of a lorry coming from Serbia, which was driven by a national of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The JO Aeneas 2012 showed its operational impact against the smuggling of drugs from the Western Balkans with major seizures at the sea border between Albania and Italy. In its opera-



In October, officers of the Spanish Cuerpo Nacional de Policía dismantled three organisations that smuggled hashish on pleasure boats from Morocco to Cadiz, Spain. The authorities arrested 17 persons and seized 2.6 tons of hashish, five yachts, six vehicles, and two satellite phones.

Source: Cuerpo Nacional de Policía

* UNODC Drug seizures (by drug class and country), 2011.

** Focus Information Agency, Albania seizes 1.5 tonnes of cannabis destined for Italy <http://www.focus-fen.net/?id=n297816>, 25/01/2013.

tional weeks 46 and 47, Icelandic, Portuguese and Italian aircraft detected three boats from Albania carrying in total 1 980 kg of marijuana. The largest shipment consisted of 1 610 kg of drugs that were packed in 88 bags. Moreover, the arrested Albanian and two Italian nationals carried an AK-47 rifle and an automatic gun with 90 cartridges of ammunition.

Alongside increased seizures along the borders to the Western Balkans, Moroccan criminal groups continued to produce and export substantial amounts of cannabis products. The area along the Moroccan coast showed to be a busy scene of illicit drug transfers. During the JO Hera in December 2012, the Spanish Civil Guard detected a shipment of 1 200 kg of marijuana arriving in Tenerife, transported on an inflatable boat from Morocco. The operation resulted in the arrest of 15 Spanish and four Moroccan nationals. This seizure was only one in a row of other detected smuggling activities during that Joint Operation. Already during November, law-enforcement authorities found 569 kg of hashish smuggled on a rubber boat to Gran Canaria.

On 31 October, the JO Indalo concluded its activities along the sea border between Spain and Morocco. The operation acted as a platform for EU interagency cooperation between Frontex, CeCLAD-M, EFCA and Europol, and therefore significantly enhanced the level of the border surveillance in the regards of cross-border criminality. In October, officers deployed as a part of the operation seized drugs with a value of EUR 8.9 million and arrested seven persons, coming from Spain, Morocco and Lithuania. The smuggling of Moroccan hashish in speed boats crossing the sea between Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula was the most frequent *modus operandi* detected during that operation.

Opiates

The largest part of heroin consumed in Europe derives from Afghan poppy fields and

is smuggled across Iran, Turkey and the Balkan countries. Organised criminal groups involved in the trafficking of heroin particularly challenge the law-enforcement authorities in the Western Balkans. Large numbers of bona fide travellers and intensifying trade between the EU, Western Balkan countries and Turkey complicate effective border controls. On the other hand, Europol reports the emergence of Pakistani OCGs in the EU that bypass Turkey and the Balkans, shipping heroin by sea directly or via the Arabian Peninsula or Africa to Europe. According to the EMCDDA, however, heroin consumption has recently shown a rather declining trend in the EU.

Frontex officers deployed in the context of the JO Focal Points Land detected 10.1 kg of heroin hidden under the rear seat of a Bulgarian car coming from Turkey on 15 November 2012. Heroin was also found transported on commercial flights.

Cocaine

A large amount of the cocaine sold on the European markets is smuggled from Latin America through West African and Maghreb countries to Spain, from where part of the illicit loads are forwarded to the Netherlands, which serves a hub for distribution to other EU Member States. The cocaine supply is currently seeing a diversification, as increasing amounts arrive at ports of southeastern Europe and along the Black Sea coast. Cocaine is also directly trafficked on commercial flights from Latin America and in sea freight containers. In October 2012, Belgian police confiscated more than eight tonnes of cocaine hidden in a shipment of bananas from Ecuador, bound for Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The shipment was the largest ever detected in Belgium and had a value of around EUR 500 million.



4.10.2. Smuggling of cigarettes

Especially at the eastern external borders of the EU, the smuggling of cigarettes is a frequently detected illegal activity. Controls of law-enforcement authorities at the most affected BCPs are challenged by intensive passenger traffic and increasing volumes of trade with the EU's eastern neighbours. Frontex Joint Operations actively contributed to the fight against the illicit import of tobacco products, which causes fiscal losses of around EUR 10 billion per year in the budgets of the EU and its Member States. Most of the detections reported within Frontex Joint Operations were made at the BCP Kapitan Andreevo between Bulgaria and Turkey. A large part of the 133 discovered cases consisted of smaller amounts mainly smuggled by Bulgarian nationals, whereas only few seizures at this border section were related to large-scale and organised contraband activities.

The current environment is conducive to the contraband of tobacco products due to multiple reasons. Some large price differentials exist between countries located in close geographical proximity, which creates considerable incentives for cross-border smuggling. In 2011, a pack of cigarettes in Latvia cost five times as much as in the Russian Federation. In Q4 2012, the land border section with the largest number of cigarettes confiscated in context of a Frontex JO showed to be between these two countries. All seized cigarettes were connected to just one incident on 6 November, when two border guards found double registration plates at two Lithuanian fuel tankers and forwarded them to the second-line control. A closer examination led to the discovery of a false wall in one of the lorries. The officers eventually found out that the hollow space was filled with 4 427 600 cigarettes.

Border guards deployed at the BCPs situated between Poland and Ukraine frequently detect persons smuggling either smaller amounts of

cigarettes for personal consumption or large shipments for resale in Poland or further transport to western Europe. In Q4, in context of the JO Focal Points Land 2012, Frontex officers in cooperation with their Polish colleagues seized more than two million cigarettes in 38 different smuggling incidents. Most of these contraband inflows were discovered at the BCP of Medyka, others along the green border, and a few in Polish private properties close to Ukraine.

Also the border between Poland and Belarus showed intensive smuggling activities. However, the 28 seizures were much smaller in size, resulting in a total of 140 000 confiscated cigarettes, most of them found at the BCP of Terespol. In nine of these cases cigarettes were hidden in the engine rooms of trains coming from Belarus.

The final destinations of many cigarettes smuggled across the eastern external borders into the EU are western European countries, where criminal groups can make even better profits due to higher excise taxes on tobacco products.

In December 2012, one case of cigarette smuggling close to the Greek island of Crete gained particular prominence. After having received information on a suspicious vessel close to the port of Chania, the Greek Coastguard stopped and searched the Moldovan-registered 'Noah' and found eight containers with around 53 760 000 cigarettes. The crew consisting of five Albanian nationals was arrested and the Egyptian-produced cigarettes confiscated.

4.10.3. Fuel product smuggling

A slight decrease in petrol prices between Q3 and Q4 took financial pressure from commuters and regular drivers. The average difference between a litre of Super 95 bought in the EU countries and their respective third-coun-

try neighbour(s) decreased from EUR 0.28 to EUR 0.24 during this period. This reduction may still not be sufficient to substantially weaken the incentive for motorists to arrange a trip across the border to countries such as the Russian Federation or Belarus, where fuel is around half as expensive as in Poland, Estonia or Finland. At the beginning of December, the Polish Border Guard discovered more than 800 litres of fuel loaded on a private vehicle crossing the border from Ukraine. The trafficking of petroleum products is also known to take place from Serbia and Albania, but it tends to occur on an individual level, including smaller quantities for own consumption or sale to acquaintances.

4.10.4. Vehicle theft

In Q4 2012, Frontex assets deployed through Joint Operations assisted in the detection of 105 stolen vehicles. This number represents a decreasing trend, although a large part of the 192 detections in Q3 were reported within the JO Minerva, which did not continue into Q4. As many as 44% of the recovered cars and lorries were stopped on the way to Ukraine, most of them on exit at the BCPs of Medyka and Dorohusk. In turn, 23% of the vehicles were identified on exit to Belarus, all of which attempted to leave the EU at the BCP Terespol. A smaller proportion of cars and lorries were found at the borders to Croatia (13%), Turkey (11%) and Serbia (7%).

Frontex JO reported the identification of vehicles that had been stolen in 16 different European countries, with Germany and Italy being the top two origins. While border guards deployed through the JO Focal Points Land detected vehicles from Germany equally on route to Belarus, Turkey, Ukraine and Serbia, most cars and lorries stolen in Italy were discovered at the border to Croatia. Moreover, cases reported in JO statistics include several cars stolen in Belgium and detected on exit to Ukraine. Border guards deployed in the JO Focal Points Land also prevented the transit of vehicles reg-

Table 3. **Average price of Super 95 fuel in EU Member States and their respective third-country neighbour(s)**

Q4 2012 (December)			
Border	EU country in EUR	Third country in EUR	Price difference in Q4
Finland-Russian Federation	1.61	0.78	0.83
Lithuania-Belarus	1.37	0.61	0.76
Poland-Belarus	1.33	0.61	0.72
Estonia-Russian Federation	1.30	0.78	0.52
Poland-Russian Federation	1.33	0.78	0.55
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.50	1.02	0.48
Greece-Albania	1.68	1.35	0.33
Hungary-Ukraine	1.41	1.02	0.39
Greece-fYROM	1.68	1.33	0.35
Poland-Ukraine	1.33	1.02	0.31
Romania-Ukraine	1.25	1.02	0.23
Romania-Moldova	1.25	1.07	0.18
Hungary-Serbia	1.41	1.33	0.08
Hungary-Croatia	1.41	1.37	0.04
Slovenia-Croatia	1.48	1.37	0.11
Bulgaria-Serbia	1.27	1.33	-0.06
Romania-Serbia	1.25	1.33	-0.08
Bulgaria-fYROM	1.27	1.33	-0.06
Greece-Turkey	1.68	1.95	-0.27
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.27	1.95	-0.68

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletin (17/12/2012) and open-source data for third countries

istered as stolen by the authorities of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shows a good level of information exchange also with third countries.


The brand preferences of criminal groups involved in vehicle theft did not show any substantial changes. Volkswagen was the most frequent make detected among stolen cars during the JO Focal Points Land, while Mercedes and BMW ranked second and third. In general, vans, medium-sized and estate cars were the preferred choice compared to high-end models. Prevalence for more average models can be explained by their higher saleability and lower conspicuousness vis-à-vis the border authorities and their risk profiling efforts.

Incidents reported in Q4 confirm a continuing trend of a large-scale and systematic theft



Figure 24. **The distribution of detections of stolen vehicles on exit among border sections shows a diversion towards the South-East Europe over the four quarters of 2012**

Share of detected vehicles on exit in Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 2012 by border sections with third countries



Source: JO Focal Points Land



Figure 25. **Polish border guards recovered stolen cars loaded on a trailer on its way towards the eastern border**

of cars originating from the EU. Crime groups utilise electronic tools to quickly gain access to medium-sized and compact-class cars with less sophisticated protective measures, which are then disassembled into spare parts and brought across the external borders. Incidents discovered in Poland show multiple consignments of stolen cars on trailers. They were transported from western European countries through the Schengen area to Lithuania, from where many of these vehicles were sold to Belarus and the Russian Federation. Polish border guards in Q4 reported five cases of Lithuanian nationals driving lorries with trailers of two to four stolen medium-class vehicles from Nor-




Figure 26. **Main routes of stolen vehicles detected through Frontex JO in Q4**

way, the Netherlands and France. In one case, also the trailer itself was registered as stolen.

4.10.5. Smuggling of weapons

Only few cases of illegally smuggled weapons were detected through Frontex JO in Q4. Border guards deployed at the border to Croatia reported 13 attempts to import arms into an EU Member State, 11 of which were related to non-lethal weapons including truncheons and brass knuckles seized on their way to Slovenia.

According to media reports, in December 2012, the Italian authorities uncovered a large amount of trafficked weapons on transit in

the port of Naples. The police, upon receipt of a tip-off, searched a ship container supposedly destined for the port of Alexandria in Egypt. The load, which was declared as construction materials, allegedly contained pistols, rocket-propelled grenades and other explosive materials. Further investigations were underway.

4.10.6. Trafficking in human beings

Q4 2012 was again marked by some significant successes in the fight against major criminal networks involved in the trafficking of human beings to Europe. The Spanish Cuerpo Nacional de Policia in the end of the year 2012 disbanded



* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

a criminal organisation that trafficked Nigerians on *pateras* across the Mediterranean to Spain. The members of the criminal group continued to exercise control over their victims after they were admitted to immigrant women shelters for humanitarian reasons. From there, the women were forced into prostitution in different places within Spain. The investigations were complicated by the non-hierarchical nature of the organisation, which consisted of a heterogeneous network of criminal groups in different locations, each specialising in separate operational phases, including the recruitment of the victims, the counterfeit of documents, the transportation to the country of destination, the exploitation of the victims and the laundering of proceeds. Italian authorities that conducted investigations into Nigerian human trafficking networks confirm that the structure combined modern managerial skills, traditional cultural values and religious beliefs.

A different type of organisational structure was revealed through the detection of a trafficking network in October 2012, run by Kosovo-Albanians in the southwest of Germany. Police officers in Germany, France and Belgium simultaneously conducted raids in numerous apartments and arrested several suspects. The authorities targeted 22 suspects belonging to a family clan, which trafficked around 50 girls, mostly under-age and coming from Kosovo*, to Germany, France, Belgium and Scandinavia for the purpose of domestic labour and sexual exploitation. Many victims crossed the borders with false documents or as impostors. Investigations in these cases showed a homogenous and hierarchical structure consisting of clan-related criminals operating across Europe. The case exemplifies a particular necessity of international and interagency cooperation for the disruption of human trafficking networks and organised criminal groups that are connected through bonds of ethnicity and kinship.

5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 12 February 2013, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Afghanistan	9 323	7 301	2 153	4 529	4 518	1 969	-73	-56	14
Albania	1 411	1 554	1 177	1 797	1 254	1 423	-8.4	13	10
Eritrea	318	352	270	461	575	1 298	269	126	9.5
Syria	602	614	715	2 024	3 923	1 241	102	-68	9.1
Somalia	604	799	1 017	1 673	1 283	1 065	33	-17	7.8
Algeria	1 613	2 570	1 275	2 000	1 494	710	-72	-52	5.2
Pakistan	5 629	5 874	1 045	1 650	1 491	691	-88	-54	5.1
Palestine	242	344	286	376	403	578	68	43	4.2
Not specified	2 104	808	321	525	771	496	-39	-36	3.6
Mali	571	87	25	110	143	379	336	165	2.8
Others	16 113	8 022	5 352	7 950	6 238	3 763	-53	-40	28
Total all borders	38 530	28 325	13 636	23 095	22 093	13 613	-52	-38	
Land Borders									
Albania	1 379	1 539	1 176	1 736	1 214	1 334	-13	9.9	24
Afghanistan	8 355	6 711	1 775	3 963	3 584	516	-92	-86	9.2
Syria	400	578	676	1 918	3 321	501	-13	-85	8.9
Algeria	1 069	2 164	1 227	1 481	878	495	-77	-44	8.8
Not specified	1 131	737	307	463	554	493	-33	-11	8.8
Kosovo*	104	119	203	199	272	316	166	16	5.6
Palestine	141	285	267	363	309	256	-10	-17	4.6
Pakistan	5 154	5 548	915	1 189	1 006	234	-96	-77	4.2
Morocco	453	748	425	570	227	200	-73	-12	3.6
Georgia	141	140	99	184	123	134	-4.3	8.9	2.4
Others	4 785	5 895	4 133	5 739	3 073	1 135	-81	-63	20
Total land borders	23 112	24 464	11 203	17 805	14 561	5 614	-77	-61	
Sea Borders									
Afghanistan	968	590	378	566	934	1 453	146	56	18
Eritrea	25	5	39	223	434	1 246	24 820	187	16
Somalia	224	113	553	1 106	862	959	749	11	12
Syria	202	36	39	106	602	740	1 956	23	9.3
Pakistan	475	326	130	461	485	457	40	-5.8	5.7
Palestine	101	59	19	13	94	322	446	243	4.0
Gambia	247	26	21	36	153	304	1 069	99	3.8
Mali	551	47	4	22	100	296	530	196	3.7
Nigeria	3 156	62	12	67	258	238	284	-7.8	3
Tunisia	3 374	96	357	685	1 008	233	143	-77	2.9
Others	6 095	2 501	881	2 005	2 602	1 751	-30	-33	22
Total sea borders	15 418	3 861	2 433	5 290	7 532	7 999	107	6.2	

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections at the external borders border type and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Land	40	63	80	106	152	152	141	0	78
Sea	24	21	36	20	16	43	105	169	22
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	18	30	50	52	47	41	37	-13	21
Algeria	13	6	8	10	15	28	367	87	14
Syria		5	1	4	9	22	340	144	11
Albania	1	5	3	3	10	19	280	90	9.7
Palestine	2	1			10	14	1 300	40	7.2
Turkey	14	1	5	1	23	12	1 100	-48	6.2
Pakistan	2	5	0	11	1	12	140	1 100	6.2
Tunisia	0	2	1	0		10	400	n.a.	5.1
Mali					0	5	n.a.	n.a.	2.6
Ghana				1		4	n.a.	n.a.	2.1
Others	14	29	48	44	53	28	-3.4	-47	14
Total	64	84	116	126	168	195	132	16	



Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections at the external borders by place of detection and top ten nationalities

						2012 Q4			per cent of total
	2011		2012			Q4	% change on		
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3		year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 013	1 114	1 489	1 254	1 019	1 424	28	40	67
Land	195	159	215	177	272	223	40	-18	11
Land Intra EU	103	94	138	122	96	142	51	48	6.7
Air	88	108	81	70	97	110	1.9	13	5.2
Not specified	30	46	53	46	111	110	139	-0.9	5.2
Sea	117	93	129	116	117	109	17	-6.8	5.1
Top Ten Nationalities									
Morocco	86	91	90	95	91	185	103	103	8.7
Not specified	48	88	88	77	146	168	91	15	7.9
Italy	116	134	202	94	98	149	11	52	7.0
Spain	92	111	140	144	77	137	23	78	6.5
Romania	68	58	136	55	79	94	62	19	4.4
France	76	64	95	99	70	88	38	26	4.2
Pakistan	51	38	59	82	62	83	118	34	3.9
Albania	41	59	73	37	65	68	15	4.6	3.2
China	52	105	88	101	61	66	-37	8.2	3.1
Bulgaria	44	38	40	29	37	53	39	43	2.5
Others	872	828	1 094	972	926	1 027	24	11	48
Total	1 546	1 614	2 105	1 785	1 712	2 118	31	24	

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections at the external borders by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	69 572	76 512	72 520	68 906	68 696	68 316	-11	-0.6	81
Air	9 361	8 985	8 693	8 493	9 752	8 472	-5.7	-13	10
Land	5 259	5 214	4 731	4 766	5 632	4 754	-8.8	-16	5.6
Land Intra EU	2 032	1 639	1 347	1 427	1 393	1 665	1.6	20	2.0
Sea	1 519	1 325	1 040	1 084	1 090	1 371	3.5	26	1.6
Between BCPs	292	159	130	212	187	195	23	4.3	0.2
Not Specified	2	0	0	3	9	44	n.a.	389	0.1
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	6 777	7 750	6 345	6 179	6 252	5 619	-27	-10	6.6
Morocco	5 026	5 575	6 047	5 683	4 724	4 814	-14	1.9	5.7
Syria	1 046	1 192	1 396	2 020	4 004	4 547	281	14	5.4
Pakistan	3 720	3 587	3 752	5 088	4 989	4 505	26	-9.7	5.3
Not specified	1 501	2 308	1 159	1 253	2 653	4 142	79	56	4.9
Algeria	3 925	4 010	4 247	4 077	3 747	3 705	-7.6	-1.1	4.4
Albania	2 382	3 085	3 167	3 627	2 856	3 614	17	27	4.3
Ukraine	3 788	3 737	3 202	3 036	3 655	3 188	-15	-13	3.8
Russian Federation	3 173	2 427	2 363	2 419	3 531	3 173	31	-10	3.7
Serbia	2 015	3 701	2 880	2 466	3 104	3 053	-18	-1.6	3.6
Others	54 684	56 462	53 903	49 043	47 244	44 457	-21	-5.9	52
Total	88 037	93 834	88 461	84 891	86 759	84 817	-9.6	-2.2	


Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on		per cent of total
							year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Ukraine	4 499	3 921	3 788	3 994	5 840	4 481	14	-23	15
Georgia	558	1 136	567	1 692	3 282	3 303	191	0.6	11
Albania	3 550	2 941	2 261	3 737	2 837	3 201	8.8	13	11
Russian Federation	2 710	2 214	1 840	2 325	2 978	2 611	18	-12	8.6
Serbia	1 643	1 639	1 388	1 222	1 487	1 542	-5.9	3.7	5.1
Belarus	1 549	1 615	1 106	1 116	1 386	1 425	-12	2.8	4.7
Morocco	1 211	1 014	1 058	1 081	708	1 087	7.2	54	3.6
Croatia	766	867	1 032	1 048	977	792	-8.7	-19	2.6
Turkey	1 145	672	578	625	1 117	720	7.1	-36	2.4
Not specified	462	551	485	588	506	677	23	34	2.2
Others	12 232	12 441	10 533	10 809	10 875	10 600	-15	-2.5	35
Total all borders	30 325	29 011	24 636	28 237	31 993	30 439	4.9	-4.9	
Land Borders									
Ukraine	4 191	3 608	3 503	3 723	5 500	4 281	19	-22	24
Georgia	496	1 065	493	1 620	3 214	3 208	201	-0.2	18
Russian Federation	1 794	1 510	1 290	1 620	2 185	2 211	46	1.2	12
Albania	1 884	1 161	1 192	2 587	1 684	1 915	65	14	11
Belarus	1 504	1 574	1 080	1 086	1 350	1 396	-11	3.4	7.7
Serbia	1 384	1 358	1 200	1 034	1 265	1 311	-3.5	3.6	7.2
Morocco	869	651	666	708	295	747	15	153	4.1
Croatia	713	815	979	1 002	925	728	-11	-21	4.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	424	343	347	346	385	454	32	18	2.5
Armenia	81	74	37	72	353	408	451	16	2.2
Others	2 489	1 599	1 283	1 455	2 143	1 502	-6.1	-30	8.3
Total land borders	15 829	13 758	12 070	15 253	19 299	18 161	32	-5.9	
Air Borders									
Albania	796	944	617	638	581	853	-9.6	47	7.5
Not specified	397	508	435	458	453	612	20	35	5.4
Brazil	1 079	1 056	1 003	841	540	596	-44	10	5.3
United States	605	557	461	484	534	487	-13	-8.8	4.3
Nigeria	393	388	374	435	477	423	9.0	-11	3.7
Algeria	233	504	269	356	299	406	-19	36	3.6
Turkey	282	331	355	352	322	393	19	22	3.5
Russian Federation	459	348	373	389	510	378	8.6	-26	3.3
Syria	64	90	66	117	96	299	232	211	2.6
China	336	256	305	258	345	287	12	-17	2.5
Others	7 451	8 057	6 965	6 537	6 484	6 600	-18	1.8	58
Total air borders	12 095	13 039	11 223	10 865	10 641	11 334	-13	6.5	
Sea Borders									
Albania	870	836	452	512	572	433	-48	-24	46
Morocco	98	75	138	114	168	101	35	-40	11
Not specified	34	29	40	117	43	51	76	19	5.4
Tunisia	19	39	28	26	39	35	-10	-10	3.7
Turkey	35	42	18	30	65	26	-38	-60	2.8
Serbia	75	69	32	33	42	26	-62	-38	2.8
Kiribati	1	6	36	23	61	24	300	-61	2.5
Russian Federation	457	356	177	316	283	22	-94	-92	2.3
India	42	44	26	89	51	21	-52	-59	2.2
YROM	14	26	9	15	14	19	-27	36	2.0
Others	756	692	387	844	715	186	-73	-74	20
Total sea borders	2 401	2 214	1 343	2 119	2 053	944	-57	-54	

Annex Table 6. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2012 Q4 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	4 481	15	106	1 072	171	2 351	241	318	155	22	44	4 495
Georgia	3 303	2	9	2 915	5	59	37	10	284	2	4	3 327
Albania	3 201	66	162	50	17	493	81	361	1 758	60	189	3 237
Russian Federation	2 611	11	9	1 836	30	412	27	166	98	116	22	2 727
Serbia	1 542	26	12	117	4	151	279	445	470	51	9	1 564
Belarus	1 425	4	1	689	1	359	25	243	104	15	5	1 446
Morocco	1 087	477	58	111	21	135	6	21	203	70	9	1 111
Croatia	792	173	0	9	0	34	171	82	126	154	46	795
Turkey	720	38	38	372	19	129	6	35	56	27	37	757
Brazil	608	2	6	100	0	167	26	56	84	11	251	703
Others	10 669	930	648	2 553	304	2 475	313	720	621	278	2 247	11 089
Total	30 439	1 744	1 049	9 824	572	6 765	1 212	2 457	3 959	806	2 863	31 251

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union.


Annex Table 7. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders by border type and reason for refusal

	2011		2012			2012 Q4		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on year ago			prev. qtr
All Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	8 982	7 803	5 933	8 313	11 381	9 824	26	-14	31	Georgia (30%)
E) No justification	6 331	6 888	6 109	5 704	6 728	6 765	-1.8	0.5	22	Ukraine (35%)
H) Alert issued	4 480	3 970	3 352	3 281	5 099	3 959	-0.3	-22	13	Albania (44%)
Reason not available	3 344	3 038	2 540	2 693	3 031	2 863	-5.8	-5.5	9.2	United States (15%)
G) No subsistence	2 799	2 965	2 507	3 400	2 651	2 457	-17	-7.3	7.9	Serbia (18%)
A) No valid document	2 186	1 908	1 775	1 998	2 021	1 744	-8.6	-14	5.6	Morocco (27%)
F) Over 3-month stay	1 333	1 337	1 479	1 142	1 531	1 212	-9.3	-21	3.9	Serbia (23%)
B) False document	675	752	913	1 004	798	1 049	39	31	3.4	Albania (15%)
I) Threat	581	838	762	816	886	806	-3.8	-9	2.6	Croatia (19%)
D) False visa	403	527	380	374	511	572	8.5	12	1.8	Ukraine (30%)
Total all borders	31 114	30 026	25 750	28 725	34 637	31 251	4.1	-9.8		
Land Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	5 874	4 760	3 646	5 521	8 389	7 498	58	-11	41	Georgia (39%)
E) No justification	2 452	2 192	2 185	2 259	3 875	3 530	61	-8.9	19	Ukraine (65%)
H) Alert issued	3 005	2 523	2 167	2 183	3 996	2 912	15	-27	16	Albania (43%)
G) No subsistence	1 867	1 977	1 725	2 484	1 750	1 527	-23	-13	8.3	Serbia (25%)
F) Over 3-month stay	1 137	1 137	1 221	925	1 336	1 036	-8.9	-22	5.7	Serbia (26%)
A) No valid document	1 037	749	912	896	906	784	4.7	-13	4.3	Morocco (57%)
I) Threat	428	606	475	529	609	460	-24	-24	2.5	Croatia (33%)
B) False document	138	80	310	464	328	305	281	-7	1.7	Albania (50%)
D) False visa	141	179	81	110	192	257	44	34	1.4	Ukraine (66%)
Total land borders	16 079	14 203	12 722	15 371	21 381	18 309	29	-14		
Air Borders										Nationality
E) No justification	3 732	4 475	3 815	3 317	2 590	3 085	-31	19	26	Albania (9.5%)
Reason not available	3 200	2 939	2 466	2 568	2 901	2 778	-5.5	-4.2	23	United States (15%)
C) No valid visa	2 386	2 456	1 991	2 050	2 389	2 221	-9.6	-7.0	19	Russian Fed. (7.7%)
G) No subsistence	829	872	731	822	852	892	2.3	4.7	7.4	Albania (13%)
A) No valid document	627	673	600	589	629	794	18	26	6.6	Unknown (46%)
B) False document	519	642	568	518	441	712	11	61	5.9	Unknown (15%)
H) Alert issued	747	803	721	644	634	698	-13	10	5.8	Albania (34%)
I) Threat	145	220	276	267	259	319	45	23	2.7	Suriname (16%)
D) False visa	246	331	277	246	295	308	-6.9	4.4	2.6	Nigeria (13%)
F) Over 3-month stay	193	194	257	213	191	173	-11	-9.4	1.4	Brazil (14%)
Total air borders	12 624	13 605	11 702	11 234	11 181	11 980	-12	7.1		
Sea Borders										Nationality
H) Alert issued	728	644	464	454	469	349	-46	-26	36	Albania (78%)
A) No valid document	522	486	263	513	486	166	-66	-66	17	Kiribati (25%)
E) No justification	147	221	109	128	263	150	-32	-43	16	Albania (53%)
C) No valid visa	722	587	296	742	603	105	-82	-83	11	Tunisia (14%)
Reason not available	144	99	74	125	130	85	-14	-35	8.8	Albania (21%)
G) No subsistence	103	116	51	94	49	38	-67	-22	4.0	Albania (82%)
B) False document	18	30	35	22	29	32	6.7	10	3.3	Morocco (41%)
I) Threat	8	12	11	20	18	27	125	50	2.8	Albania (81%)
D) False visa	16	17	22	18	24	7	-59	-71	0.7	Morocco (43%)
F) Over 3-month stay	3	6	1	4	4	3	-50	-25	0.3	Albania
Total sea borders	2 411	2 218	1 326	2 120	2 075	962	-57	-54		

Annex Table 8. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection by top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	2 750	2 555	2 447	3 545	7 505	8 927	249	19	11
Afghanistan	8 552	7 626	6 306	6 736	7 151	7 437	-2.5	4.0	8.9
Serbia	1 770	5 771	3 352	1 691	4 576	6 321	9.5	38	7.6
Russian Federation	3 643	3 730	2 697	2 911	4 442	6 300	69	42	7.5
Pakistan	3 778	3 904	3 126	3 540	3 966	4 785	23	21	5.7
Not specified	1 460	4 172	3 881	2 999	2 999	4 442	6.5	48	5.3
Somalia	3 288	3 714	2 820	3 964	3 570	3 925	5.7	9.9	4.7
Iran	3 012	3 276	2 488	2 669	3 271	3 657	12	12	4.4
Eritrea	2 191	2 053	2 129	2 288	2 880	2 967	45	3.0	3.6
Iraq	4 159	3 503	2 660	2 579	2 863	2 770	-21	-3.2	3.3
Others	32 810	31 570	24 951	26 669	29 091	31 915	1.1	9.7	38
Total	67 413	71 874	56 857	59 591	72 314	83 446	16	15	



Annex Table 9. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs by border type and top ten claimed nationalities

Border Type	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on			
							year ago	prev. qtr		
Nationality Claimed										
Air	1 093	1 196	1 240	1 208	1 223	1 834	53	50	71	Syria (20%)
Land	571	494	740	1 060	819	654	32	-20	25	Albania (55%)
Sea	167	145	103	98	134	84	-42	-37	3.3	Morocco (55%)
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed	Nationality Document									
Syria	23	33	31	60	92	412	1 148	348	16	Turkey (26%)
Albania	49	75	353	909	498	391	421	-21	15	Greece (92%)
Morocco	253	211	197	82	56	115	-45	105	4.5	Morocco (23%)
Bangladesh	14	18	21	50	62	108	500	74	4.2	Italy (56%)
Turkey	53	50	53	44	55	96	92	75	3.7	Turkey (41%)
Afghanistan	30	22	53	51	67	95	332	42	3.7	United Kingdom (26%)
Unknown	129	151	78	58	33	78	-48	136	3.0	France (13%)
Tunisia	16	20	27	19	28	77	285	175	3.0	Italy (91%)
Pakistan	27	28	64	94	44	75	168	70	2.9	Greece (48%)
Nigeria	74	63	108	75	58	74	17	28	2.9	Nigeria (28%)
Others	1 163	1 164	1 098	924	1 183	1 051	-9.7	-11	41	France (12%)
Total	1 831	1 835	2 083	2 366	2 176	2 572	40	18		

Annex Table 10. **Document fraud**

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on			
							year ago	prev. qtr		
Document Type	Nationality Document									
PASSPORTS	723	721	705	647	769	1 056	46	37		Turkey (8.2%)
Forged	228	285	268	288	328	456	60	39	43	Bangladesh (7.5%)
Authentic	199	220	192	151	241	274	25	14	26	Sweden (16%)
Counterfeit	119	74	98	99	74	181	145	145	17	Turkey (31%)
No more details	165	135	133	98	108	75	-44	-31	7.1	South Africa (12%)
Stolen blank	11	7	14	11	18	69	886	283	6.5	Germany (71%)
Pseudo	1	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	0.1	Other and stateless
ID CARDS	284	257	238	247	217	242	-5.8	12		Italy (22%)
Counterfeit	113	110	131	112	102	134	22	31	55	Turkey (35%)
Authentic	84	77	71	47	52	47	-39	-9.6	19	Spain (40%)
Forged	24	19	11	44	13	37	95	185	15	Italy (41%)
Stolen blank	12	12	12	18	7	13	8.3	86	5.4	Italy (77%)
No more details	50	39	12	25	42	11	-72	-74	4.5	Italy (55%)
Pseudo	1	0	1	1	1	0	n.a.	-100		
VISA	178	176	183	170	167	242	38	45		Italy (27%)
Counterfeit	123	112	118	95	83	111	-0.9	34	46	Germany (24%)
Forged	16	18	28	22	41	79	339	93	33	Italy (58%)
Stolen blank	9	6	11	16	7	22	267	214	9.1	Spain (45%)
No more details	22	37	17	27	23	17	-54	-26	7.0	France (53%)
Authentic	8	3	8	10	13	13	333	0	5.4	Italy (77%)
Pseudo	0	0	1	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.		
RESIDENCE PERMITS	297	384	345	308	330	389	1.3	18		Greece (32%)
Counterfeit	150	179	172	142	161	161	-10	0	41	Greece (20%)
Stolen blank	61	71	59	67	56	98	38	75	25	Greece (59%)
Authentic	56	85	71	49	67	66	-22	-1.5	17	France (33%)
Forged	19	24	27	34	25	50	108	100	13	Greece (66%)
No more details	10	24	16	15	21	14	-42	-33	3.6	Belgium (43%)
Pseudo	1	1	0	1	0	0	-100	n.a.		
STAMPS	279	225	577	959	630	509	126	-19		Greece (70%)
Counterfeit	195	160	502	931	583	470	194	-19	92	Greece (75%)
Forged	11	8	0	27	42	35	338	-17	6.9	Italy (17%)
No more details	73	57	75	1	5	4	-93	-20	0.8	Greece (50%)
OTHER	70	72	35	35	63	134	86	113		Italy (73%)
Counterfeit	30	52	16	17	47	101	94	115	75	Italy (77%)
Authentic	5	8	9	9	12	23	188	92	17	Italy (83%)
Forged	32	5	2	5	3	7	40	133	5.2	France (29%)
Pseudo	2	0	2	3	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	2.2	Unknown (67%)
No more details	0	6	0	1	1	0	-100	-100		
Stolen blank	1	1	6	0	0	0	-100	n.a.		
Total	1 831	1 835	2 083	2 366	2 176	2 572	40	18		



Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2011		2012			2012 Q4				Highest share
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on		per cent of total	
							year ago	prev. qtr		
Nationality Claimed										
PASSPORTS	723	721	705	647	769	1 056	46	37		Syria (25%)
TUR-Counterfeit	16	18	7	9	14	56	211	300	5.3	Syria (84%)
DEU-Stolen blank	2	0	3	3	9	49	n.a.	444	4.6	Syria (100%)
SWE-Authentic	6	13	6	10	16	44	238	175	4.2	Syria (32%)
BGD-Forged	4	4	6	11	16	34	750	113	3.2	Bangladesh
GBR-Forged	7	4	12	25	23	34	750	48	3.2	Afghanistan (74%)
FRA-Authentic	20	26	20	13	27	33	27	22	3.1	Morocco (12%)
DZA-Forged	5	21	14	7	12	27	29	125	2.6	Algeria (48%)
PAK-Forged	7	4	2	2	6	24	500	300	2.3	Pakistan (71%)
FRA-Counterfeit	7	5	7	2	6	22	340	267	2.1	Syria (41%)
FRA-Forged	20	25	5	23	18	20	-20	11	1.9	Cameroon (20%)
Others	629	601	623	542	622	713	19	15	68	Syria (18%)
ID CARDS	284	257	238	247	217	242	-5.8	12		Syria (22%)
TUR-Counterfeit	3	5	2	2	4	47	840	1 075	19	Syria (89%)
ITA-Counterfeit	33	27	42	46	19	21	-22	11	8.7	Spain (24%)
ESP-Authentic	37	37	41	20	16	19	-49	19	7.9	Italy (32%)
ITA-Forged	7	11	3	9	3	15	36	400	6.2	Albania (60%)
BGR-Counterfeit	8	6	6	7	8	11	83	38	4.5	Bulgaria (36%)
ITA-Stolen blank	10	12	11	15	3	10	-17	233	4.1	Albania (90%)
FRA-Counterfeit	8	5	7	4	3	10	100	233	4.1	Syria (40%)
ROU-Counterfeit	7	19	18	12	13	7	-63	-46	2.9	Romania (29%)
FRA-Authentic	11	9	5	4	10	6	-33	-40	2.5	Morocco (33%)
ITA-No more details	16	8	3	9	8	6	-25	-25	2.5	Spain (67%)
Others	144	118	100	119	130	90	-24	-31	37	Morocco (16%)
Visa	178	176	183	170	167	242	38	45		Bangladesh (14%)
ITA-Forged	1	2	7	10	23	46	2 200	100	19	Bangladesh (57%)
DEU-Counterfeit	18	20	17	14	22	27	35	23	11	Afghanistan (30%)
FRA-Counterfeit	39	31	40	44	27	24	-23	-11	9.9	Palestine (25%)
BEL-Counterfeit	2	0	1	0	1	12	n.a.	1 100	5.0	Turkey (58%)
ESP-Stolen blank	0	2	0	2	0	10	400	n.a.	4.1	Syria (60%)
ITA-Authentic	0	0	5	7	10	10	n.a.	0	4.1	Bangladesh (70%)
FRA-No more details	6	11	10	8	3	9	-18	200	3.7	France (33%)
ESP-Counterfeit	2	9	14	3	9	9	0	0	3.7	Afghanistan (67%)
AUT-Counterfeit	1	0	0	3	0	8	n.a.	n.a.	3.3	Nigeria (63%)
ITA-Counterfeit	1	5	19	9	5	8	60	60	3.3	Kosovo* (25%)
Others	108	96	70	70	67	79	-18	18	33	Syria (13%)

Total: see Table 11B

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 11B. Document fraud (cont.)

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on			
							year ago	prev. qtr		
Nationality Claimed										
Residence permits	297	384	345	308	330	389	1.3	18		Syria (14%)
GRC-Stolen blank	10	25	21	47	33	58	132	76	15	Pakistan (29%)
DEU-Stolen blank	42	39	24	18	17	36	-7.7	112	9.3	Afghanistan (36%)
GRC-Forged	5	0	9	17	14	33	n.a.	136	8.5	Pakistan (48%)
GRC-Counterfeit	12	5	9	5	7	32	540	357	8.2	Syria (53%)
ITA-Counterfeit	44	33	47	63	46	31	-6.1	-33	8.0	Morocco (29%)
BEL-Counterfeit	56	78	21	20	23	25	-68	8.7	6.4	Armenia (32%)
FRA-Authentic	9	9	9	9	20	22	144	10	5.7	Mali (50%)
ESP-Authentic	26	39	33	21	20	18	-54	-10	4.6	Morocco (28%)
CHE-Counterfeit	6	19	29	9	5	16	-16	220	4.1	Kosovo* (25%)
ESP-Counterfeit	7	20	27	14	9	14	-30	56	3.6	Morocco (29%)
Others	80	117	116	85	136	104	-11	-24	27	Morocco (13%)
Stamps	279	225	577	959	630	509	126	-19		Albania (70%)
GRC-Counterfeit	5	1	254	646	405	352	35 100	-13	69	Albania (99%)
POL-Counterfeit	117	90	78	34	29	27	-70	-6.9	5.3	Ukraine
FRA-Counterfeit	3	3	20	2	8	13	333	63	2.6	Unknown (15%)
DEU-Counterfeit	1	2	5	8	10	11	450	10	2.2	Pakistan (36%)
TUR-Counterfeit	0	0	0	2	1	10	n.a.	900	2.0	Syria (100%)
SVK-Counterfeit	16	11	18	7	7	9	-18	29	1.8	Ukraine (100%)
ITA-Forged	0	0	0	3	7	6	n.a.	-14	1.2	Bangladesh (67%)
SVN-Forged	0	0	0	0	2	6	n.a.	200	1.2	Albania (83%)
HUN-Counterfeit	10	6	9	5	12	5	-17	-58	1.0	Bosnia and Herzegovina (40%)
PRT-Forged	0	0	0	0	1	5	n.a.	400	1.0	Angola (40%)
Others	127	112	193	252	148	65	-42	-56	13	Turkey (12%)
Other	70	72	35	35	63	134	86	113		Tunisia (51%)
ITA-Counterfeit	9	13	2	7	12	78	500	550	58	Tunisia (87%)
ITA-Authentic	1	2	5	5	7	19	850	171	14	Bangladesh (84%)
LKA-Counterfeit	0	21	0	0	0	6	-71	n.a.	4.5	Sri Lanka
BGR-Counterfeit	0	4	1	0	0	3	-25	n.a.	2.2	Romania (33%)
FRA-Counterfeit	3	0	2	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.5	Romania (50%)
FRA-Forged	1	1	0	0	0	2	100	n.a.	1.5	Cameroon (50%)
XXP-Forged	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.5	Palestine
GTM-Counterfeit	1	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.5	Colombia
UNK-Pseudo	1	0	1	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	1.5	Romania (50%)
ROU-Counterfeit	0	1	1	0	1	2	100	100	1.5	Romania
Others	54	30	23	23	43	16	-47	-63	12	Algeria (6.3%)
Total	1 831	1 835	2 083	2 366	2 176	2 572	40	18		

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.


Annex Table 12. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Pakistan	8 569	9 073	5 854	5 782	7 097	5 974	-34	-16	9.8
Albania	1 506	2 140	3 568	4 149	3 615	4 024	88	11	6.6
Morocco	2 392	3 465	4 214	4 022	3 744	3 456	-0.3	-7.7	5.7
Afghanistan	7 243	9 208	6 421	7 198	6 321	3 207	-65	-49	5.3
Algeria	2 667	4 573	3 696	3 955	3 269	2 851	-38	-13	4.7
India	2 091	2 579	3 088	2 467	2 360	2 713	5.2	15	4.4
Bangladesh	1 924	2 427	3 495	3 382	4 596	2 514	3.6	-45	4.1
Ukraine	2 229	2 460	2 163	2 160	2 445	2 487	1.1	1.7	4.1
Nigeria	1 610	1 901	2 455	2 251	2 327	2 312	22	-0.6	3.8
Syria	743	820	1 026	1 370	3 561	2 172	165	-39	3.6
Others	26 415	28 664	33 924	31 155	31 794	29 315	2.3	-7.8	48
Total	57 389	67 310	69 904	67 891	71 129	61 025	-9.3	-14	

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			per cent of total
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	3 386	3 597	3 028	3 071	2 903	4 166	16	44	9.9
Pakistan	1 547	2 193	2 366	2 490	1 831	3 805	74	108	9.0
India	1 926	2 271	2 388	2 204	1 973	2 362	4.0	20	5.6
Ukraine	1 861	1 963	1 473	1 906	2 106	2 145	9.3	1.9	5.1
Serbia	1 207	1 209	1 683	1 881	1 989	1 941	61	-2.4	4.6
Russian Federation	1 605	1 555	1 470	1 539	2 078	1 782	15	-14	4.2
Morocco	1 582	1 837	2 078	2 020	1 888	1 711	-6.9	-9.4	4.1
Bangladesh	702	951	1 078	1 090	806	1 674	76	108	4.0
Afghanistan	937	1 341	1 204	1 219	915	1 196	-11	31	2.8
Kosovo ^a	744	828	706	973	776	1 171	41	51	2.8
Others	22 142	23 840	21 170	22 038	20 993	20 204	-15	-3.8	48
Total	37 639	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 258	42 157	1.4	10	

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2011		2012			2012 Q4			
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
TYPE OF RETURN									
Forced	20 203	23 452	19 625	21 273	18 892	22 840	-2.6	21	54
Enforced by Member State	17 464	20 742	17 077	18 423	14 976	20 305	-2.1	36	48
Not specified	2 383	2 266	2 211	2 241	3 471	2 192	-3.3	-37	5.2
Enforced by Joint Operation	356	444	337	609	445	343	-23	-23	0.8
Voluntary	14 936	15 658	16 123	16 572	15 755	17 112	9.3	8.6	41
Others	8 494	8 807	8 586	9 577	8 464	9 767	11	15	23
IOM-assisted	3 531	3 975	4 254	3 984	3 423	3 761	-5.4	9.9	8.9
Not specified	2 911	2 876	3 283	3 011	3 868	3 584	25	-7.3	8.5
Not specified	2 500	2 475	2 896	2 586	3 611	2 205	-11	-39	5.2
Total	37 639	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 453	42 157	1.4	10	100
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES									
Forced									
Albania	3 265	3 436	2 871	2 864	2 579	3 649	6.2	41	8.7
Pakistan	968	1 494	1 574	1 759	997	2 862	92	187	6.8
Bangladesh	392	650	669	706	501	1 304	101	160	3.1
Afghanistan	703	1 053	891	950	606	946	-10	56	2.2
Tunisia	2 067	2 783	1 277	1 511	1 575	861	-69	-45	2.0
India	696	766	843	872	899	807	5.4	-10	1.9
Kosovo*	339	443	306	584	383	765	73	100	1.8
Morocco	649	856	870	847	830	765	-11	-7.8	1.8
Serbia	644	770	741	785	659	745	-3.2	13	1.8
Algeria	552	609	624	615	580	716	18	23	1.7
Others	9 928	10 592	8 959	9 780	9 283	9 420	-11	1.5	22
Total Forced Returns	20 203	23 452	19 625	21 273	18 893	22 840	-2.6	-21	
Voluntary									
Ukraine	1 380	1 502	1 124	1 483	1 707	1 754	17	2.8	4.2
India	1 223	1 500	1 536	1 328	1 038	1 547	3.1	49	3.7
Russian Federation	1 278	1 224	1 132	1 171	1 741	1 471	20	-16	3.5
Serbia	562	437	938	1 093	1 322	1 186	171	-10	2.8
Pakistan	561	659	770	708	680	908	38	34	2.2
fYROM	564	404	377	442	669	657	63	-1.8	1.6
Brazil	637	979	758	989	414	536	-45	29	1.3
China	685	798	903	759	563	476	-40	-15	1.1
Albania	106	149	143	201	309	447	200	45	1.1
Nigeria	466	534	429	433	336	441	-17	31	1.0
Others	7 474	7 472	8 013	7 965	6 976	7 689	2.9	10	18
Total Voluntary Returns	14 936	15 658	16 123	16 572	15 867	17 112	9.3	8,6	

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.



European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu



For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 6257/2013

Warsaw, May 2013