

FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2014

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2014



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1
00-124 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu

Warsaw, October 2014
Risk Analysis Unit
Frontex reference number: 16160/2014

OPOCE Catalogue number TT-AF-14-003-EN-N
ISSN 2363-0566

© Frontex, 2014
All rights reserved. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.

DISCLAIMERS

This is a Frontex staff working document. This publication or its contents do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. All maps and charts included in this report are the sole property of Frontex and any unauthorised use is prohibited. Frontex disclaims any liability with respect to the boundaries, names and designations used on the maps. The contents of open-source boxes are unverified and presented only to give context and media representation of irregular-migration phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

Table of contents

Executive summary #5

1. Introduction #7

2. Methodology #8

3. Summary of FRAN indicators #10

4. Situational picture in Q2 2014 #11

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing #11

4.2. Routes #13

4.3. Clandestine entry #21

4.4. Detections of facilitators #22

4.5. Detections of illegal stay #22

4.6. Refusals of entry #24

4.7. Asylum claims #26

4.8. Document fraud #26

4.9. Returns #29

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border #30

4.11. Passenger flow #35

5. Statistical annex #37



List of abbreviations used

BCP	border-crossing point
CIRCA	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
EDF	European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FYR Macedonia	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IBSS	Integrated Border Surveillance System
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICONet	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
ID	identity document
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JO	Joint Operation
n.a.	not applicable
NM	nautical mile
Q/qtr	quarter of the year
SAR	search and rescue
SASEMAR	Spanish Maritime Security and Rescue Society (<i>La Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima</i>)
SIS	Schengen Information System
SUV	sport utility vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	United States dollar
US	United States of America

Executive summary

In comparison with the first quarter of 2014, the second quarter saw an increase in all of the indicators of irregular migration and asylum exchanged under the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). A factor in this general trend was the annually recurring cycle of seasonal variation, whereby the summer months of each year are usually marked by increased pressure at the external borders.

However, the increase in irregular migration was far above what would usually be expected based on seasonal fluctuations at this time of the year. In the second quarter of 2014, the number of illegal border-crossings reported by the Member States was at its highest level since FRAN data collection began in 2007. In fact, compared to the second quarter of 2013, detections at the external borders increased by more than 170%.

As many as 90% of the irregular migrants were reported from the sea border of the EU. Compared to one year ago, Italy reported a more than eightfold increase in detections of illegal border-crossing, while the number in Greece more than doubled. Detections in Spain increased by 50%, even though from a significantly lower base.

Overall, detections reported from the Italian sea border represented almost three-quarters of all detected illegal border-crossings in Q2 2014 and for the second consecutive quarter Eritreans were the most reported nationality, representing around a third of all detections at this border section.

The intensified illegal migration by sea in the Central Mediterranean was not only related to improved weather conditions, but also to the presence of a large number of sub-Sa-

haran Africans in the coastal areas of Libya. The unstable situation in Libya has led to increased violence against immigrants, which acts as a push factor playing into the hands of facilitators.

Moreover, Italy continued its maritime operation Mare Nostrum in the waters of the Sicily Channel between Italy and Libya. It was launched in October 2013 to controlling migrant flows through increased surveillance and search-and-rescue activities.

Detections of Syrians, i.e. the second most reported nationality on this route, increased sevenfold in the Central Mediterranean in Q2 2014 compared to the previous quarter. The situation of Syrians seeking refuge in Egypt from the ongoing violent conflict in their home country also remained difficult. Due to hard economic and political conditions in the country Syrians continued to leave Egypt in massive numbers, mostly routing through Libya hoping to find an opportunity to reach Italy by boat.

The number of irregular migrants detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route in Q2 2014 was almost twice as high as in Q2 2013 and in the previous quarter. A range of operational activities has significantly reduced detections at the Greek and Bulgarian land borders to Turkey; although, in the long term, a displacement of the flow of irregular migrants to the Aegean Sea was observed.

The highest number of detections of illegal border-crossing at land borders in Q2 2014 was reported by Hungary, although this number was two-thirds lower than in Q2 2013 and 15% lower than in Q1 2014. Afghans remained the most reported nationality at this



border section, suggesting sustained secondary movements from Greece through the Western Balkan region to Hungary and further on to other Member States, in spite of increased operational activities at the EU's external border with Turkey.

As it happened in the past, large groups of migrants tried to cross to Ceuta and Melilla illegally. The attempts to cross the Spanish land border continued in Q2, but fewer migrants were successful in crossing due to the reinforcement of the fence. The number of persons detected for illegal crossings into Ceuta or Melilla decreased by 40% compared to last quarter, reaching a similar level as in Q2 2013. In contrast, detections at the Western Mediterranean sea border rose by 50%. Several indicators point to a continued increase in migration along this route.

In the second quarter of 2014, the number of asylum seekers exceeded 100 000 applications and reached the largest number since FRAN data collection began. Of all FRAN indicators, the number of asylum applications showed the most regular long-term upward trend. The annual total asylum numbers have increased by almost a fifth every year since 2010. While in 2011, a larger proportion of asylum seekers migrated due to

the bad economic situation in their home countries, in 2014 the share of those escaping violence and armed conflict grew. In this reporting period, the number of asylum applications was 20% higher than during the previous quarter of 2014 and a third higher than in Q2 2013.

Asylum applications were increasingly concentrated in the top destination countries. Since 2010, the share of applications for international protection submitted in the current top three asylum destinations (Germany, Sweden and Italy) has grown from 37% to around 60% of the total number reported to the FRAN.

In general, Syrian refugees continued to be the number one nationality seeking international protection in the EU, representing 20% of all asylum applications submitted in Q1 2014. Two-thirds of Syrian asylum seekers were reported from Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands.

Eritreans, on the other hand, were the fastest growing nationality of asylum seekers in Europe, as applications reported by Member States have increased by 270% since the previous quarter and more than sixfold since Q2 2013.

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first – to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second – to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore, some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities of Member State border-control authorities undertaken to secure different border sections and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines and the growing volume and complexity of the data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.



2. Methodology

This, the 24th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between April and June 2014 and exchanged between 31 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN Meeting, a proposal for a harmonised definition of the return indicator was outlined and several questions were presented in order to encourage discussion among FRAN members in view of es-

tablishing the regular collection of monthly return data by Frontex. Subsequently, an online survey of FRAN members was conducted to gather information and further stimulate discussion to fine-tune the proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN report (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions of these indicators are included in an annex to that report. Data collection commenced in January 2011.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2007. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end-of-year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 24th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 25 July 2014. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which was added as part of the regular data exchange within FRAN at the beginning of 2011.

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 document fraud (EDF-RAN)
- 7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN and EDF-RAN data used in the tables are as of 18 August 2014

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud to illegally cross the external borders and on all international flights. Data were backdated and joined with those exchanged under a pilot Tailored Risk Analysis released in 2011.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK and Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under categories 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes the main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active for at least a proportion of Q2 2014. Air borders saw the continuation of the JO Focal Points Air 2014 as well as the start of the JO Alexis 1. Sea borders saw the renewal of the JO Poseidon Sea, JO Hermes and JO Aeneas, as well as the start of the JO Focal Points Sea 2014 and JO Indalo 2014. Land borders saw the continuation of the JO Poseidon Land 2014 and the start of both the JO Focal Points Land 2014 and JO Flexible Operational Activities 2014 whilst the return-related Project Attica 2013 also continued.

Both primary data source, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data source, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation) were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, also to the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State representatives who responded to requests for additional information on key topics and emerging trends.




3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between the first and second quarter



* Data from Austria for January-May 2014 are not available at the moment

4. Situational picture in Q2 2014

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

As reflected in FRAN data, the second quarter of 2014 saw a substantial increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU external borders compared to Q1 2014. Member States reported 68 589 irregular migrants, which is more than three times as much as during the previous quarter. Furthermore, compared to the second quarter of 2013 the number of detections grew by around 45 000.

The sea borders of the EU, where more than 60 000 irregular migrants were reported by Member States (i.e. six times as many as one year ago) accounted for 90% of the detections of illegal border-crossing. Detections reported in the Central Mediterranean (around 53 000 in Q2 2014) represented almost three quarters of all illegal border-crossing detections.


One third of all migrants reported from this border were Eritrean nationals.

Member States reported the highest number of detections of Syrian refugees from the EU's external border since the beginning of the armed conflict in their home country. More than 10 000 Syrians tried to reach the EU through the Italian sea border, while close to 5 000 were detected at the Greek borders with Turkey. In general, detections at the Greek sea borders have been at the highest level since 2009.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing and the proportion of detections at the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. This figure clearly illustrates the particularly high proportion of detections at the sea borders during the second quarter.

Figure 2. **Detections of illegal border-crossing at the sea borders have been on the highest level since FRAN data collection began**

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders




Source: FRAN data as of 18 August 2014



Figure 3. **Of those Member States affected by illegal border-crossings, most reported increased detections, especially those on the Mediterranean Sea (Italy, Spain and Greece) and those affected by the flows of irregular migrants entering the EU via Turkey (Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary)**


Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2013 and Q2 2014 for the top ten reporting Member States shown by the size of the circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between the two reporting periods



Source: FRAN data as of 18 August 2014

Figure 4. **In relative terms, detections of Eritreans, Nigerians and Malians have increased the most since Q2 2013**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2013 and Q2 2014 for the top ten nationalities shown by the size of the circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between the two reporting periods



Source: FRAN data as of 18 August 2014

Figure 3 illustrates the level of detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2013 and Q2 2014 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes) for the top ten Member States. In Q2 2014, of the Member States affected by illegal border-crossings, most reported increased detections compared to the same period in 2013. The biggest increase was reported by Italy where detections rose eightfold, followed by Spain with an increase of more than 50%. In contrast, detections reported by Hungary decreased by three quarters.

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these trends by the nationality of the detected migrants at the EU level. Figure 4 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing by the top ten nationalities during the second quarters of 2013 and 2014 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes). This clearly shows that detections of Eritreans again increased the most (by around nine times) in relative terms among all nationalities compared to the same period in 2013, followed on different levels by Nigerians, Malians and Syrians.

4.2. Routes


For more detailed analyses, detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes which more accurately relate to regions of detection rather than linear routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 5, during the second quarter of 2014 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean ranked first among the main irregular migration routes, following an eightfold increase compared to Q2 2013. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Member States reported an almost twofold increase compared to the same time in 2013. For most sea borders, the upward trend registered in Q2 2014 exceeded the usual seasonal increase.

4.2.1. Central Mediterranean route

In total, more than 53 000 migrants were detected at the Central Mediterranean route in Q2 2014 according to Frontex operational data. The number of detections in the Central Mediterranean has not only been higher than during the past winter due to improved maritime weather conditions, but reached the highest level recorded since FRAN data

Figure 5. In Q2 2014, detections in the Central Mediterranean continued to soar reaching the highest level of any second quarter since the initial stages of the Arab Spring in 2011

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main migration route



Source: FRAN data as of 18 August



Figure 6. **Boat detected by Italian authorities on 16 May 2014, about 120 nautical miles south of Lampedusa with 299 irregular migrants on board**

collection began in 2007. Even during the Arab Spring, when the migratory flows particularly from Tunisia had been exceptionally large, the number of irregular migrants detected in this region was only half as high as in Q2 2014. During the reporting period, more than 90% of all detected migrants departed from Libya, while slightly more than 5% left from Egypt. During the Arab Spring in Q2 2011 the top migrant nationality detected at sea in the Central Mediterranean was Tunisian, whereas three years later in Q2 2014 most migrants were nationals of Eritrea and Syria.

There are several reasons that contributed to increased migration along this route. First, improved weather conditions made the Central Mediterranean more navigable. Second, the presence of a large number of sub-Saharan Africans in the coastal areas of Libya increased the migratory pressure. Third, the increasingly unstable situation in Libya led to a deteriorating security situation and increased violence, especially against sub-Saharan migrants. Libyan authorities currently lack the ability to fully prevent the departure of boats from their coastline and to dismantle those facilitation networks that have good organisational and logistical capacities.

As shown in Figure 7, the number of migrants detected in their attempt to cross the Cen-

tral Mediterranean peaked in regular intervals, as shown in weeks 15, 19, 24, 26 and 29. After each peak detections decreased drastically and then gradually grew again.

According to Frontex operational data, the number of Eritreans detected in the Central Mediterranean rose to a record level. Since the first quarter of the year, the number of reported Eritrean irregular migrants increased tenfold from 1 522 to 16 207. Reports suggest that many of the Eritreans had been living for some time in Libya and that they actually had no intention to travel to Europe. Although Libya was planned to be their final destination, they decided to leave for Italy because of the deteriorating security situation in Libya.


Also the situation of those Syrians who sought refuge in Egypt to escape the ongoing violent conflict in their country remained difficult. They therefore continued to leave Egypt in large numbers. The trends show that after October 2013, direct sea crossings from Egypt to Italy subsided and more Syrians travelled to Libya to find an opportunity to reach the Italian coast by boat. After March 2014 however, numbers of direct boats from Egypt gradually grew again, almost reaching the peak levels of last year.

According to Frontex operational data, the number of Malian nationals apprehended in the Central Mediterranean repeatedly increased, by more than 1 800 persons since the previous quarter to 3 064, thus ranking third among all migrant nationalities on this route in Q2 2014.

In the second quarter of 2014, almost 51 000 persons were rescued in 274 rapid rescue operations undertaken by Italian authorities, assets deployed through Frontex Joint Operations and civilian vessels. In spite of these combined efforts, several tragic accidents in overcrowded migrant boats leading to 83 fatalities could not be prevented. In one of the worst cases, on 29 June, Italian authorities detected a wooden boat with 592 mi-

Figure 7. **Detections of migrants illegally crossing the Central Mediterranean towards the EU during the JO Hermes 2013 increased dramatically during weeks 15, 19, 24, 26 and 29 of 2014**

Weekly detections of irregular migrants illegally crossing the border during the JO Hermes 2013/2014. Blue shaded frame indicates Q2 2014



Source: Frontex operational data as of 18 August 2014

grants on board. When all of the migrants had safely boarded the Italian vessels, more than 60 migrants were discovered locked on the lower deck of the wooden vessel together with 45 dead.

Moreover, Italy strengthened its maritime presence in the Central Mediterranean through a specific operation named Mare Nostrum (Our Sea) since 18 October 2013. It aims at controlling migrant flows through increased surveillance and search-and-rescue (SAR) activities. Under Mare Nostrum the Italian Navy deployed a number of ships and other assets to the waters of the Sicily Channel between Italy and Libya.

4.2.2. Apulia and Calabria

In the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria, detections of illegal border-crossing tend to be associated with two different kinds of irregular migration. The majority of detections in the area of Apulia are of secondary movements to Italy and migrants who originally entered the Schengen area in Greece, while most detections in Calabria are of migrants who departed from Turkey or Egypt and sailed across the Aegean Sea, often near Crete, towards Italy to enter the Schengen area for the first time.

After a lower number of detections reported during the last winter, the number of detections in Q2 2014 was closer to the average over the past few years. The most reported nationality on this route were Syrians. Two thirds departed from Egypt, primarily arriving in Calabria, while one third of the Syrians detected on this route departed from Greece, mainly arriving in Apulia. The second most predominant nationality on this route, Pakistanis, primarily departed from Greece, whilst some Afghan nationals also arrived from Turkey in June.

4.2.3. Eastern Mediterranean route

The number of detected migrants who attempted to irregularly reach the EU along the Eastern Mediterranean route in the second quarter of 2014 was almost twice as high as during the second quarter of 2013. Since the beginning of 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing have increased continuously, from 4 195 in Q1 to 8 767 in Q2 2014. Because of seasonal reasons, the number of migrants grew from 2 030 in April to 4 231 in June, around 85% of whom were detected at the sea border. Almost two thirds of the reported detections were related to Syrian nationals, whereas 20% and 5%, respectively, of irregular migrants Afghan and Somali citizens.



© Frontex, 2014

Deadly accident near Samos

In the early morning of 5 May 2014, Frontex assets detected two capsized boats, one yacht and one dinghy, close to the north coast of Samos Island. A search and rescue operation was launched, leading to the rescue of 36 persons (out of which two were later identified as facilitators and 34 irregular migrants, mostly from Somalia). 22 corpses were recovered, among them many women and children.

Survivors indicated that the arrangements for the journey were made in Istanbul, from where the whole group of 56 migrants was transported by bus to Cesme, in the province of Izmir. On the night of 4 May 2014, the group embarked aboard the yacht (see picture above) and started to navigate towards Samos. After sailing for two hours in rough weather, the yacht started to take on water and the facilitators moved the migrants to the starboard side of the boat. Inevitably, the yacht overturned and some migrants, mainly women and children, were trapped underneath. Some of the migrants rushed to the attached dinghy, which also capsized. Because of the early detection by Frontex assets deployed in the area, it was possible to save the rest of the group.


The Eastern Mediterranean route has traditionally been a major hotspot for irregular migration into the EU, predominantly associated with illegal border-crossings from Turkey. After early August 2012 at the Greek land border and since November 2013 at the Bulgarian border, detections have been at much lower levels following increased operational activity in the area. However, total detection numbers in June 2014 again reached the levels of 2009–2011.

The marked decrease in detections observed since August 2012 at particular border sections is due to a range of operational activities taking place in the region:

1. In August 2012 the Greek authorities launched operation Aspida, deploying additional manpower, assets and equipment to the Evros region in order to curb and tackle illegal migration. The enhanced surveillance and patrolling activities have resulted in a remarkable drop in the number of apprehended irregular migrants in the Evros region and have led to a displacement of the migration flow towards the Bulgarian-Turkish border and the eastern Aegean Sea. In addition to the operation Aspida, the operation Xenios Zeus focused on detecting migrants inland in urban areas around Athens.
2. As a response to the increased pressure at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, the Bulgarian authorities decided to implement an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS) to conduct enhanced air surveillance, a special police operation and to construct a 30 km long fence along vulnerable parts of the border.
3. JO Poseidon Land 2014 was also active during Q2 2014 at the land border with Turkey. The operation commenced on 26 March. From 1 April to 30 June 2014, a total of 1 302 migrants were reported for crossing the border illegally (869 migrants in the Bulgarian operational area and 433 migrants in the Greek operational area), which rep-

Figure 8. **Increased operational activity reduced the detections of migrants at the Greek and later at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey. Numbers also show substantial displacement to the eastern Aegean Sea**

Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing in the Eastern Mediterranean region by border section and the detections of migrants arriving with fraudulent documents on flights from Istanbul since the beginning of 2012 (graph)



Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 29 August 2014

resents a decrease compared to the same reporting period of 2013, when 1 268 migrants were apprehended (1 054 migrants in Bulgaria and 214 migrants in Greece). Meetings between the Greek and Turkish authorities take place on a monthly basis to allow for the exchange of relevant data and information.

- Moreover, JO Poseidon Sea 2014 was operational during the reporting period in order to tackle the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

As can be seen in Figure 8, the abovementioned operational activities led to reduced detections of illegal border-crossing in the eastern Mediterranean region; however, in the long term a displacement to the sea borders was observed. The fact that the overall number of illegal border-crossings on the eastern Mediterranean route were higher than in Q2 2013 can be attributed to the detections that were made in the Aegean Sea.

Eastern Aegean Sea

According to FRAN data from April to June 2014, more than 7 000 apprehensions of irregular migrants were reported from the

eastern Aegean Sea. During Q2 2014, the number of migrants detected in this area has been far higher than during the same season in previous years. One reason for this trend is the displacement of irregular migrants from the Bulgarian and Greek land borders with Turkey.

The largest percentage increase concerned Egyptian nationals, whose number grew 15-fold and reached nearly 300. At the same time, more than 1 500 Afghan nationals were detected while trying to reach the Eastern Aegean islands in Q2 2014, which represents an increase by one third compared to one year ago.

Concerning the location of interceptions, roughly 75% were made inland on the Aegean islands and the rest at sea. In the 292 incidents detected through JO Poseidon Sea during Q2 2014, the most targeted islands have been Lesbos, Samos and Chios.

Measures at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey

As a response to increased migration pressure at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, Bulgaria has implemented a combination of measures. On 1 July 2012, the Bulgarian authorities initiated the construction of an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS) along with enhanced air surveillance which has been ongoing since October 2012. Through a special police operation launched on 11 November 2013 additional police and border police officers have been deployed to the Bulgarian-Turkish land border.

On 24 October 2013, the Bulgarian authorities started the construction of a 30 km technical engineering obstacle in the border areas which are most affected by illegal migration. It was completed by the end of July 2014 (see Fig. 9) and it can be assumed its construction will lead to a displacement of the migratory



Figure 9. **Bulgarian-Turkish border between Lesovo and Kraynovo**

flow towards the areas which are not covered by the surveillance system. In addition to these measures, regular bilateral joint meetings take place under an agreement signed between Bulgaria and Turkey.

During Q4 2013, the reported detections at the Bulgarian land border to Turkey reached their highest level since FRAN data collection began. Until Q2 2014, the abovementioned measures reduced detections of irregular migrants at the land border by 85%. Almost three quarters of the detected migrants were of Syrian and 20% of Afghan nationality.

4.2.4. Western Mediterranean route

In Q2 2014 there were close to 1 500 detections of illegal border-crossing in the western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla. This was around a 19% decrease compared to the first quarter of the year due to

lower numbers from the land border. Compared to Q2 2013, the number of detections increased by nearly 150 persons. Taking all second quarters since 2009 into perspective, the level of irregular migration registered during Q2 2014 along this route corresponded to the reported average.

More than half of the migrants reported on this route in Q2 2014 attempted to illegally cross into Melilla or Ceuta. This figure was considerably lower than in Q1 and only slightly lower than a year ago. Ceuta and Melilla are preferred destinations because they do not require the costly involvement of a facilitation network. The massive crossing attempts by sub-Saharan migrants that were reported from Ceuta and Melilla are most effective with the participation of a high number of migrants. Reports indicate that attempts to cross the security fences at the border in Melilla are not organised and are instead usually triggered when migrants realise that the border patrols are not in the field or are less numerous than normal.

In Q2 2014, around one half of those migrants apprehended during attempts to enter Ceuta and Melilla illegally were Cameroonian nationals. The second and third most frequently detected nationalities attempting irregular entry into Ceuta and Melilla were Guineans and Malians, while the number of apprehended Algerians decreased substantially.

At the sea border, the proportion of migrants detected while trying to cross the Strait of Gibraltar was reported to have increased again to around 45% of all apprehensions reported from the Western Mediterranean route. Around 80% of the reported irregular migrants were nationals of sub-Saharan countries.

Simple inflatable boats are used by many migrants who intend to reach Europe (see Fig. 10).



© Frontex, 2014

Figure 10. **Typical toy rubber boat used by migrants to cross the sea border from Morocco to Spain**

The close proximity of Spain to Morocco as well as the affordability of these types of boats encourage this option. In fact, however this crossing is very dangerous. As a result, many migrants then have to be rescued by the Spanish Search and Rescue services (SASEMAR).

One such incident took place on 15 June at around 23:30 hrs, when a boat with sixty-eight irregular migrants was detected by SASEMAR about 40 miles from Alboran Island. The Spanish Search and Rescue services intercepted the boat and rescued the migrants. The migrants were then transferred to the port of Motril, where they received medical assistance from the Red Cross. There were 68 people on board the boat and it was not possible to identify any facilitators or the captain of the boat.

4.2.5. Western African route

In the second quarter of 2014, over 100 detections of illegal border-crossing were reported from this region. Although this represents a more than threefold increase compared to one year ago, the level of detections is still far lower than in 2009, when many more persons were apprehended. The majority of the persons detected during the reporting period were Malian nationals.



In spite of minor peaks during the summer of 2013 and in the current reporting period, irregular migration on the West African route has been significantly lower after 2009. Of key importance for maintaining the low numbers of detections at the border are sustained high levels of surveillance (ensuring early detections) and collaboration with third-country authorities.

4.2.6. Western Balkan route

During the analysed period there were 2 647 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU border to the Western Balkan countries, which represents a more than 10% decrease compared to the previous quarter, and a sharp 70% drop compared to the corresponding period of last year.

In Q2 2014, the Hungarian-Serbian border section remained the busiest in terms of illegal border-crossings. In the analysed quarter, this border section registered a 15% decrease compared with the previous quarter and a 73% drop compared to the peak recorded in the same period of 2013.

As regards to nationalities detected at the Hungarian border with Serbia, the top three remains the same as in the previous two quarters. Afghan nationals still rank first; however, in Q2 2014 Kosovo* citizens moved to the second place outpacing Syrians, who now rank third. Although the overall numbers at this border section decreased, the composition of the flow still indicates continued secondary movements from Greece/Turkey through the Western Balkans and onwards to EU Member States.

As regards to nationalities detected on the Western Balkan route, most were Afghan nationals in transit from Greece and Turkey (719), while 708 were Western Balkan nationals, mostly from Kosovo*, 478 were Syrian migrants. In Q2 2014, detections of both

Afghan and Syrian nationals decreased compared to the first quarter of 2014. The number of Pakistani migrants remained rather stable during the second quarter, reaching around 50 detections. An increase in the number of Iraqi migrants can be noticed compared to the first quarter of 2014 but the overall figures still remain at a low level.

The overall number of West Africans remained stable compared to the previous quarter with increased detections of some nationalities (for example Nigerians from 15 to 59) and decreases in others. In total however, the number of West African migrants is lower than in the corresponding quarter of 2013. This may be partly due to a possible re-routing of these nationalities towards the central Mediterranean area.

4.2.7. Circular migration from Albania to Greece

Prior to being granted visa free access to the Schengen area in late 2010, Albanians were regularly detected in very high numbers illegally crossing their land border into Greece. Since visa liberalisation, Albanians are still detected illegally crossing the border into Greece but at a lower level. Moreover, there was a high level of refusals of entry (mostly for having an alert in the SIS) and also document fraud (counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay in the Schengen area).

In Q2 2014, detections of Albanians at the Greek-Albanian border increased by almost 50% compared to the last quarter, which points to continued circular migration at this border. Likewise, detections of Albanians at the Greece-FYR Macedonia border increased by more than 150%. Refusals of entry of Albanians at these border sections are on a similar level as in Q2 2013, but increased by 63% since Q1 2014. Effective returns of Albanians

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



© Frontex, 2014

Figure 11. **Migrants hiding in a lorry to cross the border from Turkey to Bulgaria**

decreased in Q2 2014 by 5% compared to the same period of 2013.

4.2.8. Eastern land borders route

The eastern land borders route represents a combination of detections of illegal border-crossing reported from the land borders of Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes – possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and countries of origin and a long stretches of impassable terrain.

In the second quarter 2014 there were 218 illegal border-crossings reported from the eastern borders, which represented a stable trend when compared with the first quarter of 2014 (189) and a drop of 37% when compared to the corresponding period of 2013. However, there was a decrease in detections at all border sections with Ukraine. The drop in detections was reported from both sides of the border: by Member States and Ukraine. A significant drop was recorded especially in detections of Afghan nationals (Slovakia) and Syrians (Romania, Hungary, Poland).

Regarding nationalities, the top five were nationals of Afghanistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Vietnam, and the Russian Federation. Simi-

larly to the previous quarter, Ukrainians were reported mainly at the borders with Romania and Poland.

Similarly to the first quarter of 2014, detections of the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens were related to smuggling rather than to migration purposes. In contrast, for the majority of Georgians, Afghans and Russians the purpose of illegal border-crossing between BCPs was linked to irregular migration.

4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections confirmed to be clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport), results in relatively low detections for the whole of the EU compared with other indicators of irregular migration. In Q2 2014, 624 detections were reported at EU level, which is almost twice as many as in Q1 2014.

Most of the detections of clandestine entry in the second quarter of 2014 were reported from Bulgaria, which was the largest number of clandestine entries reported by that country since FRAN data collection began. All incidents were related to the country's land border with Turkey. This increase in detections of clandestine entry at this border



section is likely to be linked to the strengthened surveillance along the land border with Turkey that triggered facilitators to find alternative ways into the EU.

Compared to Q1 2014, detections of clandestine entry reported by Croatia – all at its land border with Serbia – decreased to a small extent. Considerable lorry traffic goes through this border section, and is particularly used for international traffic from the Western Balkans countries to the EU, but also as a transit corridor for TIR traffic from Turkey to western EU Member States. Hiding in lorries and trains represents considerable risks for migrants' lives, in particular due to the threat of suffocation. Most of the migrants were Syrians, and it is likely that they had initially crossed the border illegally from Turkey and were in transit to their final destination within the EU when detected by the Croatian border-control authorities.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

After five years of decreasing detections of facilitators of irregular migration, numbers have recently been rising again. More facilitators were arrested, although facilitation networks showed increasingly cautious behaviour. A widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud have allowed facilitators to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossings. On the other hand, the expanded logistical and organisational structures of the facilitation networks and the increased capacities to transport migrants across the Mediterranean Sea and Europe's land borders apparently led to a greater exposure of these criminal groups to police investigations and consequently to more arrests.

During the second quarter of this year FRAN data shows 2 641 detections of facilitators of

irregular migration, 30% more than during the previous quarter and around 50% more than in Q2 2013. The top five Member States (Spain, Italy, France, Greece and Switzerland) reported more than 80% of the detections.

The fact that most facilitators were arrested by Mediterranean countries may indicate that more complex sea border-crossings require more involvement from local facilitation networks. Since Q2 2013, the number of arrested facilitators from Mediterranean countries has increased by 50%.

In accordance with the rapidly increased detection numbers of Eritreans illegally crossing the EU external borders, also more Eritrean facilitators were arrested. While before 2014, Member States regularly reported less than 20 facilitators from Eritrea per quarter, their number grew to 85 in Q2 2014.


4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q2 2014, there were 100 647 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is an increase of 15% compared to last quarter and 22% more than one year ago (Fig. 12). Since 2009, reported levels of detections have always been clearly below 100 000. In terms of nationalities reported through this indicator, Syrians ranked first, reaching another peak in Q2 2014 with 14 753 detections. Similar to the detections of illegal border-crossings and asylum applications, the number of Syrians detected staying illegally has risen sharply from mid-2013, as a consequence of people escaping the enduring armed conflict in their country.

The largest increase of this indicator was related to Eritreans, of whom 12 082 were reported for illegal stay, a number that is more than five times as high as in Q1 2014 and more than 12 times as high as one year ago in Q2 2013. If all nationalities from the Horn of Africa are grouped together, the reported numbers

Figure 12. **The highest percentage increases in the number of detected illegal stayers were reported by Sweden, Malta and Bulgaria**

Detections of illegal stay in Q2 2014 per Member State (blue shade) and the percentage change from Q2 2013



of illegal stay would add up to nearly 15 000 migrants during Q2 2014.

Other nationalities that were detected in significant numbers included Moroccans (6 064), Albanians (4 655), and Afghans (3 700).

As has been the case since Q4 2012, Germany reported the largest number of detections of illegal stay, consisting of mainly Syrians. However, the 50% growth of this indicator since Q1 2014 (representing the largest increase between two consecutive quarters so far) was mainly caused by Eritreans, re-



ported for illegal stay around 11 times more often than in the previous quarter. Since Q1 2010, the detections of illegal stay in Germany have grown threefold, making Germany by far the most popular destination country for illegal migration within the EU.

The Member State with the second highest number of detections of illegal stay was Sweden, which reported 80% more illegal stayers than in the previous quarter. This upward trend was mostly related to an increase in asylum applicants, which are additionally counted as illegal stayers by Sweden.

The Member States, which reported the largest downward trend in illegal stay were the neighbours Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Romania, where detections decreased by more than 50% since last quarter. The lower number of Syrians detected for illegal stay was to a large extent related to operational activities at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey.

4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q2 2014 26 823 refusals of entry were reported from the EU external borders. This represents only a slight increase of 7% since last quarter. However, compared to one year ago the reported number of refusals decreased by 30%. For one part, this downward trend was caused by a decrease in refusals of entry at the land borders in Poland, in particular those refusals issued to Russians and to a lesser extent Georgians at the land border with Belarus. The refusals of entry issued by Poland to Russian nationals during Q2 2014 reached only 15% of the number reported one year ago. In this context, the most mentioned reason given to the traveller was 'no valid visa'.

This reduction follows a two-year phenomenon that consisted in a large number of Chechens being refused entry at the BCP of

Terespol and then applying for asylum so as to continue to other Member States, mostly Germany. A series of measures including media campaigns in Chechnya introduced by Germany and Poland managed to curb this type of irregular migration. However, the Polish border sections with Ukraine and Belarus remained the ones with most refusals of entry issued in Q2 2014.

In general, refusals issued to Ukrainians showed a clear increase during Q2 2014, since the number reached a low during last winter. The most often given reasons were 'no valid visa' or 'no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay'.


Not only Poland but also other countries in the north-east of Europe have reported lower numbers of refusals compared to the second quarter of 2013 (Fig. 13). Since then, the Baltic countries and Finland together nearly halved the number of refusals issued to Russians in Q2 2014. Also worth mentioning is the number of refusals issued by Estonia – which went down to only a handful in 2014.

More than 11 500 refusals were reported from EU/Schengen airports, with the reason mostly being 'no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay'. Most refusal decisions were issued in Paris Charles de Gaulle and London Heathrow. At airports, entry was most frequently refused to Albanians, Algerians, and Brazilians.

The number of refusals of entry issued to nationals of the visa-free Western Balkan countries increased both compared to last quarter and the second quarter of 2013. Most were refused entry because of a Schengen alert issued, because of no sufficient means of subsistence and 'no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay'.

Figure 13. **In spite of a substantial decrease, Poland continued to refuse entry to more third-country citizens than any other Member State. The most concerned nationals were Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians**

Refusals of entry in Q2 2014 per Member State (blue shades) and percentage change since Q2 2013



Most of these refusals were issued at the border between Hungary and Serbia, Greece and Albania, and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In general, by far the two main reasons for refusals of entry in the EU were 'no valid visa' and 'has no appropriate documenta-

tion justifying the purpose of stay'. Together they represented nearly half of all refusals of entry in the second quarter of 2014 and these two reasons have ranked first since data collection has begun.



4.7. Asylum claims

In the second quarter of 2014, the number of asylum seekers crossed the mark of 100 000 applications and reached 113 312, the largest number since FRAN data collection began. The indicator increased by 20% compared to the previous quarter, representing the strongest quarterly increase in absolute numbers since 2009. Compared to the second quarter of 2013, the figure of asylum applications grew by 32%.

Both in terms of percentage and absolute numbers, Italy was the Member State which registered the largest increase in asylum applications (Fig. 14). Since Q2 2013, the figure increased almost sixfold. The largest share of asylum seekers reported by Italy was Malian (22%), followed by Nigerian (16%) and Pakistani nationals (10%).

Italy together with Germany, which again reported the largest number of applications in the EU, and Sweden, which registered a record asylum figure since FRAN data collection began in 2007, account for 60% of all asylum seekers reported by Member States. In Germany and Sweden, Syrians and Eritreans are the most prevalent nationality amongst the asylum seekers.

Compared to last quarter, the number of Eritrean migrants seeking international protection in the Netherlands increased ninefold, while Syrian asylum applications doubled. These developments made the Netherlands one of the most growing EU asylum destinations during the last quarter.

In general, Syrians continued to be the number one nationality seeking international protection in the EU, submitting in the second quarter of 2014 almost 25% more asylum applications than in Q1 2014. The nationality with the fastest growing number of asylum

seekers were Eritreans, whose applications rose by about 274% between Q1 and Q2 2014.

Western Balkan nationals, whose asylum applications used to have their seasonal low in the first half of the year continued to apply for international protection in large numbers. Although the figure reported in Q2 2014 is 15% smaller than in the previous quarter, it is the highest value of all second quarters since FRAN data collection began. Almost three quarters of their asylum applications were submitted in Germany.

4.8. Document fraud

As in the previous quarter, in Q2 2014 there were just over 2 300 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which is also roughly the same as during the previous year in Q2. Omitting the data from Switzerland, which started reporting in 2014 and the numbers from the new EU Member State Croatia, which only began reporting after June 2013, reports of document fraud would have been in decline.


Spain, France, Italy and Hungary reported the most detections of entry at the external border, together accounting for more than 60% of all detections at the EU level. Spanish detections were mostly related to attempted entries from Morocco.

Since last quarter, French authorities experienced a 20% hike in the detections of document fraud on entry from third countries.

Italy reported an increase in the detections of document fraud related to both Q1 2014 and the second quarter of 2013.

Hungary reported the largest number of document fraud cases of any second quarter since the EDF data collection started. However, compared to the previous quarter, doc-

Figure 14. **The strongest increase in number of asylum applications was reported by Italy. In absolute numbers, Germany received most applications in Q2 2014**



At the EU level, of the 124 nationalities detected using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the EU or Schengen area from a third country, the most commonly detected were from Syria, Albania and Nigeria. Syrians were detected at a range of locations but Albanians were mostly apprehended on entry to



Greece and Nigerians were mostly detected at the airports of London, Rome and Madrid. See the following sections for more details.

4.8.1. Document fraud on exit from the EU/Schengen area

The number of persons using fraudulent documents on exit (650) shows a slight decrease both compared to last quarter and one year ago. Around a fifth of detections were on exit but this is likely to be an underestimation as checks are less stringent on exit than they are on entry. In fact some Member States do not perform exit checks. On the other hand, a number of Member States reported that a third or more of their cases were on exit, such as Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Switzerland. Romania and Slovakia detected more document fraudsters on exit than on entry.

4.8.2. Between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States

As well as at the external border, it is also important that at the EU level there were over 750 detections of document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States, and between two non-Schengen EU Member States. As is normally the case, many of these were reported on entry to the UK, a common destination country for irregular migrants travelling from the Schengen area. In this case, by far the most commonly detected migrants were from Albania.

4.8.3. Intra-Schengen flights

The EDF-RAN data exchange also considers detections of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights (and to a minor extent ferry connections) where no border checks are systematically performed. Since the EDF data collection began, intra-Schengen detections have been showing modest highs

during the spring and summer season, while during most winter months, less detections were reported. In the second quarter of 2014, 1 569 detections of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights were reported, which are more than twice as many as during the previous quarter.

Apart from the seasonal fluctuations, detection numbers reported during the last three years showed a rather upward tendency, which intensified after Q3 2013. One year ago, the number of intra-Schengen detections reached only 50% of the current level.

4.8.4. Migrants from Syria

Overall, 981 Syrians were detected using fraudulent documents in Q2 2014. After a temporary low of 566 Syrians who were detected in the previous quarter, the number appears to have returned and even exceeds the unusually high level that was reported by the end of 2013. Syrians were mostly detected on entry to the Schengen area from third countries, followed by intra-Schengen travel, which suggests that many are illegally crossing the external border and then using fraudulent documents for secondary movements.

4.8.5. Migrants from Albania

In Q2 2014, 635 Albanians were detected using more than 677 fraudulent documents (excluding authentic passports containing fraudulent documents such as visas or stamps), which is a decrease compared to both the previous quarter and Q2 2013. Nevertheless, Albanians represent the second biggest proportion of document fraud at the EU level.

According to media reports* published in June 2014, UK authorities have disbanded an international gang smuggling hundreds of illegal immigrants from Albania through Turkey and Rome into Britain using fake documents.

* <http://news.sky.com/story/1290780/illegal-immigrant-smuggling-racket-smashed>

The criminals demanded between EUR 6 000 and 10 000 from their 'customers' for identity cards with substituted photographs.

4.8.6. Migrants from the Horn of Africa

Nearly 90% of all incidents related to this region's nationals are detected during secondary movements after illegal entry into the EU. In general, Member States reported 591 cases of document fraud committed by Eritrean nationals in Q2 2014, which is a threefold increase compared to the previous quarter. 189 Somali and 25 Ethiopians were detected with fraudulent documents, an increase of 38 and 19, respectively, compared to Q1 2014.

4.8.7. Migrants from Ukraine

The political crisis and armed conflict in Ukraine has not shown any substantial effect on the reported cases of document fraud. Ukrainians that were detected by Member State authorities with fraudulent travel documents tended to follow the overall seasonal trend of all other nationalities. At the EU external land borders, most incidents were reported from Polish and Hungarian BCPs.

4.8.8. Migrants from Sri Lanka

For one year, Sri Lankans arriving at Schengen airports with fraudulent documents have been steadily increasing. Between the second quarter of 2013 and the current reporting period, their reported number has been growing from 34 to 113.

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Return decisions and effective returns

In Q2 2014 there were 60 491 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which is 6% less than during

the previous quarter. Note that the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, *inter alia*, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached. As for Q1 and Q2 2014, the reported total does not include data from Austria for technical reasons. Moreover, Spanish data on return orders issued have been revised by the Spanish authorities and due to this change numbers for Q1 2014 were retroactively lowered.

40 724 effective returns were reported by Member States in Q2 2014, 10% more than during the previous quarter. For this indicator, Austrian data for this period were not yet available at the time of writing due to technical reasons.

At the Member State level there is often a discrepancy between the number of return decisions reached and the number of effective returns carried out. Some of the differences may be due to time lags between judicial decisions and physical returns, while other differences may be due to the disappearance of migrants once a decision has been reached.

In Bulgaria, both return decisions and effective returns decreased between Q1 and Q2 2014. The rather extraordinary peak reported in the first quarter of 2014 was caused by a particularly large number of illegal border-crossings in the second half of 2013. Considering this temporary phenomenon, both return indicators of Q1 2014 showed to be far higher than the quarterly average in 2013.

Nevertheless, in general, most return decisions (5 311) were related to Syrian nationals, decreasing by 15% since Q1 2014. Moroccans ranked second, with return decisions increasing by more than 500 since the previous quarter to 5 185 in Q2 2014.



4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Criminal networks that operate across the EU external borders pose a significant challenge to European law-enforcement authorities. They affect the overall management of the external borders insofar as their prevention demands substantial personnel and financial resources of the European border agencies.

4.10.1. Trafficking in human beings

Spanish authorities have identified patterns of Nigerian women being trafficked to Spain and Italy for both labour and sexual exploitation, and an increase in the sexual exploitation of children.

These women are recruited on false pretences (fictitious working arrangements) in Nigeria, and then mainly taken on two different routes. One route is travelling from Nigeria to Libya by land, and then moving onwards by boat to Italy as their final destination. The second is by travelling from Nigeria to Morocco by land, and from there attempting to gain access to Spain. These women may also be trafficked via commercial airlines using forged/false documents – this method is also the most expensive for the women, causing them to go into a large amount of debt with their exploiters.

The authorities also noted specific methods of enforcing emotional dependence on the victims. Victims participated in 'Voodoo' rituals with oaths and written statements. These often contained photographs, altars, candles and amulets, all with specific reference to the victim. Another specific method employed was the use of certain victims to be the controllers over the others. Whilst these women picked to be 'controllers' were still in heavy debt to the traffickers, they were put in a slightly less disadvantageous posi-

tion. However, with their role came the responsibility of generating their own level of profit required as well as the profit of those under their control.

These two sets of control methods would likely bring about a much more solid organisation; with both the overarching psychological and intimidating control of the traffickers, and the closer supervision and control of those in a very similar situation to them. Although not explicitly stated, the chance for the victim's 'promotion' to being a controller would be a strong incentive for the victims to stay in line.

4.10.2. Smuggling of excise goods at the eastern borders

The smuggling of cigarettes remained the main cross-border crime observed at the eastern borders. In the second quarter of 2014, the number of tobacco smuggling incidents reported through Frontex Joint Operations increased significantly when compared to the first quarter of 2014. Border guards reported 90 cases of cigarette contraband through JO Focal Points Land, which accounted for over five times more incidents than in the previous quarter. Almost half of the detections took place at the border with Moldova, while the borders with Ukraine and the Russian Federation were nearly equally affected by the number of incidents.

Similarly to previous quarters, *modi operandi* related to contraband cigarettes remained unchanged with smuggling occurring at BCPs, e.g. in personal belongings or in different means of transportation in specially built hidden compartments or in the cargo, as well as between BCPs via land borders or rivers. Apart from cigarettes with excise stamps of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation, cases of tobacco products transported illegally from Kaliningrad Oblast (the Russian Federation) to Lithuania without any



Figure 15. **Double bottom floor of SUV Isuzu Trooper fully equipped with illicit cigarettes from Belarus**

signs of excise duty stamps were reported by Lithuania.

The shipment of illicit cigarettes hiding in various parts of vehicles was detected on a regular basis. Typical places for illegal transport of tobacco goods include car bumpers, door, vehicles instrument panel, fuel tanks or the air bag compartment.

The use of double bottom constructions, in turn, still seemed to be less frequently used, but for larger amounts. Lithuanian border guards, as an example, revealed in April 15 000 packets of cigarettes originating from Belarus and hidden in a cargo compartment below the floor.

Contraband cigarettes were also detected by border patrols at land border sections. Cardboard boxes wrapped in black plastic were often left alone in the forest or on the river bank to be later transported inland. For example, about 37 500 packets of cigarettes were found inside of a small truck abandoned by perpetrators in the forest near the border with Lithuania.

Moreover, apprehensions of those caught 'red-handed' were also reported in the period examined. Cases described by the Polish Border Guard and Lithuanian State Border Guard Service indicated that at the Polish-Ukrainian and Lithuanian-Belarusian borders smugglers were detected carrying cigarettes packed in cardboard boxes attached with braces as shown in Figures 16 and 17.

The largest shipments of illicit cigarettes on the eastern borders were reported in cargo trains. Polish border guards faced several such cases. As an example, on 2 April 2014 border guards of BCP Terespol revealed over 1.2 million cigarettes worth almost EUR 170 000. The goods with Belarusian excise stamps were hidden under piles of wood.



Figure 16. **Cigarettes smuggled via land border from Belarus in wrapped boxes**



Figure 17. **Boxes of cigarettes with attached braces discarded in the woods**

© Lithuanian State Border Guard Service

© Lithuanian State Border Guard Service

© Polish Border Guard



Figure 18. **Cigarettes smuggled from Belarus hidden under piles of wood**

Smuggling via rivers was still a risk in the second quarter of 2014. Well known *modus operandi* such as cigarettes left alone either on the river banks or in floating boats were repeated continuously. Moldovan border police, for example, on 27 of May 2014 revealed 3 123 packets of cigarettes inside an inflatable pontoon drifting on the river Prut.




Figure 19. **Illicit cigarettes revealed in the area of unloading port near BCP Terespol**

Interestingly, in line with better weather conditions the use of diving suits for smuggling was recorded. On June 25, 2014 Lithuanian border guards detained a person dressed in a diving suit about 300 meters from the border with Belarus. Nearby the river, a shipment of 750 packets of cigarettes with Belarusian excise stamps was found.

Contraband cigarette market declining, Estonia still among largest in the EU

In Estonia, illegal cigarettes made up 18.6% of the market last year, down by 1.1 percentage points compared to 2012. Latvia (28.8%), Lithuania (27.1%) and Ireland (21.1%) were the only Member States with higher shares. The EU's average was 10.5 %, which was slightly lower than a year ago. The total of close to 60 billion pieces of illegal cigarettes purchased in the EU in 2013 translates into around EUR 11 billion in unpaid tax. Most of the contraband cigarettes in Estonia hail from the Russian Federation or Belarus, and around half are produced solely for the illegal market.

Source: news.err.ee; 2 July 2014



Figure 20. **Cigarettes revealed on a floating pontoon**

4.10.3. Drug trafficking

Drug trafficking to Western Europe

As before, cocaine accounted for a large percentage of seizures in Western Europe. All recorded cases originated from South America, with Ecuador being the main country of origin, followed by Columbia. Spain remained the top destination for large shipments (>1 000 kg per seizure) whilst Portugal and Italy both caught several significant hauls of between 100–200 kg.

During the month of May 2014, a number of cocaine shipments were seized on their way from Costa Rica to Spain, with nearly 4.5 tonnes seized in a 24 hour window.

One incident involved a shipment of 1.9 metric tonnes which was being smuggled on two fishing boats. A second involved 2.5 tonnes which was hidden amongst pineapples; the cocaine was divided up into 2 296 packages and hidden amongst the fruit. The haul would have had a street value of roughly 150 million Euros, and led to the arrest of six Spanish nationals. These were the largest recorded seizures originating from Costa Rica, and may indicate an increased shipping capacity from that region.

A small number of larger shipments were also caught in the Netherlands, Britain, France and Germany. These were often hidden alongside legitimate products and all originated from South American countries. Across Western Europe a number of smaller seizures (40–50 kg) were made, which mostly appeared to be acts of opportunity by travellers or smaller vessels.

Continuing from past trends, a steady stream of hashish was detected from Morocco to Spain, with little change from previous years. Greece has also seen a number of Hashish seizures at sea, although with relatively small



Figure 21. **Part of 1.9 tonne seizure of cocaine found on fishing boats from Costa Rica**

weight in comparison to the hauls from Morocco to Spain. The Morocco/Spain route seems unlikely to change, even with a number of high profile seizures. Seizures involving Moroccan nationals usually involved small amounts carried either on the person (under clothing), by ingestion or by land vehicle. Seizures involving Spanish nationals were usually larger shipments moved via boat with a land vehicle at the arrival point to continue onwards.

Poseidon Sea seizure

On 23 June, aircraft deployed under the JO Poseidon Sea operation detected two suspicious vessels in the area of Marathoupoleos, Greece. A Hellenic Coast Guard vessel arrived in the area and following a pursuit seized a speed boat laden with cigarettes from a variety of brands. The cargo ship, also laden with cigarettes, was seized after a pursuit with 6 Ukrainian crew members on board, while a lorry used for transporting the cigarettes was found abandoned in the coastal area. Hellenic Coast Guard officers arrested three smugglers involved in the incident, and following an investigation, arrested a further 6 members of the smuggling network. In total, 12 934 980 pieces of cigarettes were seized, representing a potential loss of duty of up to EUR 2 million.



The future threat of khat

The UK's recent move to illegalise khat (also known as qat, chat and gat) may lead to more incidents of smuggling in Western Europe due to the UK's large (largest in Europe by most estimates) Somali diasporas. Previously, Khat was legal in the UK, which was seen as a main route (and easiest border) into the rest of Europe, where Khat was already criminalised. Furthermore, evidence and convictions of large scale Khat smuggling rings in the US and other countries where it was already criminalised show that an organised crime framework for trafficking the drug is already in place.

Whilst it is unclear which borders will be most affected, the plant is mostly grown in the Red Sea region and is a major cash crop in Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. Without the easier route into Europe through the UK, the same routes used for hashish smuggling (Morocco/Spain) may become more popular.

Very few instances of heroin trafficking were found, however one major seizure was made by the Netherlands of 764 kg coming from Iran. The drugs were hidden in a container filled with 2 000 boxes of raisins from Iran, which was seized at Rotterdam port. The final destination of the container was either Greece or Bulgaria, from which it is probably distributed onwards to the surrounding countries.

Drug trafficking in the Balkans

The main routes were from Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina towards Croatia, with a number of seizures being made in the Adriatic Sea between Albania and Italy.

The main drug being trafficking out of Albania, Kosovo* and Bosnia-Herzegovina was marijuana, with the majority of detections along the Croatian border. Most incidents involved smuggling by land, mostly in passenger cars rather than commercial vehi-

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Albanian marijuana seized in Bari

The Guardia di Finanza and officials of the Customs Agency, as part of the checks carried out within the port to counter the introduction of the illegal goods from Eastern Europe, seized 1 350 kg of marijuana. Hidden inside of a cargo cover, composed of cement used in the construction industry. The driver of the vehicle, an Albanian aged 55, was arrested.

Source: www.ansa.it; 14 April 2014

Croatia's biggest marijuana haul

Police in Croatia seized more than 800 kg of marijuana smuggled over the Adriatic Sea from Albania in a fishing boat. Police said that the seizure is one of the biggest ever in the country. They say the drugs' value was estimated at some EUR 1.3 million (USD 1.8 million). The statement says eight Croatian and two Bosnian citizens have been detained, while the boat owner from Albania remains at large. Police say the drugs were placed in 700 packages for distribution in Croatia and in Western Europe.

Source: www.foxnews.com; 5 April 2014

cles and there were indicators in a number of cases that the drug's final destination was the Western Mediterranean.

4.10.4. Vehicle theft

Smuggling of vehicles at the eastern borders

In the second quarter of 2014 the number of detected vehicles reported through Frontex Joint Operations increased when compared to the previous quarter. 85 stolen vehicles have been prevented from crossing the border in

Q2 2014. Most incidents reported through JO Focal Points Land, were detected at the border with Ukraine and to the lesser extend with Belarus, Moldova and the Russian Federation.

According to JO Focal Points Land, the Polish-Ukraine border section was the most affected one by the phenomenon of stolen vehicles, followed by the Ukrainian border with Hungary, Belarusian border with Poland and the Moldovan border with Romania.

As reported detected stolen vehicles were originating from different Member States such as: Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, Austria, the Netherlands and the UK. BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen, Honda and Audi were still the top five most trafficked makes.

Smuggling of vehicles at the Western Balkan borders

In the second quarter of 2014 the number of detected stolen vehicles reported through Frontex Joint Operations increased by 46% when compared to the previous quarter. 47 stolen vehicles were prevented from crossing the border in Q2, compared to only 32 detections in the first quarter of 2014. Similarly to the first quarter, the majority of cases were recorded at the Serbian border, namely at the border with Hungary and Croatia. Bulgaria-Turkey and Croatia-Montenegro border sections were affected to a lesser extent.

4.11. Passenger flow

Since January 2014, Member States have been invited to regularly report on passenger flows at their external borders under FRAN. Their reporting is not yet comprehensive and thus it is not yet possible to have an EU-wide overview of passenger flow across the external borders at the EU level. Nevertheless, some limited analyses are possible and presented here.

Table 2. **Q2 2014 saw more entries at both air and land borders than Q1, reflecting increased passenger flows during the holiday season**

Quarterly entries of air-passengers (from third-countries and from non-Schengen Member States) and land-passengers from third-countries in Q1 and Q2 2014

	Q1	Q2	% change
Air – 15 Member States (out of 31)	24 022 813	33 035 078	38%
Land – 7 Member States (out of 13)	6 663 400	8 587 398	29%

Source: FRAN data as of 3 September 2014

4.11.1. At the air borders

At the air borders, one of the main difficulties for most Schengen Member States is to distinguish between the flow of passengers entering from third-countries and those entering from a non-Schengen Member States. Some Member States merged both flows, while others reported only arrivals from third-countries.

In Q2, 15 Member States (compared to 7 for Q1 2014) reported entries from third-countries and non-Schengen Member States for all three months, summing up more than 33 million passenger arrivals. This was an increase of about 40% compared to Q1, mostly due to the start of the holiday season which usually shows a peak around August.

For these Member States, quarterly arrivals were compared with refusals of entry and detections of document fraud on entry from third-countries or between Schengen and non-Schengen Member States. As passenger-flows vary widely among these Member States (more than 15 million in France, and less than 4 000 in Slovakia), comparisons among Member States were made on the basis of a rate, in this case the number of refusals of entry or document fraud detections for every 100 000 entries.

On average, these Member States refused entry to 14 travellers for every 100 000 entries. Generally speaking, Member States with low passenger flow tend to have a large ratio of refusals.



Detections for document fraud varied widely, from zero to 41 detections per 100 000 arrivals. It should be noted here that only detections made on arrivals from third-countries or between Schengen and non-Schengen Member States were taken into account.

4.11.2. At the land border

At the land border, data on passengers arriving from third-countries were available for seven Member States, totalling about 8.5 million passengers in Q2 2014. Like at the air border, passenger flow increased between Q1

and Q2, mostly associated with the summer season which usually shows a peak in August.

On average, these Member States refused entry to 114 travellers for every 100 000 entries, which was much higher than at the air border. Also, in contrast to the air border, the larger passenger flow at the land border corresponded to a greater number of refusals of entry.

Detections for document fraud per 100 000 passengers was comparable to the detection rate at the air borders, with about 3 detections per 100 000 passengers.

5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 18 August 2014, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders by border type

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Eritrea	123	1 948	6 689	2 538	1 760	16 994	772	866	25
Syria	1 248	2 784	11 917	9 597	4 714	16 432	490	249	24
Sub-Saharan Africa**	0	0	0	0	1 055	8 733	n.a.	728	13
Mali	354	635	1 024	874	2 470	3 915	517	59	5.7
Afghanistan	1 082	1 892	2 675	3 845	1 808	2 739	45	51	4
Nigeria	41	304	2 161	880	552	2 539	735	360	3.7
Albania	1 199	3 098	2 094	2 630	1 505	2 236	-28	49	3.3
Somalia	481	1 466	2 978	699	1 293	1 963	34	52	2.9
Gambia	279	362	844	1 332	1 255	1 829	405	46	2.7
Egypt	243	818	1 376	435	325	1 552	90	378	2.3
Others	4 667	11 503	11 031	7 219	4 945	9 657	-16	95	14
Total All Borders	9 717	24 810	42 789	30 049	21 682	68 589	176	216	100
Land Borders									
Albania	1 158	3 042	2 052	2 581	1 470	2 218	-27	51	30
Syria	591	960	3 148	3 902	1 321	1 565	63	18	21
Afghanistan	473	498	708	2 713	1 116	944	90	-15	13
Kosovo*	588	4 449	926	387	479	510	-89	6.5	6.9
Cameroon	19	11	48	47	165	456	4045	176	6.2
Palestine	121	177	193	232	29	89	-50	207	1.2
Pakistan	403	1 512	1 057	239	71	89	-94	25	1.2
Mali	204	164	143	140	593	84	-49	-86	1.1
Iraq	51	88	188	86	38	77	-13	103	1
Turkey	84	62	78	73	101	73	18	-28	1
Others	2 324	3 625	4 661	2 986	1 416	1 241	-66	-12	17
Total Land Border	6 016	14 588	13 202	13 386	6 799	7 346	-50	8	100
Sea Borders									
Eritrea	10	1 891	6 619	2 433	1 700	16 928	795	896	28
Syria	657	1 824	8 769	5 695	3 393	14 867	715	338	24
Sub-Saharan Africa**	0	0	0	0	1 055	8 733	n.a.	728	14
Mali	150	471	881	734	1 877	3 831	713	104	6.3
Nigeria	31	184	1 863	792	531	2 475	1245	366	4
Somalia	364	1 336	2 807	547	1 222	1 893	42	55	3.1
Gambia	251	333	824	1 314	1 243	1 796	439	44	2.9
Afghanistan	609	1 394	1 967	1 132	692	1 795	29	159	2.9
Egypt	226	775	1 329	419	315	1 539	99	389	2.5
Morocco	87	105	342	138	191	996	849	421	1.6
Others	1 316	1 909	4 186	3 459	2 664	6 390	235	140	10
Total Sea Border	3 701	10 222	29 587	16 663	14 883	61 243	499	311	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

** Italy reported sub-Saharan migrants whose nationality could not be specified

Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

							2014 Q2		
	2013				2014		% change on		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	prev. qtr	
Border Type									
Land	189	105	56	208	308	589	461	91	94
Sea	13	13	3	12	10	35	169	250	5.6
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	30	15	24	112	79	250	1567	216	40
Afghanistan	53	29	13	33	35	138	376	294	22
Algeria	30	13	1	4	9	52	300	478	8.3
Myanmar	0	0	0	2	2	25	n.a.	1150	4
Mali	1	0	0	1	29	21	n.a.	-28	3.4
Guinea	0	1	0	3	10	17	1600	70	2.7
Ukraine	4	2	0	1	0	11	450	n.a.	1.8
Morocco	16	5	2	10	6	9	80	50	1.4
Tunisia	5	3	0	0	3	9	200	200	1.4
Pakistan	9	8	0	13	10	9	13	-10	1.4
Others	54	42	19	41	135	83	98	-39	13
Total	202	118	59	220	318	624	429	96	100

* Greece does not distinguish between detections at BCPs and between BCPs. Total detections for Greece are shown in Annex Tables 1 and 2


Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 157	1 321	1 298	1 281	1 178	1 932	46	64.0	73
Land	188	139	191	177	227	215	55	-5.3	8.1
Land intra-EU	104	101	158	203	249	170	68	-32	6.4
Sea	98	103	115	78	144	155	50	7.6	5.9
Not specified	23	64	81	99	123	90	41	-27	3.4
Air	82	65	54	72	95	79	22	-17	3
Top Ten Nationalities									
Morocco	77	89	105	95	91	222	149	144	8.4
Spain	70	58	41	72	117	167	188	43	6.3
Not specified	156	154	200	183	83	147	-4.5	77	5.6
Italy	112	247	187	129	137	134	-46	-2.2	5.1
France	81	60	59	71	100	115	92	15	4.4
Syria	25	28	70	49	62	100	257	61	3.8
Egypt	27	46	233	91	51	99	115	94	3.7
Turkey	34	34	64	53	72	99	191	38	3.7
Albania	60	61	86	72	87	96	57	10	3.6
Nigeria	28	22	30	33	14	92	318	557	3.5
Others	982	994	822	1 062	1 202	1 370	38	14	52
Total	1 652	1 793	1 897	1 910	2 016	2 641	47	31	100

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Place of detection									
Inland	66 334	70 047	76 059	78 538	75 128	88 718	27	18	88
Air	7 839	7 233	8 329	7 608	6 703	6 710	-7.2	0.1	6.7
Land	4 541	4 298	4 786	4 052	2 779	3 190	-26	15	3.2
Land Intra-EU	377	554	985	1 300	960	921	66	-4.1	0.9
Not specified		21	4	13	32	726	3 357	2 169	0.7
Sea	380	461	236	319	123	275	-40	124	0.3
Between BCPs	177	201	78	118	1 792	107	-47	-94	0.1
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	3 849	3 621	8 206	10 679	11 159	14 754	307	32	15
Eritrea	967	872	3 290	3 357	2 220	12 082	1 286	444	12
Not specified	3 985	4 105	6 531	5 976	4 268	6 133	49	44	6.1
Morocco	6 445	6 979	6 600	6 226	6 116	6 064	-13	-0.9	6
Albania	3 392	3 956	4 057	4 761	4 482	4 655	18	3.9	4.6
Afghanistan	4 077	4 058	4 113	4 588	5 034	3 700	-8.8	-26	3.7
Ukraine	2 891	2 859	3 400	3 317	2 825	3 444	20	22	3.4
Algeria	3 551	3 862	3 430	3 631	3 591	3 002	-22	-16	3
Pakistan	3 791	4 099	3 344	2 971	2 827	2 679	-35	-5.2	2.7
Somalia	1 466	1 482	1 694	1 711	1 621	2 512	70	55	2.5
Others	45 234	46 922	45 812	44 731	43 374	41 622	-11	-4	41
Total	79 648	82 815	90 477	91 948	87 517	100 647	22	15	100


Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals reported at the external borders by border type

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Ukraine	3 641	4 206	4 424	4 109	3 172	3 844	-8.6	21	14
Albania	2 789	2 695	3 225	2 855	2 977	3 342	24	12	12
Russian Federation	3 017	10 578	5 993	3 110	1 843	2 255	-79	22	8.4
Serbia	2 008	1 619	2 105	2 449	2 149	2 075	28	-3.4	7.7
Belarus	1 026	1 165	1 102	1 279	1 117	1 192	2.3	6.7	4.4
Morocco	1 298	1 381	1 506	1 187	1 392	1 063	-23	-24	4
Georgia	1 714	2 937	1 777	1 672	803	961	-67	20	3.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	647	417	1 348	1 111	1 027	944	126	-8.1	3.5
Algeria	450	588	446	591	643	754	28	17	2.8
United States	503	611	709	562	557	620	1.5	11	2.3
Others	11 279	11 443	11 068	10 601	9 328	9 773	-15	4.8	36
Total All Borders	28 372	37 640	33 703	29 526	25 008	26 823	-29	7.3	100
Land Borders									
Ukraine	3 429	3 952	4 159	3 835	2 993	3 475	-12	16	25
Albania	1 576	1 474	1 919	1 535	1 443	1 883	28	30	13
Serbia	1 769	1 429	1 923	2 284	1 932	1 852	30	-4.1	13
Russian Federation	2 374	9 972	5 255	2 635	1 493	1 774	-82	19	13
Belarus	1 001	1 144	1 042	1 243	1 088	1 159	1.3	6.5	8.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	615	373	1 304	1 071	986	912	145	-7.5	6.5
Georgia	1 634	2 844	1 701	1 563	701	860	-70	23	6.1
Morocco	943	1 029	1 114	852	1 012	697	-32	-31	4.9
FYR Macedonia	441	470	441	406	435	399	-15	-8.3	2.8
Turkey	205	226	779	304	218	261	15	20	1.9
Others	2 035	1 906	1 281	1 119	749	813	-57	8.5	5.8
Total Land Border	16 022	24 819	20 918	16 847	13 050	14 085	-43	7.9	100
Air Borders									
Albania	724	747	735	953	1 011	922	23	-8.8	8
Algeria	430	566	427	578	624	725	28	16	6.3
United States	492	590	682	541	546	609	3.2	12	5.3
Brazil	724	615	542	600	602	606	-1.5	0.7	5.3
Russian Federation	401	393	572	446	323	415	5.6	28	3.6
Nigeria	340	380	414	513	351	387	1.8	10	3.4
Not specified	499	470	395	548	445	374	-20	-16	3.3
Ukraine	204	233	228	256	175	312	34	78	2.7
Turkey	336	272	306	343	402	296	8.8	-26	2.6
China	268	381	311	226	224	291	-24	30	2.5
Others	6 389	6 556	6 387	6 778	6 238	6 567	0.2	5.3	57
Total Air Border	10 807	11 203	10 999	11 782	10 941	11 504	2.7	5.1	100
Sea Borders									
Albania	489	474	571	367	523	537	13	2.7	44
Morocco	99	129	154	89	153	145	12	-5.2	12
Russian Federation	242	213	166	29	27	66	-69	144	5.3
Ukraine	8	21	37	18	4	57	171	1325	4.6
Turkey	39	48	102	39	23	39	-19	70	3.2
Philippines	246	275	173	49	3	30	-89	900	2.4
Syria	13	37	60	15	12	26	-30	117	2.1
Not specified	29	47	58	31	36	26	-45	-28	2.1
Tunisia	36	39	33	31	33	25	-36	-24	2
Algeria	6	12	16	12	14	23	92	64	1.9
Others	336	323	416	217	189	260	-20	38	21
Total Sea Border	1 543	1 618	1 786	897	1 017	1 234	-24	21	100

Annex Table 6. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2014 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	3 844	86	39	1 548	9	1 426	185	250	188	29	204	3 964
Albania	3 342	21	38	54	13	808	103	756	1 351	62	155	3 361
Russian Federation	2 255	48	2	1 646	16	197	43	96	43	145	70	2 306
Serbia	2 075	36	7	86	2	351	741	419	412	9	20	2 083
Belarus	1 192	68	1	580	0	270	35	157	42	34	54	1 241
Morocco	1 063	326	18	256	13	156	3	43	133	115	11	1 074
Georgia	961	0	1	859	2	69	5	12	9	1	6	964
Bosnia and Herzegovina	944	264	2	43	0	16	14	318	269	15	4	945
Algeria	754	25	12	220	1	353	3	116	5	3	22	760
United States	620	35	0	11	0	8	22	4	13	8	521	622
Others	9 773	691	441	2 355	249	2 368	361	642	576	186	2 192	10 061
Total	26 823	1 600	561	7 658	305	6 022	1 515	2 813	3 041	607	3 259	27 381

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.


Annex Table 7. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal and border type

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
All Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	8 778	18 520	13 419	9 313	6 576	7 658	-59	16	28	Russian Federation (21%)
E) No justification	6 363	6 736	6 717	6 700	5 700	6 022	-11	5.6	22	Ukraine (24%)
Reason not available	2 656	3 031	3 313	3 449	2 700	3 259	7.5	21	12	United States (16%)
H) Alert issued	3 161	2 735	2 689	2 202	2 896	3 041	11	5	11	Albania (44%)
G) No subsistence	2 607	2 324	3 089	3 108	2 603	2 813	21	8.1	10	Albania (27%)
A) No valid document	2 188	2 406	2 507	1 897	1 665	1 600	-33	-3.9	5.8	Morocco (20%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 202	886	1 130	1 827	1 806	1 515	71	-16	5.5	Serbia (49%)
I) Threat	1 006	848	695	528	621	607	-28	-2.3	2.2	Russian Federation (24%)
B) False document	675	594	696	606	547	561	-5.6	2.6	2	Unknown (15%)
D) False visa	358	297	326	571	294	305	2.7	3.7	1.1	Syria (6.2%)
Total All Borders	28 994	38 377	34 581	30 201	25 408	27 381	-29	7.8	100	
Land Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	6 440	15 889	10 704	7 130	4 598	5 198	-67	13	36	Ukraine (28%)
E) No justification	2 805	3 290	3 556	3 073	2 178	2 411	-27	11	17	Ukraine (54%)
H) Alert issued	2 186	1 879	1 828	1 396	1 965	2 183	16	11	15	Albania (45%)
G) No subsistence	1 733	1 418	2 297	2 069	1 637	1 781	26	8.8	12	Albania (31%)
F) Over 3 month stay	967	689	824	1 538	1 256	1 207	75	-3.9	8.5	Serbia (59%)
A) No valid document	1 109	1 384	1 517	1 061	955	831	-40	-1.3	5.8	Morocco (38%)
I) Threat	713	500	308	282	352	350	-30	-0.6	2.5	Russian Federation (36%)
Reason not available	101		243	251		174	n.a.	n.a.	1.2	Ukraine (66%)
B) False document	99	117	171	111	133	100	-15	-25	0.7	Ukraine (37%)
D) False visa	85	46	57	246	50	47	2.2	-6	0.3	Russian Federation (30%)
Total Land Border	16 238	25 212	21 505	17 157	13 124	14 282	-43	8.8	100	
Air Borders										Nationality
E) No justification	3 357	3 248	2 864	3 466	3 303	3 344	3	1.2	28	Albania (13%)
Reason not available	2 462	2 903	2 932	3 075	2 588	2 889	-0.5	12	24	United States (18%)
C) No valid visa	1 911	2 143	2 288	2 030	1 871	2 280	6.4	22	19	Russian Federation (11%)
G) No subsistence	804	837	718	973	857	891	6.5	4	7.5	Algeria (13%)
H) Alert issued	639	564	536	596	622	644	14	3.5	5.4	Albania (35%)
A) No valid document	712	656	582	698	611	608	-7.3	-0.5	5.1	Unknown (26%)
B) False document	563	463	492	491	400	452	-2.4	13	3.8	Unknown (17%)
F) Over 3 month stay	222	186	281	260	488	298	60	-39	2.5	Turkey (18%)
D) False visa	257	240	235	311	218	231	-3.8	6	1.9	Senegal (6.9%)
I) Threat	260	305	356	228	246	228	-25	-7.3	1.9	Suriname (12%)
Total Air Border	11 187	11 545	11 284	12 128	11 204	11 865	2.8	5.9	100	
Sea Borders										Nationality
E) No justification	201	198	297		212	267	35	26	22	Albania (60%)
H) Alert issued	336	292	325	209	259	214	-27	-17	17	Albania (71%)
Reason not available	93	128	138	123	112	196	53	75	16	Albania (26%)
C) No valid visa	427	488	427	150	100	180	-63	80	15	Morocco (15%)
A) No valid document	367	366	408	138	99	161	-56	63	13	Russian Federation (20%)
G) No subsistence	70	69	74	66	108	141	104	31	11	Albania (94%)
I) Threat	33	43	31	18	23	29	-33	26	2.4	Albania (86%)
D) False visa	16	11	34	14	23	27	145	17	2.2	Albania (37%)
F) Over 3 month stay	13	11	25	29	62	10	-9.1	-84	0.8	Turkey (50%)
B) False document	13	14	33	4	10	9	-36	-10	0.7	Unknown (67%)
Total Sea Border	1 569	1 620	1 792	751	1 008	1 234	-24	22	100	

Annex Table 8. **Applications for asylum**

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	8 366	7 915	13 963	19 852	18 001	22 259	181	24	20
Eritrea	2 437	2 065	6 631	7 029	3 747	14 020	579	274	12
Afghanistan	5 791	5 459	5 679	7 131	7 994	6 708	23	-16	5.9
Not specified	2 528	2 689	5 680	6 302	3 731	5 977	122	60	5.3
Nigeria	2 452	2 478	2 672	2 224	3 094	4 616	86	49	4.1
Somalia	3 459	4 046	5 127	4 747	4 080	4 388	8.5	7.5	3.9
Pakistan	3 422	4 840	4 551	3 399	4 331	4 116	-15	-5	3.6
Mali	1 480	1 245	871	677	1 954	3 870	211	98	3.4
Albania	961	1 201	1 342	1 968	3 248	3 211	167	-1.1	2.8
Serbia	2 465	2 258	4 509	5 739	4 151	3 109	38	-25	2.7
Others	38 279	51 166	46 182	40 714	39 606	41 038	-20.0	3.6	36
Total	71 640	85 362	97 207	99 782	93 937	113 312	33	21	100


Annex Table 9. **Document fraud**

Document fraudsters detected at BCPs reported by FRAN member, border type and top ten nationalities

							2014 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	2013				2014		% change on			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	prev. qtr		
Border Type							Nationality Claimed			
Air	1 815	1 774	1 674	1 795	1 677	1 547	-13	-7.8	65	Syria (13%)
Land	668	500	620	599	537	668	34	24	28	Syria (35%)
Sea	123	121	219	133	110	127	5	15	5.4	Morocco (65%)
Not specified	0	1	9	0	0	31	n.a.	n.a.	1.3	Syria (39%)
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed							Nationality of Document			
Syria	315	304	245	376	258	t	49	76	19	Spain (51%)
Unknown	299	333	342	246	153	171	-49	12	7.2	France (57%)
Albania	322	259	232	215	206	140	-46	-32	5.9	Greece (51%)
Nigeria	92	118	111	160	143	138	17	-3.5	5.8	UK (38%)
Ukraine	124	113	160	143	109	133	18	22	5.6	Poland (62%)
Morocco	126	128	230	184	144	120	-6.3	-17	5.1	Spain (90%)
Sri Lanka	17	23	37	49	62	87	278	40	3.7	Italy (77%)
Israel	0	0	0	0	8	74	n.a.	825	3.1	Spain (100%)
Senegal	42	56	58	61	54	66	18	22	2.8	Spain (71%)
Iran	108	82	70	68	58	57	-30	-1.7	2.4	Germany (33%)
Others	1 161	980	1 037	1 025	1 129	934	-4.7	-17	39	Spain (20%)
Total	2 606	2 396	2 522	2 527	2 324	2 373	-1.0	2.1	100	

Annex Table 10. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
Document Type	Nationality of Document									
PASSPORTS	1 280	1 283	1 303	1 243	1 164	1 256	-2.1	8	47	Morocco (13%)
Forged	455	521	518	553	490	474	-9	-3.3	38	Nigeria (7.0%)
Authentic	492	421	475	371	376	459	9	22	37	Morocco (29%)
Counterfeit	149	176	180	188	165	178	1.1	7.9	14	Israel (27%)
No more details	150	139	112	105	116	133	-4.3	15.0	10.6	Greece (8.3%)
Stolen blank	32	24	18	25	17	11	-54	-35	0.9	Italy (45%)
Pseudo	2	2	0	1	0	1	-50	n.a.	0.1	Malta (100%)
ID CARDS	313	275	304	337	309	372	35	20	14	Spain (29%)
Authentic	86	73	113	123	108	146	100	35	39	Spain (66%)
Counterfeit	149	139	114	123	124	139	0	12	37	Italy (26%)
Forged	29	47	34	49	45	41	-13	-8.9	11	Bulgaria (22%)
Stolen blank	25	10	14	24	20	32	220	60	8.6	Italy (94%)
No more details	22	6	29	17	11	14	133	27	3.8	Italy (43%)
Pseudo	2	0	0	1	1	0	n.a.	-100	0	
VISA	366	271	390	417	341	346	28	2	13	Italy (25%)
Counterfeit	191	144	209	170	174	195	35	12	56	Italy (32%)
Authentic	69	33	74	161	100	95	188	-5	27	Poland (86%)
Forged	63	58	65	44	42	39	-33	-7.1	11	Italy (46%)
No more details	27	30	31	35	22	15	-50	-32	4.3	France (27%)
Stolen blank	16	6	11	7	3	2	-67	-33	.6	Germany (50%)
RESIDENCE PERMITS	466	387	386	471	378	336	-13	-11	13	Italy (19%)
Counterfeit	156	124	147	202	171	173	40	1.2	51	Italy (23%)
Authentic	113	95	104	92	92	81	-15	-12	24	France (35%)
Stolen blank	124	85	71	68	69	34	-60	-51	10	Germany (47%)
No more details	26	28	25	42	16	28	0	75	8	France (39%)
Forged	46	54	38	67	30	19	-65	-37	5.7	Spain (26%)
Pseudo	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	n.a.	n.a.	France (100%)
STAMPS	409	350	379	298	294	268	-23	-8.8	10	Greece (28%)
Counterfeit	366	315	302	259	239	180	-43	-25	67	Greece (39%)
Forged	34	32	68	37	51	76	138	49	28	Nigeria (20%)
No more details	9	3	9	2	4	12	300	200	4.5	France (67%)
OTHER	71	63	49	58	60	68	8	13	2.6	Italy (32%)
Counterfeit	39	36	31	33	40	43	19	7.5	63	Italy (26%)
Authentic	23	10	11	16	13	11	10	-15	16	Italy (73%)
Forged	4	8	3	4	5	8	0	60	11.8	France (25%)
Pseudo	4	7	0	4	2	4	-43	100	5.9	Unknown (75%)
No more details	1	2	2	0	0	2	0	n.a.	2.9	UK (50%)
Stolen blank	0	0	2	1	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
Total	2 905	2 629	2 811	2 824	2 546	2 646	0.6	3.9		

Note: Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit



Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations nationality of document and document fraud by document type

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on			
							year ago	prev. qtr		
Document Type	Nationality Claimed									
PASSPORTS	1 280	1 283	1 303	1 243	1 164	1 256	-2.1	8	47	Syria (25%)
MAR-Authentic	8	7	20	7	17	134	1814	688	10.7	Syria (90%)
ISR-Counterfeit	2	4	0	1	7	48	1100	586	3.8	Israel (94%)
FRA-Authentic	57	68	67	51	48	44	-35	-8.3	3.5	Not specified (27%)
SWE-Authentic	75	55	41	44	42	41	-25	-2.4	3.3	Syria (63%)
ESP-Authentic	19	12	26	17	32	41	242	28	3.3	Syria (29%)
NGA-Forged	9	8	19	12	21	33	313	57	2.6	Nigeria (94%)
FRA-Forged	26	33	32	34	24	28	-15	17	2.2	Syria (18%)
MAR-Forged	16	13	9	17	20	28	115	40	2.2	Syria (64%)
DZA-Forged	22	20	38	49	19	25	25	32	2.0	Algeria (72%)
TUR-Counterfeit	38	42	58	75	45	24	-43	-47	1.9	Syria (88%)
Others	1 008	1 021	993	936	889	810	-21	-8.9	64	Not specified (14%)
ID CARDS	313	275	304	337	309	372	35	20	14	Syria (27%)
ESP-Authentic	25	26	43	52	41	97	273	137	26	Morocco (33%)
ITA-Counterfeit	51	33	24	23	17	36	9.1	112	9.7	Albania (25%)
ITA-Stolen blank	8	7	11	17	20	30	329	50	8.1	Syria (53%)
ROU-Counterfeit	11	14	8	10	9	20	43	122	5.4	Ukraine (35%)
GRC-Counterfeit	15	10	8	23	25	19	90	-24	5.1	Albania (32%)
FRA-Authentic	21	15	24	20	16	18	20	13	4.8	Not specified (39%)
BEL-Counterfeit	8	18	16	12	8	13	-28	63	3.5	Algeria (31%)
BEL-Authentic	12	7	12	12	9	13	86	44	3.5	Syria (46%)
ITA-Forged	12	21	12	23	12	9	-57	-25	2.4	Albania (33%)
BGR-Forged	3	5	7	7	7	9	80	29	2.4	Albania (22%)
Others	147	119	139	138	145	108	-9.2	-26	29	Syria (27%)
Visa	366	271	390	417	341	346	28	2	13	Ukraine (18%)
POL-Authentic	41	12	58	119	71	82	583	15	24	Ukraine (76%)
ITA-Counterfeit	10	11	31	17	50	62	464	24	18	Sri Lanka (73%)
FRA-Counterfeit	34	37	63	68	45	41	11	-8.9	11.8	Sri Lanka (32%)
DEU-Counterfeit	37	26	40	21	25	38	46	52	11.0	Pakistan (18%)
ITA-Forged	30	31	20	21	6	18	-42	200	5.2	Bangladesh (50%)
ESP-Counterfeit	33	12	21	16	18	16	33	-11	4.6	Nigeria (88%)
CZE-Counterfeit	0	4	3	3	1	12	200	1100	3.5	Afghanistan (58%)
FRA-Forged	17	8	15	9	23	11	38	-52	3.2	Nigeria (55%)
ITA-Authentic	9	5	2	11	10	7	40	-30	2.0	Sri Lanka (29%)
ESP-Forged	3	7	10	3	2	5	-29	150	1.4	Colombia (40%)
Others	152	118	127	129	90	54	-54	-40	16	Nigeria (13%)

Total: see Table 11B

Note: Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit

Annex Table 11B. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
Member State										Nationality Claimed
RESIDENCE PERMITS	466	387	386	471	378	336	-13	-11	13	Syria (13%)
ITA-Counterfeit	36	38	32	35	30	40	5.3	33	12	Philippines (15%)
ESP-Counterfeit	17	29	14	49	39	35	21	-10	10	Philippines (31%)
FRA-Authentic	35	35	42	30	35	28	-20	-20	8.3	Mali (32%)
GRC-Counterfeit	14	18	20	34	44	21	17	-52	6.3	Syria (24%)
FRA-Counterfeit	12	5	20	15	7	18	260	157	5.4	Côte d'Ivoire (50%)
SWE-Counterfeit	5	1	5	7	2	18	1 700	800	5.4	Syria (61%)
ESP-Authentic	29	23	41	27	25	18	-22	-28	5.4	Mali (22%)
ITA-Authentic	22	12	5	10	14	12	0.0	-14	3.6	Nigeria (42%)
DEU-Stolen blank	60	24	12	8	10	11	-54	10	3.3	Ghana (18%)
FRA-No more details	0	1	4	10	1	11	1 000	1 000	3.3	Côte d'Ivoire (55%)
Others	236	201	191	246	171	124	-38	-27	37	Syria (13%)
STAMPS	409	350	379	298	294	268	-23	-9	10	Albania (28%)
GRC-Counterfeit	251	200	159	131	107	71	-65	-34	26	Albania (93%)
POL-Counterfeit	15	30	30	19	16	18	-40	13	6.7	Ukraine (89%)
NGA-Forged	0	0	0	0	1	15	n.a.	1 400	5.6	Nigeria (100%)
ISR-Forged	0	0	0	0	0	13	n.a.	n.a.	4.9	Israel (100%)
HUN-Forged	7	8	13	3	7	12	50	71	4.5	Ukraine (75%)
FRA-Counterfeit	9	14	24	10	9	11	-21	22	4.1	Côte d'Ivoire (27%)
HUN-Counterfeit	10	9	11	5	15	9	0	-40	3.4	Ukraine (44%)
ESP-Counterfeit	8	6	9	7	7	8	33	14	3.0	Bolivia (13%)
FRA-No more details	1	0	4	0	2	8	n.a.	300	3.0	Nigeria (25%)
DEU-Counterfeit	21	13	3	6	6	8	-38	33	3.0	Syria (38%)
Others	87	70	126	117	124	95	36	-23	35	Ukraine (19%)
OTHER	71	63	49	58	60	68	8	13	2.6	Romania (21%)
ITA-Counterfeit	16	13	18	12	12	11	-15	-8.3	16	Morocco (27%)
ITA-Authentic	15	8	9	16	3	8	0	167	12	Bangladesh (100%)
FRA-Counterfeit	2	3	2	5	3	5	67	67	7.4	Romania (100%)
SVN-Counterfeit	1	2	0	0	1	3	50	200	4.4	Syria (100%)
ESP-Counterfeit	1	2	2	0	0	3	50	n.a.	4.4	Ecuador (33%)
BGR-Counterfeit	7	7	3	7	3	3	-57	0	4.4	Romania (100%)
UKR-Counterfeit	3	1	0	3	4	3	200	-25	4.4	Ukraine (100%)
UNK-Pseudo	3	2	0	2	0	3	50	n.a.	4.4	Maldives (67%)
SVK-Counterfeit	0	1	0	0	0	2	100	n.a.	2.9	Syria (50%)
LVA-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	2.9	Palestine (50%)
Others	23	24	15	13	34	25	4.2	-26	36.8	Albania (16%)
Total	2 905	2 629	2 811	2 824	2 546	2 646	0.6	3.9		

Note: Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit



Annex Table 12. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total
							% change on	prev. qtr	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago		
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	1 730	1 838	3 555	5 476	6 118	5 311	189	-13	8.8
Morocco	3 439	3 242	2 802	3 003	4 621	5 185	60	12	8.6
Albania	3 838	4 588	4 528	5 029	4 574	5 086	11	11	8.4
Pakistan	4 723	4 034	3 973	3 837	3 919	3 449	-15	-12	5.7
India	2 901	2 625	2 182	2 485	2 581	2 591	-1.3	0.4	4.3
Ukraine	2 205	2 074	2 587	2 376	1 817	2 280	9.9	25	3.8
Afghanistan	2 253	2 238	2 592	2 218	2 585	1 883	-16	-27	3.1
Algeria	2 480	2 264	1 888	2 100	2 342	1 836	-19	-22	3
Nigeria	2 320	2 252	2 032	1 945	2 042	1 822	-19	-11	3
China	1 477	1 441	1 115	1 276	1 670	1 607	12	-3.8	2.7
Others	27 939	27 005	30 438	27 962	32 317	29 441	9	-8.9	49
Total	55 305	53 601	57 692	57 707	64 586	60 491	13	-6.3	100

Note: Return decisions issued in Austria are not available at the moment for Q1 and Q2 2014 due to updates of the data collection system at the national level

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns**

Decisions issued by Member State and top ten nationalities

							2014 Q2		per cent of total
	2013				2014		% change on		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	3 478	5 891	4 845	6 330	4 523	6 217	5.5	37	15
Pakistan	3 180	2 996	2 829	3 122	2 773	2 414	-19	-13	5.9
Morocco	1 730	1 787	1 657	1 584	1 814	2 224	24	23	5.5
India	2 510	2 144	2 224	2 080	2 122	2 196	2.4	3.5	5.4
Ukraine	1 680	1 761	2 224	2 098	1 408	1 916	8.8	36	4.7
Serbia	1 653	1 751	1 643	1 465	1 567	1 628	-7	3.9	4
Russian Federation	1 698	1 777	2 410	2 331	1 652	1 567	-12	-5.1	3.8
China	1 355	1 293	1 069	1 120	1 233	1 229	-4.9	-0.3	3
Kosovo*	730	805	1 734	1 268	1 010	1 079	34	6.8	2.6
Egypt	527	809	1 079	429	462	1 070	32	132	2.6
Others	19 606	19 500	19 426	18 790	18 435	19 184	-1.6	4.1	47
Total	38 147	40 514	41 140	40 617	36 999	40 724	0.5	10	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Note: Effective returns from Austria are not available at the moment from January to May 2014, due to updates of the data collection system at the national level.

Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2013				2014		2014 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Type of Return									
Forced	19 544	22 502	22 157	23 262	14 936	18 447	-18	24	45
Enforced by Member State	15 261	20 113	20 026	20 662	12 090	13 233	-34	9.5	72
Not specified	3 936	2 074	1 865	1 957	2 565	4 543	119	77	25
Enforced by Joint Operation	347	315	266	643	281	671	113	139	3.6
Voluntary	16 435	15 687	17 119	15 347	15 791	15 978	1.9	1.2	39
Others	9 405	8 428	8 480	8 302	9 611	9 996	19	4	63
Not specified	3 423	3 342	3 928	3 245	2 998	3 356	0.4	12	21
IOM-assisted	3 607	3 917	4 711	3 800	3 182	2 626	-33	-17	16
Not specified	2 168	2 325	1 864	2 008	6 272	6 299	171	0.4	15
Total	38 147	40 514	41 140	40 617	36 999	40 724	0.5	10.0	100
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES									
Forced									
Morocco	748	745	726	724	988	2 018	171	104	11
Albania	3 246	5 609	4 524	5 917	1 422	1 557	-72	9.5	8.4
Serbia	847	863	815	828	620	1 029	19	66	5.6
Algeria	575	660	696	686	691	821	24	19	4.5
Tunisia	668	880	823	752	673	800	-9.1	19	4.3
Pakistan	2 298	2 075	1 763	2 233	677	796	-62	18	4.3
Kosovo*	422	316	903	625	565	691	119	22	3.7
India	732	725	795	646	513	652	-10	27	3.5
Egypt	378	678	957	336	304	632	-6.8	108	3.4
Nigeria	641	712	652	702	605	579	-19	-4.3	3.1
Others	8 989	9 239	9 503	9 813	7 878	8 872	-4	13	48
Total Forced Returns	19 544	22 502	22 157	23 262	14 936	18 447	-18	24	100
Voluntary									
Ukraine	1 356	1 419	1 806	1 667	1 122	1 537	8.3	37	10
India	1 767	1 413	1 424	1 428	1 539	1 504	6.4	-2.3	9.4
Russian Federation	1 404	1 403	1 997	1 911	1 250	1 130	-19	-9.6	7.1
Pakistan	862	892	1 057	852	1 132	882	-1.1	-22	5.5
China	845	731	577	643	782	745	1.9	-4.7	4.7
Serbia	799	881	817	629	933	586	-33	-37	3.7
Nigeria	609	566	605	541	481	469	-17	-2.5	2.9
Albania	226	269	303	373	427	433	61	1.4	2.7
Kosovo*	308	489	831	643	444	388	-21	-13	2.4
Bangladesh	466	472	531	403	433	357	-24	-18	2.2
Others	7 793	7 152	7 171	6 257	7 248	7 947	11	9.6	50
Total Voluntary Returns	16 435	15 687	17 119	15 347	15 791	15 978	1.9	1.2	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include

land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, The Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM assisted and others) for Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.



European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union

Rondo ONZ 1
00-124 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu



For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Frontex reference number: 16160/2014

TT-AF-14-003-EN-N
ISSN 2363-0566

Warsaw, October 2014