

FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 1 • JANUARY–MARCH 2014

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





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Table of contents

Executive summary #5

1. Introduction #7

2. Methodology #8

3. Summary of FRAN indicators #10

4. Situational picture in Q1 2014 #11

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing #11

4.2. Routes #14

4.3. Clandestine entry #23

4.4. Detections of facilitators #23

4.5. Detections of illegal stay #24

4.6. Refusals of entry #26

4.7. Asylum claims #28

4.8. Document fraud #29

4.9. Returns #31

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border #33

4.11. Passenger flow #36

5. Statistical annex #38



List of abbreviations used

BCP	border-crossing point
CIRCA	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
EDF	European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EPN	European Patrols Network
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
FYR Macedonia/MKD	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HCG	Hellenic Coast Guard
IBSS	Integrated Border Surveillance System
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICONet	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
ID	identity document
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
JO	Joint Operation
n.a.	not applicable
Q	quarter of the year
SAR	search and rescue
SIS	Schengen Information System
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
UK	United Kingdom
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	United States dollar
US	United States of America

Executive summary

In the first quarter of 2014 all of the indicators of irregular migration and asylum, except the number of detected facilitators, decreased in comparison with the last quarter of 2013. This general trend was in line with the annually recurring cycle of seasonal variation, whereby the first months of each year are usually marked by reduced pressure at the external borders.

However, the decrease in the number of illegal border-crossings was not as substantial as what would usually be expected from the seasonal fluctuations at this time of the year. In fact, the past winter season showed a massive influx of irregular migration at the external border of the EU. Concretely, Q1 2014 was marked by the highest number of illegal border-crossings of any first quarter since the initial stages of the Arab Spring in 2011.

Most irregular migrants were reported from the sea border of the EU. Compared to one year ago, Italy reported a sevenfold increase in illegal border-crossings while numbers in Greece more than doubled. Detections reported from the Italian sea border represented almost 50% of all detected illegal border-crossings in Q1 2014. For the first of any quarter since FRAN data collection began, Malians were the most reported nationality at this part of the maritime border, followed by Eritreans and Syrians.

By the end of Q1 2014, several indicators pointed to a quick resumption of migratory movements across the Italian sea border after the seasonal decline of the winter months. What was remarkable was the speed at which migration appeared to regain momentum. Already in March, the number of arrivals in Italy and Malta seemed to reach

the exceptionally high levels of the summer of 2013. In the context of Frontex JO Hermes 2013, almost 5 000 irregular migrants were apprehended during the third week of March. Second, an analysis of the different waves of migrant boats that have been targeting the Italian sea border since November 2013 suggests a development of the logistical and organisational capacity of the criminal groups that are facilitating the gathering and embarkation of migrants along the Libyan coast.

In addition to the large numbers of Syrians that have been regularly detected in the Eastern Mediterranean region since the outbreak of hostilities in Syria, numerous migrants from this country have started to reach Europe from Northern Africa. In Q1 2014, close to one third of Syrians were detected on the Central Mediterranean route.

Increased operational activity in the Eastern Mediterranean region led to a decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing. Since the Bulgarian authorities started a special police operation at their border with Turkey migratory movements originally displaced by the Greek Operation Aspida from the Greek to the Bulgarian border declined substantially. The fact that the overall number of illegal border-crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route was still higher than one year ago can be attributed to detections that were made in the Aegean Sea.

The most illegal border-crossings at a land border section in Q1 2014 were reported by Hungary. Although the number of detections at the Hungarian-Serbian border has remained stable since Q4 2013, a significant increase was reported compared with the corresponding quarter of the previous year.



Afghans remained the most reported nationality at this border section, followed by Syrians. These detections point to sustained secondary movements from Greece through the Western Balkan region to Hungary and further on to other EU Member States, in spite of increased operational activities at the EU external borders with Turkey.

The land border with the strongest increase of illegal border-crossings, compared to both the last quarter and the situation one year ago, was around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. As a result of a number of attempts to cross these borders, three times as many persons as in Q1 2013 were able to enter protecting the enclaves. While those with sufficient funds used the services of facilitators to reach Spain as clandestine migrants hidden in motor vehicles, the majority of individuals willing to reach Spanish territory opted to simply climb the fences, frequently in large groups.

The attempted breaches of the borders to the Spanish enclaves were part of a general trend of a shift from the sea to the land border on the Western Mediterranean route. One of the reasons for this change may be the strengthened surveillance at sea.

Of all FRAN indicators, the number of asylum applications showed the most regular long-term upward trend. Although this indicator has been marked by a clear decline at the beginning of each year, the annual total asylum numbers increased by almost a fifth every year since 2010. Simultaneously, asylum seekers increasingly focus on the top destination countries. Since 2010, the proportion of applications for international protection submitted in Germany and Sweden grew from around a third to one half of the total number reported to FRAN.

In Bulgaria, asylum applications decreased by approximately a third after peaking in Q4 2013. This decrease coincided with a drop in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey. In other Member States, asylum applications remained fairly stable.

Syrians submitted a fifth of all applications for international protection, being the number one nationality for the third quarter in a row. Syrians did not follow the same seasonal pattern as other nationalities, which showed a substantial decline in applications during the winter season. Since the beginning of the war in Syria, a rather insignificant drop in applications during the winter was normally followed by a larger increase during the following summer months, with the respective curve resembling more upward stairs rather than the usual waves. Around three quarters of Syrian asylum seekers submitted their application in the top asylum countries Germany, Sweden, Bulgaria and the Netherlands.

Compared to the same period in 2013, document fraud decreased in Q1 2014 in terms of detections from third countries on entry to the EU and Schengen area. Spain, Italy, France and Greece together accounted for more than half of all cases at the EU level. The long-term upward trend in Spain continued also in Q1 2014, when the country reported more detections than ever, mainly at Madrid airport or Ceuta and Melilla.

The political crisis and armed conflict in Ukraine did not show any larger effect on the reported cases of document fraud. Ukrainians that were detected entering the EU/Schengen area with fraudulent travel documents generally followed the overall seasonal trend, although the number decreased at a slower pace in Q1 2014.

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second, to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative

analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated in different sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore, some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources.

FRAN members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors may occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines and the growing volume and complexity of the data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.



2. Methodology

This, the 23rd issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between January and March 2014 and exchanged between 31 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN meeting, a proposal for a harmonised definition of the return indicator was outlined and several questions were raised in order to motivate discussion

among FRAN members in view of establishing the regular collection of monthly return data by Frontex. Subsequently, an online survey of FRAN members was conducted to gather information and further motivate discussion to fine-tune the proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN report (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions of these indicators are included in an annex to that report. Data collection commenced in January 2011.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2007. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end of year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 23rd issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 25 April 2014. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which was added as part of the regular data exchange within FRAN at the beginning of 2011.

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 document fraud (EDF-RAN)
- 7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN and EDF-RAN data used in the tables are as of 21 May 2014

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud to illegally cross the external borders and on all international flights. Data were backdated and joined with those exchanged under a pilot Tailored Risk Analysis released in 2011.*

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK and Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as

'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes the main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active for at least a proportion of Q1 2014. Namely, for sea borders, they were JO Poseidon Sea 2013, JO EPN Hermes 2013 and JO EPN Aeneas 2013; for land borders – JO Poseidon Land 2013, JO Poseidon Land 2014 and JO Focal Points Land 2013; for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2013 and JO Focal Points Air 2014; and the return-related Project Attica 2013.

Both primary data source, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data source, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation) were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

Acknowledgments

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, also to the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State representatives who responded to requests for additional information on key topics and emerging trends.

* The Nature and Extent of Document Fraud to Enter the European Union 2009–2010, Ref. Ro63/2011




3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**


Detections or cases reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between fourth and first quarters


1A Illegal entries between BCPs




2 Facilitators




3 Illegal stay



4 Refusals of entry



5 Applications for asylum*



7B Effective returns**



* data from Italy for Q1 2014 and from Austria for March 2014 are not available at the moment

** data from Austria for Q1 2014 are not available at the moment

4. Situational picture in Q1 2014

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

FRAN data in the first quarter of 2014 show a substantial decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU external borders compared to Q4 2013. Although the number of 22 498 persons detected between January and March reaches only half of the level reported in Q3 2013, the past winter season showed the largest influx of irregular migration at the external border of the EU since the initial stages of the Arab Spring in 2011.

Most detections of illegal border-crossing were at the sea borders of the EU, where nearly 15 000 irregular migrants were reported by Member States. Detections reported from the Italian blue border represented almost 50% of all detections of illegal border-crossing. For the first time in any quarter since FRAN data collection began in 2008, Malian nationals were the most represented nationality at this part of the maritime border. In January and February, Eritreans were detected in far lower numbers than during the previous months, but in March 2014 Italy reported more than 1 000 detections. Syrians reached an all-time high for this time of the year, with more than 1 300 arriving in boats, mainly to Sicily. As in Q4 2013, around 1 200 Gambians were detected trying to reach Europe in rubber or wooden boats.

At the Bulgarian and Greek borders with Turkey, the situation has remained rather stable during the last six months. However, with more than 3 600 detections in Q1 2014, the number of illegal border-crossings has been at the highest level of any previous first quarter since 2011. During the second half of 2013, Greece remained the Member State

with the second largest number of illegal border-crossings.

The Greek land border with Turkey was, for many years, the main entry point of irregular migration until the launch of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012. In the course of this operation additional officers and equipment was deployed to the Evros region, reducing the number of apprehended migrants. In November 2013, the Bulgarian authorities decided to launch a similar operation in order to counter migratory displacement effects from the Greek section of the Turkish border. This, in combination with a surveillance system and a fence, led to a decrease of detections of 90% since Q4 2013, the majority being Syrian nationals. On the other hand, in the eastern Aegean Sea detections did not decrease during the first quarter of 2014.


The number of illegal border-crossings in Hungary decreased from its peak in Q2 2013 and stabilised between in Q4 2013 and Q1 2014. Still, with a third of all detections at EU land border sections, the border between Hungary and Serbia was the one from where the most illegal border-crossings were reported. Most migrants detected here were from Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Syria and Kosovo.*

The land border with the strongest increase of illegal border-crossings, was around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. As a result of a number of attempts to cross the Spanish land border with Morocco, a large number of migrants, mainly sub-Saharan Africans, were able to cross the fence to Melilla. While those with sufficient funds used the services of facilitators to reach Spain as clandestine migrants hidden in motor vehi-

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 2. **Detections of illegal border-crossing decreased in Q1 2014 as usual during the winter season. However, especially at the sea borders the level of detections was clearly above the average of all first quarters since FRAN data collections began in 2008**

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

cles, the majority opted to simply climb the fences, frequently in large groups.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing and the proportion of detections at the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. This figure clearly illustrates the rather usual seasonal decrease that was registered during the last six months. However, what is remarkable in this context is the particularly high proportion of detections at the sea borders during the quarter typically marked by the winter season.


Figure 3 illustrates the level of detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2013 and Q1 2014 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes) for the top ten Member States. In Q1 2014, of the Member States that are subject to illegal border-crossings, most reported increased detections compared to the same period in 2013. The biggest increase was reported by Italy where detections rose by over 600%, followed by Spain with an increase of nearly

130%, Romania with 70% and Greece where detections rose by two thirds. Only in Bulgaria were significant decreases reported compared to the same period in 2013. Each of these increases is dealt with in more detail in the relevant parts of Section 4.2. Routes.

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these trends by nationality of the detected migrants at the EU level. Figure 4 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing of the top ten nationalities during the first quarters of 2013 and 2014 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes). This clearly shows that detections of Eritreans increased the most (by around fourteen times) in relative terms among all nationalities compared to the same period in 2013, followed by Malians and Gambians, but on different levels. In absolute numbers, the number of Syrians detected for illegal border-crossing increased the most (by 3 385 persons). It should be however noted in this context that reports on migrants claiming to be from Syria suggest nationality swap-

Figure 3. **Of the Member States that are subject to illegal border-crossings, most reported increased detections, especially those on the Mediterranean Sea (Italy, Spain and Greece) and those affected by the flows of migrants entering the EU via Turkey (Also Greece and Hungary)**


Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2013 and Q1 2014 for the top ten reporting Member States shown by the size of the circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between the two reporting periods



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

Figure 4. **In relative terms, detections of Eritreans, Malians and Gambians have increased the most since Q1 2013, whereas Syrians showed the largest absolute increase in illegal border-crossings**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2013 and Q1 2014 for the top ten nationalities shown by the size of the circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between the two reporting periods




Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014



Figure 5. **In Q1 2014, detections in the Central Mediterranean showed the highest level of any first quarter since the initial stages of the Arab Spring in 2011**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main migration route



Source: FRAN data as of 14 May 2014

ping has become relatively common. Migrants from other countries are claiming to be for example Syria in order to increase their chances of being granted international protection or at least to inhibit return procedures. Although migrants claiming to be from Afghanistan were detected illegally crossing the external border less frequently during the last two years, in Q1 2014, they were again reported in higher numbers than one year ago.

4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses, detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes, more accurately relating to regions of detection rather than linear routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 5, during the first quarter of 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean ranked first among the main irregular migration routes, following an almost tenfold increase compared to Q1 2013. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Member States reported a twofold increase compared

to the same time in 2013. For all sea borders, the usual seasonal decrease in Q1 2014 has been less significant than in previous years.


4.2.1. Central Mediterranean route

In total, 10 799 migrants have been detected at the Central Mediterranean route in Q1 2014. As usual, the number of detections has been lower due to the maritime weather conditions of the winter season. Nevertheless irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean has been at the highest level since Q1 2011, when the migratory flows, particularly from Tunisia, had been exceptionally large following the upheaval in the Arab world. While in 2011, migrants coming from Tunisia primarily arrived at the coastal areas of Lampedusa, in 2014 most migrants departed from Libya trying to reach the Sicilian coast.

The speed at which migration appeared to regain momentum with the end of the winter season is remarkable. Already in March 2014, the number of arrivals in Italy and Malta

Figure 6. **Detections of migrants illegally crossing the Central Mediterranean towards the EU during Joint Operation Hermes 2013 increased dramatically during week 12 of 2014, when a wave of nearly 5 000 migrants was detected**

Weekly detections of irregular migrants illegally crossing the border during Joint Operation Hermes 2013



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

seemed to have reached the exceptionally high levels of summer 2013. In the context of Frontex JO Hermes 2013, almost 5 000 irregular migrants were apprehended alone during the third week of March. Almost 50% of all detected migrants who departed from Libya in Q1 2014 arrived during these seven days.

According to FRAN data, the number of Malian nationals apprehended in the Central Mediterranean, has increased by more than 1 000 persons since the previous quarter to 1 753, thus ranking first among all migrant nationalities on this route in Q1 2014. The second and third ranking nationalities were Eritreans and Syrians with 1 522 and 1 268 detections respectively. Their increase was enormous compared to Q1 2013, when only 3 and 85 persons of these nationalities were reported on the Central Mediterranean route.

By the second half of 2013 Syrians started to leave Egypt in massive numbers. Before October they were arriving in Italy directly from Egypt; from September on, they were more frequently detected in boats that had departed from Libya.

Reports show that some refugees escaped the conflict in Syria by travelling overland to Beirut, Lebanon, from where they took flights to Tripoli. In Libya, they used the services offered by facilitators to board boats to cross the Mediterranean Sea. In these specific cases, their arrival in Italy took place only three to five days after the departure from Syria. In other cases, Syrians travelled overland across Jordan and Egypt and stayed in Libya for longer periods of up to more than a year. They contacted facilitators only for the last leg of their journey to Europe.



© Frontex 2013

Figure 7. **A boat apprehended by Italian authorities on 16 May 2014 south of Lampedusa with 299 persons on board**



Operation “Mare Nostrum”

Italy has been strengthening its maritime presence in the southern Mediterranean through a specific operation named Mare Nostrum (Our Sea) since 18 October 2013. It aims at controlling migrant flows through increased surveillance and search-and-rescue (SAR) activities. Under Mare Nostrum, the Italian Navy deploys a number of ships and other assets to the waters of the Sicily Channel between Italy and Libya. In December 2013, Slovenia contributed the military vessel ‘Triglav’ to the operation. The assets were deployed to save lives at sea and to intercept and transport migrants detected in the Mediterranean Sea to Sicily. Central to the operation is the effective co-ordination and integration of assets and data coming from the different agencies.

Information from JO Hermes shows that in Q1 2014 not only Syrians but the clear majority of all other migrants that arrived by the Central Mediterranean route had departed from Libya. Only around 5% have left from Egypt, Tunisia or Turkey.

Another exceptional increase was related to Gambian nationals, the detections of which have grown nearly fourfold last year to more than 1 200 in Q1 2014. According to reports, many of these migrants decided to leave the Gambia to go to other countries of the region for economic reasons. As the living conditions for migrants are difficult there and job opportunities are scarce, they consider moving on to Libya. The unstable security situation in Libya and the power of the facilitation networks give them the final impulse to travel to Europe.

Similarly, migrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India intended to seek jobs in Libya, but frequent attacks and robberies forced them to leave and go to Europe.

In contrast, the initial intention of Somalis after leaving their country was reaching Europe rather than finding a job in another African country. Most of the irregular Somali migrants who arrived in Italy were between 20 and 25 year old men who were educated and came from the middle class.

Interviewed Somalis and Eritreans said that the facilitators provided them with no water or food and only around 30 litres of fuel because, they would be rescued by Italian authorities after two days at sea anyway. Eritreans had to pay USD 20 if they wanted to have a life jacket.

4.2.2. Apulia and Calabria

In the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria, detections of illegal border-crossing tend to be associated with two different kinds of irregular migration. The majority of detections in the area of Apulia are of secondary movements to Italy of migrants who originally entered the Schengen area in Greece, while most detections in Calabria are of migrants who departed from Turkey or Egypt and sailed across the Aegean Sea, often near Crete, towards Italy to enter the Schengen area for the first time.

Although in the past seasonal fluctuations have always been strong in this area, the number of detections in Q1 2014 have been the lowest since 2010. The most reported nationality on this route was Egyptians, all of whom departed directly from their home country to reach Calabria. Also many Syrians, whose apprehension numbers remained stable compared to one year ago, arrived in Calabria, using the sea corridor from Egypt.

The sharpest decreases compared to last year were of Pakistanis and Afghans, whose apprehension numbers were 60-80% lower than one year ago. Egypt was the top-ranking departure country for these migrants, fol-

lowed by Turkey and secondary movements from Greece.

The JO EPN Aeneas 2013 started on 3 June and has recently been extended. According to overall detections during the operation, there has been a downward movement since a peak in Q3 2013, when specifically during September more incidents were reported than during any other month since 2010. In particular, the area of Apulia has seen a drastic decrease since the beginning of JO Aeneas 2013. This development shows that the sea route between Greece and Italy has lost some significance compared to the Western Balkan route.

4.2.3. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since the beginning of the FRAN data collection, the Eastern Mediterranean route has been a major hotspot for irregular migration into the EU, predominantly associated with illegal border-crossings from Turkey. However, since early August 2012 at the Greek land border and since November 2013 at the Bulgarian border detections have been at much lower levels following increased operational activity in these areas; In the Eastern Aegean Sea, the number of detections were twice as high as one year ago but stayed on the same level as in Q4 2013. In total, in Q1 2014 there were 4 195 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, which was an increase of 53% compared to the same period in 2013 but a seasonal decrease of 55% compared to the previous quarter.

The marked decrease in detections observed since August 2012 is due to a range of operational activities taking place at different border sections on the Eastern Mediterranean route:

1. In August 2012 the Greek authorities launched operation Aspida, deploying additional manpower, assets and equipment

339 irregular migrants rescued from an iron fishing boat coming from Alexandria, Egypt



On 31 March 2014, an iron fishing boat full of migrants coming from Alexandria, Egypt, triggered a major SAR operation involving HCG assets, private vessels and a US Navy vessel. Ten days before, a


group of 100 Syrians was transferred with the help of three smaller boats from Alexandria's Al-Mandarah area to a larger wooden boat. They sailed for two hours and then they were transferred again to an iron fishing boat (see picture) which was waiting for them in the open seas. After two days of sailing, they were approached by another wooden boat with 150 persons, mainly Egyptians onboard and after another two days, a new group of approximately 100 Syrians and Egyptian joined them. They sailed for four days heading in the direction of Sicily, but due to the rough sea conditions the vessel had engine problems. One of the migrants then contacted the Italian authorities via mobile phone and requested assistance. The first response was made by a US military vessel and a Greek cargo vessel, which took all the migrants onboard and with the assistance of the Hellenic Coast Guard, transferred them to the port of Paleochora, Crete. There were (185 Egyptians and 154 Syrians) and 6 facilitators (all Egyptian nationals) onboard the iron fishing vessel.

to the Evros region in order to tackle illegal migration. The operation has been extended until 30 June 2014. The enhanced surveillance and patrolling activities have resulted in a significant drop in the number of apprehended irregular migrants in the Evros region and have led to a displacement of the migration flow towards the Bulgarian-Turkish border and the eastern Aegean Sea. In addition to the operation Aspida, the operation Xenios Zeus focused



Figure 8. **Increased operational activity reduced the detection of migrants at the Greek and later at the Bulgarian land border to Turkey. Numbers also show some displacement to the eastern Aegean Sea**

Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing in the eastern Mediterranean region since the beginning of 2013 by border section. Also, the detections of migrants arriving with fraudulent document on flights from Istanbul



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

on detecting migrants inland in urban areas around Athens.

- As a response to the increased pressure at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, the Bulgarian authorities decided to implement an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS) and a specialised police operation, to conduct enhanced air surveillance, and to construct a 30-kilometre-long fence along vulnerable parts of the border.
- JO Poseidon Land 2013 was also active during Q3 2013 at the land border with Turkey. The operation ended on 26 March and on the same day JO Poseidon Land 2014 was commenced. From 1 January to 30 March 2014, a total of 635 irregular migrants were reported for crossing the border illegally (394 migrants in the Bulgarian operational area and 241 migrants in the Greek operational area), which represents a decrease compared to the same reporting period of 2013, when 883 migrants were apprehended (731 migrants in Bulgaria and 152 migrants in Greece). Regular meetings between the Greek and Turkish authorities

take place on a monthly basis with the exchange of relevant data and information.

- Moreover, JO Poseidon Sea 2013 was operational during the reporting period in order to tackle the flow of irregular migrants at the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

As can be seen in Figure 8, the abovementioned operational activities led to a sustained long-term decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing in the eastern Mediterranean region. The fact that the overall numbers of illegal border-crossing on the eastern Mediterranean route was still higher than one year ago can be attributed to the detections in the Aegean Sea.

Eastern Aegean Sea

According to FRAN data from January to March 2014, more than 3 000 apprehensions of irregular migrants were reported from the eastern Aegean Sea. During Q1 2014, the

number of migrants detected in this area has been far higher than during the same season in previous years. This trend can be attributed to the high number of Syrian migrants who continued to enter Turkey and the increased surveillance and operational activity at the EU common land borders with Turkey. Several migrants apprehended on the Greek eastern Aegean Islands stated that they had made previous attempts to cross the border from Turkey to Greece via the Evros River, but because of the intense patrolling on the Greek side of the border it was impossible to cross over without being detected. Consequently facilitators offered them the sea route as an alternative.

In regards to the location of interceptions, roughly 80% were made inland on the Aegean islands and the rest at sea. In the 166 incidents detected through JO Poseidon Sea 2013 during Q1 2014, the most targeted islands have been Lesbos, Chios and Samos.

Bulgarian land border

As a response to the increased migration at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, the Bulgarian authorities decided to launch a combination of measures. Since 1 July 2012, the Bulgarian authorities have implemented an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS) at the border section between the BCPs of Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo, covering 58 km, and enhanced air surveillance has been ongoing since October 2012. Through a special police operation launched on 11 November 2013 additional police and border police officers have been deployed to the Bulgarian-Turkish land border.

The Bulgarian authorities also started the construction of a fence in the border area most affected by illegal migration. In addition to these measures, regular bilateral meetings between Bulgarian and Turkish authorities

take place under an agreement signed between Bulgaria and Turkey.

During Q4 2013, the highest level of detections since the beginning of the FRAN data collection was reported at the Bulgarian land border to Turkey. Since then, as a consequence of the abovementioned Bulgarian measures, the level of detections decreased by 93%.

Migrants from Syria

As was the case in the previous quarter, in Q1 2014 Syrians constituted more than half of all detections on this route (2 617). While detections in the eastern Aegean Sea increased by more than 15%, illegal border-crossing at the land-border sections to Turkey decreased by 86% since the previous quarter due to increased operational activity, coming down to the similar levels of one year ago. However, repeated apprehensions of irregular migrants travelling clandestinely within Bulgaria and Greece point to a substantial share of Syrians who had managed to cross the border undetected.

4.2.4. Western Mediterranean route


In Q1 2014 there were over 2 500 detections of illegal border-crossing in the western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla. This was roughly similar to the detections reported half a year ago in Q3 2013, and the second largest total reported on this route, the record being in Q3 2011, the year of the Arab Spring.

On February 6 15 migrants drowned in Moroccan waters while trying to swim to Ceuta from a nearby beach. The accident was widely reported in the media as it coincided with an increase of attempts to cross the fence by large groups of migrants. From the beginning of the year till March 2014, the Spanish



Figure 9. **In Q1 2014, the Spanish authorities reported seven attempts made by large groups of migrants to cross the land border in Melilla. In one attempt, about 500 migrants from a group of more than 1 100, succeeded in crossing the border**

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the western Mediterranean route, by border types (blue = sea border, green = land border), by quarter since 2009



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

authorities reported seven attempts made by large groups of migrants. One of the largest incidents happened on 17 March, when about 500 migrants from a group of more than 1 100, succeeded in crossing the border to Melilla. The migrants attempted to cross at night but were prevented by Moroccan and Spanish authorities. It was only in the early morning, taking advantage of a fog forming in a valley, that some succeeded in reaching Spain.

These incidents are part of a general trend of increasing detections at the land border, while detections at the sea border decreased. As can be seen in the chart above, detections at the land border reached a peak in Q1 2014. One of the reasons which might help to explain this trend is the strengthening of surveillance at sea that would push migrants to attempt crossing the fenced-land border.

For several months, the Spanish authorities had warned of an increasing number of migrants joining makeshift camps on the Mo-

roccan hills nearby Melilla. Most migrants are sub-Saharan Africans.

4.2.5. Western African route

In the first quarter of 2014, few detections of illegal border-crossing were reported from this region. The level of detections is far lower than during the peak of migration in Q1 of 2009, when close to 1 500 persons were apprehended. The majority of the persons detected during the reporting period were Moroccan (24).

In spite of a minor peak detections in Q3 and Q4 2013, irregular migration on the West African route is still at a much reduced rate compared the situation before 2010. Sustained high levels of surveillance ensuring early detections and collaboration with third-country authorities are the key to maintaining the low levels of detections at the border.

4.2.6. Western Balkan route

Western Balkan countries and their neighbouring EU Member States reported more

than 6 00 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs. Importantly, the number was 20% lower in relation to the previous quarter and 15% lower than in the corresponding period of the previous year. This lower number of was largely due to a 45% decrease in detections made at the Greek-Albanian border compared with the previous quarter. The drop is in line with the seasonal changes in the circular migration of Albanian citizens to Greece.

Detections at the Hungarian-Serbian border, which remained the busiest in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing in the region, remained stable with a 3% slip compared with the previous quarter and a 13% increase compared with the corresponding quarter of the previous year. As regards nationalities detected at the Hungarian-Serbian border, the number of Afghan nationals remained the largest during the first quarter, followed by Syrians. This suggests sustained secondary movements from Greece through Western Balkans regions to Hungary and further on to other EU Member States. In fact, information collected in the context of Frontex Joint Operations suggests that the Western Balkan route is to some extent used instead of the direct sea route from Greece to Italy, mostly due to the lower costs of facilitation.

In contrast, the recently growing trend in detections at the Bulgarian-Serbian border have turned into a sharp decline, compared to the previous quarter, which was mainly due to fewer detections of Afghans and Syrians. This drop corresponds with decreased detections of irregular migrants aiming to cross illegally into Bulgaria.

As regards nationalities detected in the region as a whole, over half the detections continued to be linked to migrants who had most probably entered the Western Balkans en route from Turkey to Greece or Bulgaria (i.e. Afghans, Pakistanis, Syrians, Algerians,

Somalis and Eritreans). Albanians were the top detected nationality with a 28% share of total detections.

However, there were sharply diverging trends as regards different nationalities. The level of detected Afghan nationals remained stable while the rise in detections of Syrian nationals continue, showing a 28% increase (1 096) compared to the previous quarter (853).

In contrast, the number of detected Pakistani nationals continued to drop sharply (to only 115 during the first quarter). There was also a sharp decrease in the number of detected North African migrants. For example, the number of detected Algerian nationals dropped to only 6 compared with 559 in the corresponding quarter of 2013 and 45 in the previous quarter. The number of West African migrants continued to drop, too. For example, the number of detected Nigerian nationals fell from 101 to 24 and that of Senegal nationals from 96 to 6 between the final quarter of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014.

The decreasing trend in detections of these nationalities could partly be attributed to changes in *modus operandi* or, to some extent, also to nationality swapping. However, the decreasing trend corresponds closely with a significantly low number of detections made at the borders with Turkey in comparison with a much higher level of detections of Syrian, Afghan and Eritrean nationals, for example.

According to the Turkish authorities, the number of detections of Pakistanis and Algerians also remained modest throughout 2013. It is, therefore, likely that the decrease in the flow of these nationalities is, for the most part, simply due to a decreased 'pool' of these persons already living in Greece (or arriving in Greece legally) and willing to move on.



4.2.7. Circular migration from Albania to Greece

Prior to being granted visa free access to the Schengen area in late 2010, Albanians were regularly detected in very high numbers illegally crossing their land border into Greece. Since visa liberalisation, Albanians are still detected illegally crossing the border into Greece but at a much lower level, although numbers began to increase again in 2013. Moreover, there were increased numbers of reports of refusals of entry (mostly for having an alert in the SIS) and also document fraud (counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay in the Schengen area).

In Q1 2014, detections of Albanians at the Greek-Albanian border increased by 16% compared to the same quarter of 2013. Likewise, detections of Albanians at the Greek border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia increased by 148% compared to the same quarter of 2013, although from a low base.

Over the same period, refusals of entry of Albanians at these border sections have also remained stable, even decreasing in Greece. Effective returns of Albanians also decreased in Q1 2014 compared to 2013, indicating that the increase in illegal border-crossing observed in 2013 did not continue through 2014.

4.2.8. Eastern land borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported from the green borders of Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and countries of origin and often impassable terrain. Also according to several bi-monthly analytical reports shared throughout

2013 and 2014, visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to be predominant on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing (see Section 4.8 Document fraud).

In Q1 2014 there were 189 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported at the eastern land borders of the EU, which is slightly less than in the previous quarter and in the same period in 2013.

Despite the decreasing general trend, there were important variations considering different border sections. First, detections decreased at the borders with Belarus and the Russian Federation. The drop may be explained by seasonal variations, but was also due to a decreased flow of Georgian nationals detected at the Lithuanian-Belarusian border, which was in line with a decreasing number of refusals of entry issued to Georgian nationals. At the borders with the Russian Federation, the drop could be also partly linked with enhanced security measures undertaken by the Russian authorities due to the Sochi Olympic Games 2014.

In contrast, at the Member State borders with Ukraine there were 104 detections compared with 61 in the corresponding period of the last year. According to data gathered in the context of the eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), the detections by Ukrainian authorities increased too.

However, it needs to be stressed that in the case of Ukrainian nationals, with a total 26 detections at the Member State borders with Ukraine, the purpose of illegal border-crossing was related to irregular migration in only 4 cases. By March the impact of the Ukrainian crisis remained very limited in terms of illegal border-crossings. Additionally, if indeed there was a link to the growth in detections at the Ukrainian borders, it concerned mostly non-re-

gional transiting third-country nationals, such as Afghan and Syrians.

For the first time the most commonly detected migrants on this route were from Syria (30), detected at the Polish, Romanian and Hungarian land borders with Ukraine. Other nationalities detected in comparably high overall numbers on this route were Ukrainian (26) and Russian (20).

4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections confirmed to be clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport), results in extremely low detections for the whole of the EU especially compared with other indicators of irregular migration. In Q1 2014, 236 detections were reported at EU level.

However, it should be noted that some Member States do not have systematic data collection system in place to report on this indicator. For example, this is the case in Spain. Indeed, although detections of clandestine entries are made on a daily basis at the BCPs in Ceuta and Melilla or on the regular ferry connections between Morocco and Spain, these detections are not distinguished from detections of illegal border-crossing (1A).

When considering the data available, most of the detections were reported from Croatia, mainly at its land border with Serbia. Considerable lorry traffic goes through this border section, and is particularly used for international traffic from the Western Balkans countries to the EU, but also as transit corridor for large lorry traffic from Turkey to western EU Member States. Most of the migrants were Eritreans or Syrians, and it is likely that these migrants had initially crossed the border illegally from Turkey and were in

transit to their final destination within the EU when detected by the Croatian border-control authorities.

Bulgaria also reported a high number of detections of clandestine entry at its land border with Turkey. This increase may be linked to the strengthened surveillance along the land border with Turkey that would trigger facilitators to attempt alternative illegal entry to the EU, notably by hiding migrants in vehicles. Although no casualties have been reported this quarter, clandestine entry represents considerable risks for migrants' lives, in particular due to the threat of suffocation.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Between the beginning of the FRAN data collection and the year 2011, the number of detections of facilitators of irregular migration has been steadily falling. Since then, the mid-term trend has been rather stable leading to a recent modest hike, while the number of illegal border-crossings has significantly increased. According to interviews conducted with migrants, one important reason for this divergence seems to be the more cautious behaviours of facilitators, who frequently stay behind when migrants embark on boats or approach the EU external land border.

Additionally, a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud in an attempt to mimic legal entry to the EU has resulted in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.

During the first quarter of this year FRAN data shows 2 015 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, just 5% more than during the previous quarter. The top three Member States (France, Italy, and Greece) reported the majority of the numbers; together they accounted for more than 60% of



all detections of facilitators at the EU level. This distribution which accumulates in the Mediterranean countries may be indicative of difficult border sections that require more assistance from the facilitators, although in most cases facilitators were reported as being detected inland.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; very often most of the top reporting countries for this indicator tend to report their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. Hence, in most reporting periods the top nationalities of facilitators tend to be consistent with the top reporting countries for this indicator. However, in Q1 2014 the most commonly detected nationality of facilitators was Bangladeshi (144), followed by the Member State nationalities Italy (137), Spain (117) and France (100).

4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q1 2014, there were over 86 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is in the range of detections reported for the previous quarter and for Q1 2013.

The number of detections of illegal stay are nearly four times larger than detections of illegal border-crossing (in Q1 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing totalled 22 498). This difference is due to the fact that migrants detected for illegal stay may be repeatedly detected in a quarter, either in the same or in different Member States. Another factor explaining the difference is that many detections of illegal stay concerned overstaying migrants. However, there are no data available that would be able to establish the contribution of these two factors in the overall total and thus obtain a more accurate picture of the number of individuals staying illegally in the EU during this quarter or any other time period.

As has been the case since Q4 2012, Germany reported the largest number of detections of illegal stay (over 12 000 detections), mostly Syrians. The detections of illegal stay in Germany have doubled between Q1 2010 and Q1 2014, making Germany by far the most popular destination country for illegal migration within the EU. Several factors may explain this increase, including the German asylum policy that may attract migrants in search of the best conditions for international protection among EU Member States, as well as the relatively better economic conditions of Germany compared to other Member States, that offers more economical opportunities for migrants.

Compared to the previous quarter, the main increase was in fact reported by Bulgaria, where detections doubled between Q3 2013 and Q1 2014. This large increase, mostly Syrians, is connected with the large numbers of arrivals of migrants crossing the border illegally in Q3 2013. As of November 2013, detections of illegal border-crossing have decreased but migrants who were not returned may still be staying in Bulgaria.

In terms of nationalities, Syrians ranked first, reaching a peak in Q1 2014 with 11 156 detections. Similar to the detections of illegal border-crossings and asylum applications, the number of Syrians detected staying illegally has risen sharply from mid-2013, as a consequence of people fleeing the country (Fig. 11). However, this total also includes detections in Sweden (over 3 000), which for administrative reasons mostly coincide with Syrians applying for asylum. Nevertheless, Bulgaria reported the largest number of detections of Syrians staying illegally, probably as a consequence of the large flow of Syrians crossing the border illegally from Turkey to Bulgaria in Q2 and Q3 2013.

Figure 9. **The highest percentage increases in the number of detected illegal stayers were reported by Luxembourg, Norway and France**

Detections of illegal stay in Q1 2014 per Member State (blue shade) and the percentage change from Q1 2013





Figure 11. **Detections of Syrians staying illegally rose sharply and reached a peak in Q1 2014. The most detections were reported from Bulgaria**

Detections of Syrians staying illegally in the EU, by quarter



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

Other nationalities that were detected in significant numbers included Moroccans (6 278), Afghans (5 032) and Albanians (4 483).

4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q1 2014 there were 24 903 refusals of entry at the external border, one of the lowest quarterly totals since systematic data collection has been in place, beginning in 2009.

Figure 12. **Snapshot of a web page calculator for avoiding overstay**

Calculator of travel days remaining under a Schengen short-stay visa

Date of entry/Control: 04/08/14 ☒ Planning ☐ Control

☒ Passport ☐ Visa

Enter previous stay(s) in the Schengen area

Calculation results will display in this area.

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/schengen_calculator_en.html


This low total, corresponding with a 16% decrease compared to the previous quarter, is associated with a decrease in refusals of entry at the land borders in Poland. This is explained by fewer refusals of entry to Russians at the land border with Belarus and fewer refusals of entry to Ukrainians at the land border with Ukraine.

Regarding the decrease in refusals of entry to Russians, Q1 2014 marked the end of a 2-year phenomenon that saw large number of Chechens being refused entry at the BCP Terespol and then applying for asylum and continuing their journey to other Member States, mostly to Germany. This decrease is due to a series of measures introduced by Germany and Poland to tackle the phenomenon. This includes media campaigning in Chechnya informing people that Germany did not systematically grant asylum to Russians of Chechen origin.

Regarding the decrease in refusals of entry to Ukrainians, this was mostly due to fewer refusals of entry at the Polish land border with

Figure 13. **In spite of a substantial decrease, Poland continued to refuse entry to more third-country citizens than any other Member State. The most concerned nationals were Ukrainian, Russians and Belarusians**

Refusals of entry in Q1 2014 per Member State (blue shades) and percentage change since Q1 2013



Ukraine, where most of the traffic of Ukrainian passengers takes place.

Despite this decreasing trend, Poland continues to report the largest number of refusals, nearly twice as many as Hungary, which is the second ranking Member State, and Ukrain-


ians continue to be the main nationality refused entry, representing 13% of the total.

In terms of reasons for refusals, by far the two main reasons for refusals of entry in the EU were 'no valid visa' and 'has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose of



Figure 14. **After the peak in refusals of Russians of Chechen origin in Q2 2013 the number decreased considerably and is now back to the level Q2 2012**

Refusals of entry to Russians at the land border between Poland and Belarus



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

stay'. Together they represented nearly half of all refusals of entry in the first quarter of 2014. Since data collection has begun, these two reasons have ranked first.

A trend that is developing is the increasing number of refusals of entry for already staying more than 3 months in the EU. At the beginning of 2013, about 1 000 persons were refused entry for this reason per quarter, but in the last quarter of 2013 and in the first quarter of 2014 this number rose over 1 800. Most of the persons who were refused entry for this reason were Serbian nationals (754 in Q1 2014), representing about 50% of all persons refused entry for this reason in Q1 2014. Most of them were refused entry at the land border between Hungary and Serbia (90%).

The reason for this increase is likely a consequence of the new Regulation (EU) No 610/2013 of 26 June 2013, which redefined the concept of a 'short stay' for third-country nationals in the Schengen area and which entered into force on 18 October 2013.

As of 18 October 2013, the vast majority of the third-country nationals, irrespective of being visa required or exempt, who travel to

the Schengen area for a short stay (contrary to residing in one Member State for longer than three months) can stay '90 days in any 180-day period'. Contrary to the definition which was in force until 18 October 2013, the new concept is more precise by setting the duration in days instead of months.

In order to apply the 90 days / 180-day rule, a calculator has been developed for the general public and for the Member States' authorities. The calculator is a tool only, it does not constitute a right to stay for a period resulting from its calculation.


4.7. Asylum claims

The number of asylum claims reported by FRAN members during Q1 2014 totalled 93 109. This does not include data for Austria for March. The trend compared to the previous quarter decreased by 7%, but compared to Q1 2013 was up by 30%.

As in the previous quarters, most of the applications were reported from Germany and Sweden (48%). For these two Member States, quarterly applications decreased for the second time in a year, after reaching a peak in Q3

Figure 15. **The total number of applications for international protection has increased dramatically compared to one year ago, as has the proportion of applications submitted to the top 3 Member States**

Total number of asylum applications submitted in the EU by quarter since the beginning of 2009 (left-hand axis). The line shows the percentage of applications submitted in the top 3 Member States (right-hand axis)



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

2013, but the levels of applications were still much higher in 2014 than they were a year ago. This decrease coincided with fewer detections of illegal border-crossing in Q1 2014 than in Q3 2013, in particular detections of Syrians who dropped from 11 917 to 4 633.

Asylum applications in Bulgaria also decreased from over 3000 in Q3 2013 to about 2000 in Q1 2014. This decrease coincided with a drop in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Bulgaria and Turkey. In other Member States, asylum applications remained fairly stable.

In terms of nationalities, Syrians continued to rank first, representing almost 20% of all asylum applications.

4.8. Document fraud

In Q1 2014 there were just over 2 300 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which is a decrease of 5% compared to the previous year in Q1. Omitting the data from Switzerland, which started reporting in 2014 and

the numbers from the new EU Member State Croatia, which only began reporting after June 2013, the decline would have been even more significant.

Spain, Italy, France and Greece reported the most detections of document fraud on entry at the external border, together accounting for more than half of all detections at the EU level. The long-term upward trend in Spain also continued in Q1 2014, when the country reported more detections than ever, the most common of which were related to Moroccans.

Hungary reported the largest number of document fraud cases in a first quarter since the EDF data collection started and among all other EU countries it was the second largest increase in absolute numbers between Q4 2013 and Q1 2014. Of document fraudsters reported from Hungary, most were nationals of Western Balkan countries (mainly Albanians, Serbs and Kosovo* citizens) and Ukraine. Slovenia, on the other hand, reported the largest percentage rise (+189%) since the last quarter. This increase was mainly caused

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



by Western Balkan nationals using counterfeit stamps in their passport.

Despite a substantial decrease, Italy still ranked second in terms of detected document fraud cases. But in contrast to Hungary and France, only a few document fraudsters were from the Western Balkans or the EU's eastern neighbourhood. Instead, the most prevalent nationalities were Sri Lankans, Nigerians and Syrians.

At the EU level, of the 107 nationalities detected using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the EU or Schengen area from a third country, the most commonly detected were from Syria (258), Albania (206) and Morocco (144). Syrians were detected at a range of locations but Albanians were mostly apprehended on entry to Greece and Moroccans were mostly detected at Ceuta and Melilla.

4.8.1. Document fraud on exit from the EU/Schengen area

In addition to the 2 300 detections on entry there was also an increasing trend of nearly 700 detections on exit, hence around a quarter of detections were on exit but this is likely to be an underestimation as checks are less stringent on exit than they are on entry. In fact some Member States do not perform exit checks. On the other hand, a number of Member States including Croatia, Denmark, France, Hungary, Norway and Slovakia reported that a third or more of their cases were on exit. Only Romania and Bulgaria detected more document fraudsters on exit than on entry. In the case of Romania most exit detections were of Romanians and to a lesser extent Syrians exiting the land border towards Hungary. In Bulgaria, the majority of detections on exit were made at the BCPs Ruse to Romania or Kalotina to Serbia.

4.8.2. Between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States

As well as at the external border, it is also important that at the EU level there were over 950 detections of document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States and between two non-Schengen EU Member States. As is normally the case, many of these were reported on entry to the UK, a common destination country for irregular migrants travelling from the Schengen area. By far the most commonly detected migrants in this category were from Albania (374), mostly detected entering the UK.

4.8.3. Intra-Schengen flights

The EDF-RAN data exchange also considers detections of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights (and to a minor extent ferry connections) where no border checks are systematically performed. The strong increases in the number of detections throughout 2013 peaked with an all-time high of 1 271 cases in Q4 2013. The first quarter of 2014 was marked by a drop of more than 40%, resulting in 718 reported cases of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights and nine cases on intra-Schengen ferry connections.

4.8.4. Migrants from Albania

In Q1 2014, 763 Albanians were detected using more than 900 fraudulent documents (including authentic passports containing fraudulent documents such as visas or stamps), which is a decrease compared to both the previous quarter and Q1 2013. Nevertheless, Albanians still represent the biggest proportion of document fraud at the EU level.

4.8.5. Migrants from Syria

Overall, 566 Syrians were detected using fraudulent documents in Q1 2014. After a peak of 920 Syrians who were detected in the last quarter

of 2013, the number appears to have returned to a lower level rather common for the first half of 2013. Syrians were mostly detected on entry to the Schengen area from third countries (231), followed by intra-Schengen flights (193), which suggests that many are illegally crossing the external border and then using fraudulent documents for secondary movements.

4.8.6. Migrants from Eritrea and Somalia

Document fraud committed by nationals from different countries in the Horn of Africa often shows similar patterns. Three quarters of all incidents related to this region's nationals are detected during secondary movements after illegal entry into the EU (see chapter 'Illegal border-crossings: Central Mediterranean'). In Q1 2014, Member States reported 193 cases of document fraud committed by Eritrean and 151 by Somali nationals, compared to Q1 2013 an increase of 159 and 19, respectively.

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Return decisions

In Q1 2014 there were 55 787 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision.* For technical reasons this total does not include data from Austria and Spain.

The main feature during Q1 2014 was the large increase in return decisions issued by Bulgaria, where return decisions doubled in relation to Q3 2013. This was due to a large number of migrants crossing the border illegally in the past few months.

At the Member State level there is often a discrepancy between the number of return decisions reached and the number of effective returns carried out. Some of the differences may be due to time lags between judicial decisions and physical returns, while other dif-

ferences may be due to the disappearance of migrants once a decision has been reached.

More Syrians were subject to return decisions than any other nationality (6 066), mostly in Bulgaria (57%). However, these return decisions are not often implemented, as evidence by the low number of effective returns (69), mostly to Turkey.

Note that the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, *inter alia*, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached.

4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q1 2014, Member States reported 36 841 effective returns, but Austrian data for this period were not yet available. Bearing in mind this limitation the number of third country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU remained stable compared to most previous quarters.

As has usually been the case for this indicator, the UK conducted the largest number of returns in Q1 2014 of nearly 150 nationalities with Indians (18%) ranking top. Greece ranked second in terms of the number of active returns, with Albanians representing the majority (56%) and the largest number for a single nationality in any Member State.


Effective returns have been rather stable since 2011 when systematic data collection on this indicator began, ranging between 10 000 and 15 000 per month, the average being around 13 000. By contrast, detections of illegal border-crossing fluctuated importantly during the same period, from 2 255 in January 2013 to 20 285 in March 2011, with an average of 9 066 per month. These large differences in trends and patterns for these

* This total does not include data from Austria and Spain.



Figure 16. **Some Member States reached more decisions to return than the number of effective returns carried out**


Number of return decisions issued and effective returns performed by Member States in Q3 2014



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

Figure 17. **In Q1 2014 the most commonly returned migrants were from Albania, Pakistan and India. Some nationalities were subject to many decisions to return but were not effectively returned to the same degree (Syrians, Afghans, Moroccans)**

Return decisions issued and effective returns (voluntary or forced) to third countries or the top nationalities in Q1 2014



Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014

two indicators are explained by the fact that most migrants detected crossing the border illegally are in fact not returned because they applied for asylum or due to the fact that they cannot be returned to their country of origin for other reasons.

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Criminal groups that operate across the EU external borders pose a significant challenge to European law-enforcement authorities. They affect the overall management of the external borders insofar as prevention of their activities demands substantial personal and financial resources of the European border agencies.

4.10.1. Trafficking in Human Beings

The International Labour Organisation recently published the report 'Profits and Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labour', in which it estimated the extent, cost and profits generated through forced labour, including from trafficked persons held in debt bondage or work in slave-like conditions. The study says that two thirds of the estimated global profits of USD 150 billion, around USD 99 billion, came from commercial sexual exploitation, while another USD 51 billion resulted from forced labour exploitation, including domestic work, agriculture and other economic activities. It additionally provides new evidence of the key socio-economic factors that increase the risk of falling victim to coercion and abuse.

Although the report provides a regional breakdown containing only a combined estimate for all of the developed economies globally, their calculated profits are certainly an adequate approximation for most of the European Union countries. According to the study, in the developed economies and the EU the average annual profit for traffickers is EUR 5 500 per victim of forced domestic

work and around EUR 60 000 per victim of forced sexual exploitation. The estimated profits in consequence presume the availability of vast illegal proceeds for large investments into the recruitment, facilitation, document fraud and transport of victims of THB into the EU.

The identification of cases of trafficking in human beings remains a demanding task for border authorities. The constant changes in *modi operandi* and the use of deceptive means to make the victim believe in promising opportunities in Europe makes the detection of victims during the short time window of a border-control extremely challenging.

During Q1 2014 substantial disruptions of criminal groups involved in trafficking in human beings were reported by Spanish authorities. In a recent operation, the Spanish police have dismantled a criminal network of Asian origin responsible for trafficking in human being for sexual exploitation. The women, mainly of Chinese origin, were recruited in their country of origin with fake promises of work in Spain. Once in Spain, they were collected at Madrid-Barajas Airport and taken directly to one of the locations where the network was holding other women for similar purposes. Taking advantage of their lack of knowledge of the language and the fact that they were in a foreign country where they did not know anyone, the perpetrators withdrew their documents and forced them into sexual work to pay off the money they borrowed to get to Spain. The victims were between 20 and 30 years old and were held in several houses and then moved to karaoke places, hotels or other houses.

4.10.2. Smuggling of excise goods at the eastern borders

In the first quarter of 2014, the number of tobacco smuggling incidents reported through Frontex Joint Operations decreased by 60%



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 18. **Cigarettes smuggled from Ukraine hidden in a tire of an off-road car detected at the BCP Lubaczow**

compared to the fourth quarter of 2013. Nevertheless, the smuggling of cigarettes remained the main cross-border crime at the eastern borders. Border guards reported 18 cases of cigarette contraband through JO Focal Points Land, most of which were detected at the border with Ukraine (14) and to a lesser extent with Belarus (4). Similarly to the previous quarter (Q4 2013), no cases of cigarette smuggling were detected at the Moldovan borders.

According to JO Focal Points Land, Ukraine was the only country which did not see a drop in cases of cigarettes illegally exported to the EU (10 cases in Q4 2013, compared to 14 in Q1 2014). Medyka (Poland) and Zahony (Hungary) were the most used BCPs for contraband activities reported to Frontex.

Similar to previous quarters, smuggled cigarettes had excise stamps from Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation. *Modi operandi* remained also unchanged smuggling in personal belongings or in different means of transportation hidden in specially constructed compartments or in the cargo as well as outside of BCPs via green land borders or rivers.

On 6 February 2014, Polish border guards revealed 1 228 800 cigarettes worth about EUR 176 664, including 3 000 cigarettes with Ukrainian excise stamps and 1 225 800 cigarettes with Belarusian stamps. The goods were hidden in the cargo of mineral wool and building boards in a semi-trailer lorry driven by a Polish citizen.

Smuggling via rivers was still a risk in the first quarter of 2014 due to the winter weather enabling smugglers to use the ice as cover. For

example, Polish border guards detected two Polish citizens with 3 cardboard boxes wrapped in black plastic, containing 30 000 cigarettes without excise stamps worth about EUR 4 125 in total. They crossed the river Bug on the ice from Ukraine to Poland to give to Polish accomplices. During the return to Ukraine they swept snow on the ice in order to cover their tracks.

Contraband cigarettes were also often captured by green border patrols when they were left by perpetrators at the green borders on the river banks to be picked up later, as in cases reported by Poland and Hungary.

Contraband cigarettes were also smuggled aboard light planes and motorized hang gliders across EU external borders. In February 2014, for example, the Polish border guards observed two cases of flights over the Poland-Ukraine state border (11 February 2014 and 18 February 2014), one of which was accompanied by a lantern in the sky. It was possibly released in order to distract the border guards or to verify the strength and direction of the wind.

South Eastern Europe

The numbers of detections of cigarette smuggling reported to Frontex in South Eastern Europe show to be very low in Q1 2014 and were related to individual traffic through private or public transport. In the first half of February, Serbia's customs and border police services have prevented an attempt to smuggle around 300 000 cigarettes exiting at the Đerdap border-crossing in eastern Serbia. The cigarettes were found in a lorry with a declared load of marble dust destined for Romania. The brand of the majority of the seized cigarettes was 'Marble and Ashima' and had no excise stamps. For that reason, authorities believe they were taken over directly from the factory. Another brand, 'Monte', was also found in the lorry, but with excise stamps. The case has been taken over by the Serbian justice authorities.

4.10.3. Drug trafficking

Western Mediterranean sea

In Q1 2014, routes from the African continent to Europe, especially to the Iberian Peninsula, were again used by criminal organisations for the trafficking of cannabis. The main provider of cannabis resin to Europe is Morocco, although its production capacities are in decline while those in Afghanistan are increasing. Amounts seized in Spain, the country reporting the largest detections, clearly exceeded the domestic demand. From Spain, shipments of cannabis resin are forwarded to other countries of the European Union.

In February 2014 the Spanish National Police seized 22 tonnes of hashish that were transported by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. The drug originated from Morocco, whereas its final destination was unknown. As a result of the operation, 12 persons were apprehended and luxury vehicles as well as large amounts of cash and diamonds were seized. The head of the organised crime group lived in the city of Almería and was the owner of several companies, which import and export horticultural products. These entities, operating under the cover of a legal company, with allowed the trafficker to have the necessary maritime infrastructure to transport the narcotics.

As for cocaine and according to EMCDDA calculations based on seizure data*, between 2001 and 2011, Spain accounted for around 50% of all cocaine seizures in the EU. Large shipments usually travelled by sea from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela to Spain and Portugal. A large share of the substance also arrived from South America via Africa.

In February 2014, the Spanish National Police seized 360 kg of cocaine in the port of Barcelona coming from Colombia. The container was transporting several thousand cans of

Contraband cigarettes crossing from the Russian Federation decreases fivefold

The number of contraband cigarettes brought across the border from Russia to Estonia decreased by 5.5 times in 2013, compared to the previous year. The significant drop is due to a new policy implemented last year which applies to people transporting cigarettes on a small scale. Now they not only have to hand over the illicit cigarettes but they are also a subject to a fine. Apart from the decreasing trend of smuggled cigarettes from the Russian Federation, the new approach decreased the number of travellers crossing the border, and increased sales of legal cigarettes. In Narva, the largest border town legal sales of cigarettes, increased by 60% according to open source information.

Source: <http://news.err.ee/v/economy/e3fcd05-b89a-476c-bd27-7e346c22e975>



© Cuerpo Nacional de Policía

Figure 19. Smuggling of cocaine concealed in cans of coffee powder

coffee powder and the drugs were found inside 717 of these boxes. When the boats arrived at the Spanish port, people working in the shipyards recovered the goods and delivered them to the drug trafficking organisation. As a result of the operation, seven suspects were arrested, all members of an organisation specialised in smuggling containers of drugs from South America.

In another large operation conducted in March 2014, the Spanish National Police arrested 42 persons and dismantled an organisation responsible for the trafficking of 'shabú' in Spain. In Asia, 'Shabú' is known as 'the drug of the poor' and technically it is methamphetamine in pure state. During the operation 8 kg of this psychotropic drug were seized. The drug was being transported

* EMCDDA (2013), EU Drug Markets Report: a strategic analysis, p. 38ff



Figure 20. **Apprehension of 'shabú', a psychotropic drug, transported by 'mules' through the Barcelona airport**

by 'mules' through the Barcelona airport. The organisation responsible for introducing the drug into Spain was composed of citizens of African origin who were using a front company that imported and exported vehicles in order to divert attention of the authorities.

Despite the relative decrease in the amount of drugs transported from Morocco, a new *modus operandi* to transport illicit drugs was detected. In March 2014, the Spanish Civil Guard dismantled a drug trafficking network responsible for transporting hashish from Morocco to Spain by helicopter. The traffickers used to fly the aircraft during the night documentation, lights and a flight plan. As a result of this operation six persons were arrested and 704 kg of hashish was seized.

4.11. Passenger flow

Since January 2014, Member States have been invited to regularly report on passenger flows at their external borders under FRAN. Their reporting is not yet comprehensive and thus it is not yet possible to have an EU-wide overview of passenger flow across the external borders at the EU level. Nevertheless, some limited analyses are possible focusing on the Member States that reported all necessary data for the three months of Q1 2014.

4.11.1. At the air borders

At the air borders, one of the main difficulties for most Schengen Member States is to distinguish between the flow of passengers entering from third-countries and those entering from a non-Schengen Member State. Some

Member States merged both flows, while others reported only arrivals from third countries.

The seven Member States reporting entries from third-countries and non-Schengen Member States for all three months of Q1 2014 totalled more than 22 millions arrivals. All Member States recorded their lowest total for February. This is partly due to the fact that the month of February has fewer days than any other month. Nevertheless, even after normalisation of all months against a standard month of 30 days, February recorded the lowest total suggesting that indeed fewer passengers travelled during that month. Passenger flow increased sharply from February to March, a trend that is likely to continue until passenger peak time in July-August.

For these seven Member States, the monthly arrivals were compared with refusals of entry. As passenger flows vary widely among these Member States, comparisons among Member States were made on the basis of a rate, in this case the number of refusals of entry for every 100 000 entries. On average, these seven Member States refused entry to 16 travellers for every 100 000 entries. Out of these Member States, five have rather similar rate of refusals of entry (between 12 and 19 refusals of entry for every 100 000 passengers), but Latvia reported a much higher rate possibly linked to the low passenger flow, while Denmark reported the lowest.

Three Member States reported about 100 000 entries from third countries only for all three months of Q1 2014. They show the same pattern of fewer passengers during February, followed by a stark increase between February and March.

When analysed against refusals of entry, the rate for Member States reporting only entries from third countries (thus excluding entries from non-Schengen Member States) was much higher than for Member States report-

ing passengers from third countries and from non-Schengen Member States. However, as only three Member States reported on entries from third countries only, it is difficult to draw conclusions.

4.11.2. At the land border

At the land border, data on passengers arriving from third countries were available for 12 border sections, totalling about 6 million passengers in Q1 2014. Like at the air border, passenger flow was lowest for February, even after normalisation for 30 days, and increased sharply between February and March.

Among these 12 border sections, the three Polish border sections ranked first, highlighting the busy traffic at Polish external land borders. The heaviest flow was by far at the border with Ukraine.

At the land border, the breakdown by nationality is available and shows that Ukrainians represented nearly a third of all passengers among these 12 border sections. They were the main nationality at the four border sections with Ukraine.

In Q1 2014, regular traffic of Ukrainians was the largest in March. It is difficult to link this increase with the events in Ukraine as historical data is lacking and comparison with previous year not possible. The increase in March might also be linked to a seasonal increase that will peak in the summer months.

When analysed against refusals of entry per 100 000 entries, large difference can be noted among border sections. While the average for these 12 border sections is 134 refusals per 100 000 passengers, the highest rate is reported at the land border between Hungary and Serbia, due to the fact that this is the main crossing point for Serbians travelling to the EU, and the lowest at the border between Poland and the Russian Federation.



Figure 21. Helicopter used to transport drugs from Morocco to Spain

Finally, refusals of entry per 100 000 entries at the land border (averaging 134 refusals per 100 000 entries in Q1 2014) were much higher than refusals of entries per 100 000 entries at the air border (averaging 16 refusals per 100 000 entries). This large difference may be explained by three reasons: first, the reporting at the air border is for arrivals from third countries and non-Schengen Member States. It is very likely there is a large difference between the rate of refusals on entry from third countries and from non-Schengen Member States, with the rate of refusal likely to be much higher for entries from third countries. Second, air travellers typically plan their trip better while land passengers may more easily attempt to cross the border even though they do not meet all the conditions for entry. A third reason is associated with pre-embarkation checks at the air border that enable airlines companies to deny boarding to a passenger not meeting all the conditions for entry to the EU. For some Member States, boarding denial may be as large as refusals of entry at the border itself.

Table 1. Refusals of entry per 100 000 passengers were much higher at the land border (134 refusals per 100 000 air passengers) than at the air border (16 refusals of entries per 100 000)

Monthly comparison of refusals of entry per 100 000 passengers at the land and air borders, Q1 2014

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Q1 2014
Land (12 border sections)	132	144	128	134
Air (seven Member States)	16	16	16	16

Source: FRAN data as of 21 May 2014



5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 21 May 2014, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012	2013				2014 Q1			per cent of total
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Syria	1 241	1 248	2 784	11 917	9 597	4 630	271	-52	21
Not specified	496	655	673	1 270	972	2 199	236	126	9.8
Mali	379	354	635	1 024	874	1 887	433	116	8.4
Afghanistan	1 969	1 082	1 892	2 675	3 845	1 806	67	-53	8.0
Eritrea	1 298	123	1 948	6 689	2 538	1 759	1330	-31	7.8
Albania	1 423	1 199	3 098	2 094	2 630	1 505	26	-43	6.7
Somalia	1 065	481	1 466	2 978	699	1 282	167	83	5.7
Gambia	310	279	362	844	1 332	1 250	348	-6.2	5.6
Sub-Saharan Africa*	0	0	0	0	0	1 055	n.a.	n.a.	4.7
Senegal	75	55	219	628	741	786	1329	6.1	3.5
Others	5 357	4 241	11 733	12 670	6 821	4 339	2.3	-36	19
Total All Borders	13 613	9 717	24 810	42 789	30 049	22 498	132	-25	100
Land Borders									
Not specified	493	643	664	1 270	892	2 188	240	145	29
Albania	1 334	1 158	3 042	2 052	2 581	1 470	27	-43	19
Syria	501	591	960	3 148	3 902	1 240	110	-68	16
Afghanistan	516	473	498	708	2 713	1 115	136	-59	15
Kosovo**	316	588	4 449	926	387	479	-19	24	6.3
Algeria	495	505	794	811	390	118	-77	-70	1.5
Turkey	55	84	62	78	73	101	20	38	1.3
Serbia	74	78	75	61	57	80	2.6	40	1.0
Pakistan	234	403	1 512	1 057	239	71	-82	-70	0.9
Somalia	106	117	130	171	152	65	-44	-57	0.8
Others	1 490	1 376	2 402	2 920	2 000	727	-47	-64	9.5
Total Land Border	5 614	6 016	14 588	13 202	13 386	7 654	27	-43	100
Sea Borders									
Syria	740	657	1 824	8 769	5 695	3 390	416	-40	23
Mali	296	150	471	881	734	1 864	1143	154	13
Eritrea	1 246	10	1 891	6 619	2 433	1 700	16 900	-30	11
Gambia	304	251	333	824	1 314	1 243	395	-5.4	8.4
Somalia	959	364	1 336	2 807	547	1 217	234	122	8.2
Sub-Saharan Africa*	0	0	0	0	0	1 055	n.a.	n.a.	7.1
Senegal	71	43	158	522	668	782	1719	17	5.3
Afghanistan	1 453	609	1 394	1 967	1 132	691	13	-39	4.7
Pakistan	457	352	478	621	385	577	64	50	3.9
Nigeria	238	31	184	1 863	792	531	1613	-33	3.6
Others	2 235	1 234	2 153	4 714	2 963	1 794	45	-39	12
Total Sea Border	7 999	3 701	10 222	29 587	16 663	14 844	301	-11	100

* Sub-Saharan Africa represents sub-Saharan migrants whose nationality could not be specified.

** This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.


Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

						2014 Q1			
	2012	2013				Q1	% change on		per cent of total
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		year ago	prev. qtr	
Border Type									
Land	160	189	105	56	208	219	16	5.3	96
Sea	43	13	13	3	12	10	-23	-17	4.4
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	28	30	15	24	112	59	97	-47	26
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	1	38	n.a.	3700	17
Afghanistan	41	53	29	13	33	35	-34	6.1	15
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	17	n.a.	n.a.	7.4
Pakistan	12	9	8	0	13	10	11	-23	4.4
Bangladesh	0	2	0	0	0	8	300	n.a.	3.5
Ghana	4	5	7	2	0	8	60	n.a.	3.5
Somalia	2	1	0	0	0	7	600	n.a.	3.1
Morocco	4	16	5	2	10	6	-63	-40	2.6
Albania	19	3	0	0	0	4	33	n.a.	1.7
Others	109	84	51	18	51	37	-56	-27	16
Total	203	202	118	59	220	229	13	4.1	100

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012	2013				2014 Q1			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 424	1 142	1 199	1 090	1 281	1 178	3.2	-8.0	58
Land Intra EU	142	93	104	158	203	249	168	23	12
Land	223	188	169	191	177	227	21	28	11
Sea	109	98	105	115	78	144	47	85	7.1
Not specified	110	23	64	81	99	122	430	23	6.1
Air	110	80	65	54	72	95	19	32	4.7
Top Ten Nationalities									
Bangladesh	23	30	29	15	29	144	380	397	7.1
Italy	149	112	177	141	129	137	22	6.2	6.8
Spain	137	70	58	41	72	117	67	63	5.8
France	88	81	61	58	71	100	23	41	5.0
Morocco	185	77	79	96	95	91	18	-4.2	4.5
Albania	68	60	72	81	72	87	45	21	4.3
Not specified	168	156	141	191	183	83	-47	-55	4.1
Pakistan	83	48	49	35	80	74	54	-7.5	3.7
Turkey	36	32	34	63	53	72	125	36	3.6
Serbia	44	55	40	38	43	69	25	60	3.4
Others	1 137	903	966	930	1 083	1 041	15	-3.9	52
Total	2 118	1 624	1 706	1 689	1 910	2 015	24	5.5	100

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

						2014 Q1			
	2012	2013				Q1	% change on		per cent of total
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	68 316	66 334	70 047	76 059	78 538	74 252	12	-5.5	86
Air	8 472	7 839	7 233	8 329	7 608	6 696	-15	-12	7.7
Land	4 754	4 541	4 298	4 786	4 052	2 779	-39	-31	3.2
Between BCPs	195	177	201	78	118	1 792	912	1419	2.1
Land Intra EU	1 665	377	554	985	1 300	960	155	-26	1.1
Sea	1 371	380	461	236	319	123	-68.0	-61	0.1
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	4 547	3 849	3 621	8 206	10 679	11 156	190	4.5	13
Morocco	4 814	6 445	6 979	6 600	6 226	6 278	-2.6	0.8	7.2
Afghanistan	5 619	4 077	4 058	4 113	4 588	5 032	23	9.7	5.8
Albania	3 614	3 392	3 956	4 057	4 761	4 483	32	-5.8	5.2
Not specified	4 142	3 985	4 154	6 572	5 993	4 200	5.4	-30	4.8
Algeria	3 705	3 551	3 862	3 430	3 631	3 604	1.5	-0.7	4.2
Pakistan	4 505	3 791	4 099	3 344	2 971	2 836	-25	-4.5	3.3
Ukraine	3 188	2 891	2 859	3 400	3 317	2 829	-2.1	-15.0	3.3
Tunisia	2 825	2 820	2 941	2 363	2 513	2 589	-8.2	3.0	3.0
Russian Federation	3 173	3 198	4 154	4 110	3 260	2 568	-20.0	-21	3.0
Others	44 685	41 649	42 132	44 282	44 009	41 059	-1.4	-6.7	47
Total	84 817	79 648	82 815	90 477	91 948	86 634	8.8	-5.8	100


Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external border reported by border type

						2014 Q1			per cent of total
	2012	2013				Q1	% change on		
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Ukraine	4 486	3 641	4 206	4 424	4 109	3 171	-13	-23	13
Albania	3 207	2 789	2 695	3 225	2 855	2 926	4.9	2.5	12
Serbia	1 552	2 008	1 619	2 105	2 449	2 145	6.8	-12	8.6
Russian Federation	2 865	3 017	10 578	5 993	3 110	1 840	-39	-41	7.4
Morocco	1 087	1 298	1 381	1 506	1 187	1 392	7.2	17	5.6
Belarus	1 427	1 026	1 165	1 102	1 279	1 117	8.9	-13	4.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	497	647	417	1 348	1 111	987	53	-11	4.0
Georgia	3 304	1 714	2 937	1 777	1 672	803	-53	-52	3.2
Algeria	430	450	588	446	591	643	43	8.8	2.6
Turkey	739	580	546	1 187	686	641	11	-6.6	2.6
Others	11 487	11 193	11 508	10 590	10 477	9 238	-17	-12	37
Total All Borders	31 081	28 363	37 640	33 703	29 526	24 903	-12	-16	100
Land Borders									
Ukraine	4 281	3 429	3 952	4 159	3 835	2 992	-13	-22	23
Serbia	1 311	1 769	1 429	1 923	2 284	1 928	9.0	-16	15
Russian Federation	2 211	2 374	9 972	5 255	2 635	1 490	-37	-43	12
Albania	1 915	1 576	1 474	1 919	1 535	1 392	-12	-9.3	11
Belarus	1 396	1 001	1 144	1 042	1 243	1 088	8.7	-12	8.4
Morocco	747	943	1 029	1 114	852	1 012	7.3	19	7.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	454	615	373	1 304	1 071	946	54	-12	7.3
Georgia	3 208	1 634	2 844	1 701	1 563	701	-57	-55	5.4
FYR Macedonia	403	441	470	441	406	434	-1.6	6.9	3.4
Turkey	301	205	226	779	304	216	5.4	-29	1.7
Others	1 934	2 035	1 906	1 281	1 119	746	-63	-33	5.8
Total Land Border	18 161	16 022	24 819	20 918	16 847	12 945	-19	-23	100
Air Borders									
Albania	853	724	747	735	953	1 011	40	6.1	9.2
Algeria	406	430	566	427	578	624	45	8.0	5.7
Brazil	596	724	615	542	600	602	-17	0.3	5.5
United States	487	492	590	682	541	546	11	0.9	5.0
Not specified	612	503	470	395	548	445	-12	-19	4.1
Turkey	393	336	272	306	343	402	20	17	3.7
Nigeria	423	340	380	414	513	351	3.2	-32	3.2
Venezuela	175	176	165	143	387	328	86	-15	3.0
Russian Federation	378	401	393	572	446	323	-19	-28	3.0
Morocco	239	256	223	238	246	227	-11	-7.7	2.1
Others	6 772	6 416	6 782	6 545	6 627	6 082	-5.2	-8.2	56
Total Air Border	11 334	10 798	11 203	10 999	11 782	10 941	1.3	-7.1	100
Sea Borders									
Albania	439	489	474	571	367	523	7	43	51
Morocco	101	99	129	154	89	153	55	72	15
Not specified	51	29	47	58	31	36	24	16	3.5
Tunisia	35	36	39	33	31	33	-8.3	6.5	3.2
Russian Federation	276	242	213	166	29	27	-89	-6.9	2.7
Turkey	45	39	48	102	39	23	-41	-41	2.3
FYR Macedonia	19	6	8	19	7	16	167	129	1.6
Algeria	9	6	12	16	12	14	133	17	1.4
India	92	33	71	28	19	14	-58	-26	1.4
Kosovo*	1	7	4	6	2	12	71	500	1.2
Others	518	557	573	633	271	166	-70	-39	16
Total Sea Border	1 586	1 543	1 618	1 786	897	1 017	-34	13	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 6. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal, Member State and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2014 Q1 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	3.171	99	50	1 295	2	1 106	188	252	143	11	33	3.179
Albania	2.926	60	48	84	5	748	119	526	1 477	54	194	3.315
Serbia	2.145	75	16	164	2	373	754	491	412	8	8	2.303
Russian Federation	1.840	28	8	1 263	9	215	49	107	32	137	51	1.899
Morocco	1.392	513	25	250	38	114	60	43	225	129	15	1.412
Belarus	1.117	51	1	596	2	199	47	141	45	43	12	1.137
Bosnia and Herzegovina	987	231	0	41	0	107	20	638	338	29	13	1.417
Georgia	803	0	8	646	10	70	5	10	68	0	3	820
Algeria	643	23	10	156	0	373	0	62	2	2	18	646
Turkey	641	26	8	258	11	101	156	36	24	17	50	687
Others	9.238	656	373	1 935	215	2 300	404	586	474	201	2.323	9.467
Total	24.903	1.762	547	6.688	294	5.706	1.802	2.892	3.240	631	2.720	26.282

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

A has no valid travel document(s);**B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;**C** has no valid visa or residence permit;**D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;**E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;**F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;**G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;**H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;**I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.


Annex Table 7. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal

	2012	2013				2014 Q1			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
All Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	10 225	8 778	18 544	13 425	9 313	6 688	-24	-28	25	Ukraine (19%)
E) No justification	6 766	6 361	6 807	6 720	6 700	5 706	-10	-15	22	Ukraine (19%)
H) Alert issued	3 967	3 160	2 761	2 693	2 203	3 240	2.5	47	12	Albania (46%)
G) No subsistence	2 465	2 607	2 325	3 090	3 108	2 892	11	-6.9	11	Bosnia and Herzegovina (22%)
Reason not available	2 863	2 656	3 034	3 314	3 449	2 720	2.4	-21	10	United States (16%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 214	1 202	886	1 130	1 827	1 802	50	-1.4	6.9	Serbia (42%)
A) No valid document	1 961	2 188	2 410	2 507	1 897	1 762	-19	-7.1	6.7	Morocco (29%)
I) Threat	806	1 006	848	695	528	631	-37	20	2.4	Russian Federation (22%)
B) False document	1 049	675	665	701	606	547	-19	-9.7	2.1	Unknown (12%)
D) False visa	577	358	302	329	571	294	-18	-49	1.1	Morocco (13%)
Total All Borders	31 893	28 991	38 582	34 604	30 202	26 282	-9.3	-13	100	
Land Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	7 498	6 440	15 889	10 704	7 130	4 710	-27	-34	34	Ukraine (27%)
H) Alert issued	2 912	2 186	1 879	1 828	1 396	2 309	5.6	65	16	Albania (42%)
E) No justification	3 530	2 805	3 290	3 556	3 073	2 184	-22	-29	16	Ukraine (48%)
G) No subsistence	1 527	1 733	1 418	2 297	2 069	1 926	11	-6.9	14	Bosnia and Herzegovina (33%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 036	967	689	824	1 538	1 252	29	-19	8.9	Serbia (56%)
A) No valid document	784	1 109	1 384	1 517	1 061	1 052	-5.1	-0.8	7.5	Morocco (47%)
I) Threat	460	713	500	308	282	362	-49	28	2.6	Russian Federation (35%)
B) False document	305	99	117	171	111	133	34	20	1	Ukraine (35%)
D) False visa	257	85	46	57	246	50	-41	-80	0.4	Morocco (22%)
Reason not available		101		243	251	20	-80	-92	0.1	Turkey (70%)
Total Land Border	18 309	16 238	25 212	21 505	17 157	13 998	-14	-18	100	
Air Borders										Nationality
E) No justification	3 085	3 355	3 255	2 867	3 466	3 303	-1.5	-4.7	29	Albania (13%)
Reason not available	2 778	2 462	2 903	2 933	3 075	2 588	5.1	-16	23	United States (17%)
C) No valid visa	2 221	1 911	2 151	2 294	2 030	1 871	-2.1	-7.8	17	Algeria (7.9%)
G) No subsistence	892	804	838	719	973	857	6.6	-12	7.6	Albania (41%)
H) Alert issued	698	638	567	539	596	622	-2.5	4.4	5.6	Albania (41%)
A) No valid document	794	712	656	582	698	611	-14	-12	5.5	Unknown (45%)
F) Over 3 month stay	173	222	186	281	260	488	120	88	4.4	Turkey (28%)
B) False document	712	563	464	497	491	400	-29	-19	3.6	Unknown (16%)
I) Threat	319	260	305	356	228	246	-5.4	7.9	2.2	Suriname (18%)
D) False visa	308	257	240	238	311	218	-15	-30	1.9	Senegal (11%)
Total Air Border	11 980	11 184	11 565	11 306	12 128	11 204	0.2	-7.6	100	
Sea Borders										Nationality
H) Alert issued	357	336	292	325	209	259	-23	24	26	Albania (76%)
E) No justification	151	201	198	297	161	212	5.5	32	21	Albania (75%)
Reason not available	85	93	128	138	123	112	20	-8.9	11	Albania (42%)
G) No subsistence	46	70	69	74	66	108	54	64	11	Albania (91%)
C) No valid visa	506	427	488	427	150	100	-77	-33	9.9	Morocco (17%)
A) No valid document	383	367	366	408	138	99	-73	-28	9.8	Unknown (23%)
F) Over 3 month stay	5	13	11	25	29	62	377	114	6.2	Morocco (87%)
D) False visa	12	16	11	34	14	23	44	64	2.3	Morocco (87%)
I) Threat	27	33	43	31	18	23	-30	28	2.3	Albania (91%)
B) False document	32	13	14	33	4	10	-23	150	1.0	Unknown (50%)
Total Sea Border	1 604	1 569	1 620	1 792	912	1 008	-36	11	100	

Annex Table 8. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

						2014 Q1			per cent of total
	2012	2013				Q1	% change on		
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	9 109	8 366	7 915	13 963	19 852	17 767	112	-11	19
Afghanistan	7 652	5 791	5 459	5 679	7 131	7 809	35	9.5	8.4
Pakistan	4 783	3 422	4 840	4 551	3 399	4 316	26	27	4.6
Serbia	6 321	2 465	2 258	4 509	5 739	4 151	68	-28	4.5
Somalia	4 150	3 459	4 046	5 127	4 747	4 038	17	-15	4.3
Eritrea	3 064	2 437	2 065	6 631	7 029	3 764	54	-46	4.0
Albania	1 121	961	1 201	1 342	1 968	3 251	238	65	3.5
Nigeria	2 194	2 452	2 478	2 672	2 224	3 083	26	39	3.3
Russian Federation	6 414	7 010	15 453	8 693	4 129	3 080	-56	-25	3.3
Iraq	3 202	2 585	2 128	2 681	2 605	2 637	2.0	1.2	2.8
Others	38 099	32 692	37 519	41 359	40 959	39 213	20	-4.3	42
Total	86 109	71 640	85 362	97 207	99 782	93 109	30	-6.7	100

Data for Austria for March are not available at the moment.



Annex Table 9. Document fraudsters

Document fraudsters detected at BCPs reported by border type and top ten nationalities claimed

	2012	2013				2014 Q1		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on			
							year ago			prev. qtr
Border Type							Nationality Claimed			
Air	1 482	1 800	1 765	1 717	1 786	1 676	-6.9	-6.2	73	Syria (13%)
Land	634	558	434	533	585	522	-6.5	-11	23	Albania (28%)
Sea	80	67	119	299	130	110	64	-15	4.8	Morocco (61%)
Not specified	3	0	1	9	1	0	n.a.	-100		
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed							Nationality of Document			
Syria	340	319	303	283	376	258	-19	-31	11	Spain (17%)
Albania	389	320	259	248	217	206	-36	-5.1	8.9	Greece (47%)
Unknown	68	298	333	342	246	167	-44	-32	7.2	France (59%)
Morocco	104	76	128	231	184	144	89	-22	6.2	Spain (81%)
Nigeria	69	93	118	111	160	143	54	-11	6.2	United Kingdom (49%)
Turkey	81	56	30	74	44	102	82	132	4.4	Spain (69%)
Ukraine	54	50	71	102	124	100	100	-19	4.3	Poland (54%)
Afghanistan	67	45	51	83	32	64	42	100	2.8	Germany (42%)
Sri Lanka	35	17	23	37	49	62	265	27	2.7	Italy (77%)
Iraq	48	34	34	57	37	61	79	65	2.6	Denmark (25%)
Others	944	1 117	969	990	1 033	1 001	-10	-3.1	43	Spain (26%)
Total	2 199	2 425	2 319	2 558	2 502	2 308	-4.8	-7.8	100	

Annex Table 10. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

						2014 Q1			per cent of total	Highest share
	2012	2013				Q1	% change on			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		year ago	prev. qtr		
Document Type	Nationality of Document									
PASSPORTS	1 050	1 261	1 283	1 382	1 325	1 165	-7.6	-12	46	France (7.3%)
Forged	456	447	521	545	591	491	9.8	-17	42	Greece (9.4%)
Authentic	270	480	421	500	407	376	-22	-7.6	32	France (13%)
Counterfeit	179	149	176	206	191	165	11	-14	14	Turkey (27%)
No more details	75	150	139	115	105	116	-23	10.0	10.0	South Africa (13%)
Stolen blank	69	32	24	16	30	17	-47	-43	1.5	Greece (35%)
Pseudo	1	3	2	0	1	0	-100	-100	0.0	
ID CARDS	242	290	275	382	391	309	6.6	-21	12	Italy (20%)
Counterfeit	134	148	139	157	132	124	-16	-6.1	40	Greece (20%)
Authentic	47	67	73	124	150	108	61	-28	35	Spain (38%)
Forged	37	25	47	47	64	45	80	-30	15	Italy (27%)
Stolen blank	13	25	10	21	27	20	-20	-26	6.5	Italy (100%)
No more details	11	22	6	33	17	11	-50	-35	3.6	Italy (55%)
Pseudo	0	3	0	0	1	1	-67	0	0	Finland (100%)
VISA	242	318	259	337	407	323	1.6	-21	13	France (26%)
Counterfeit	111	189	144	213	176	174	-7.9	-1.1	54	Italy (29%)
Authentic	13	25	21	16	143	82	228	-43	25	Poland (65%)
Forged	79	61	58	66	46	42	-31	-8.7	13	France (55%)
No more details	17	27	30	31	35	22	-19	-37	6.8	France (41%)
Stolen blank	22	16	6	11	7	3	-81	-57	.9	Spain (100%)
RESIDENCE PERMITS	387	461	385	422	500	379	-18	-24	15	Greece (28%)
Counterfeit	159	154	122	166	215	171	11	-20	45	Greece (26%)
Authentic	66	111	95	115	105	92	-17	-12	24	France (38%)
Stolen blank	98	124	85	72	70	69	-44	-1.4	18	Greece (72%)
Forged	50	45	54	43	68	31	-31	-54	8	Italy (29%)
No more details	14	26	28	25	42	16	-38	-62	4.2	Greece (19%)
Pseudo	0	1	1	1	0	0	-100	n.a.	n.a.	
STAMPS	509	409	350	381	298	294	-28	-1.3	12	Greece (39%)
Counterfeit	470	366	315	301	259	239	-35	-7.7	81	Greece (45%)
Forged	35	34	32	70	37	51	50	38	17	Greece (14%)
No more details	4	9	3	10	2	4	-56	100	1.4	France (50%)
OTHER	134	71	63	57	58	60	-15	3.4	2.4	Italy (27%)
Counterfeit	101	39	36	34	33	40	2.6	21	67	Italy (30%)
Authentic	23	23	10	15	16	13	-43	-19	22	Italy (23%)
Forged	7	4	8	4	4	5	25	25	8.3	Ghana (20%)
Pseudo	3	4	7	0	4	2	-50	-50	3.3	Hungary (50%)
No more details	0	1	2	2	0	0	-100	n.a.	.0	
Stolen blank	0	0	0	2	1	0	n.a.	-100	n.a.	
Total	2 564	2 810	2 615	2 961	2 979	2 530	-10	-15		



Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2012	2013				2013 Q1			Highest share Nationality Claimed	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on			per cent of total
							year ago	prev. qtr		
PASSPORTS	1 050	1 261	1 283	1 382	1 325	1 165	-7.6	-12	46	Syria (14%)
FRA-Authentic	33	55	68	68	57	48	-13	-16	4.1	Not specified (31%)
GRC-Forged	11	12	9	7	13	46	283	254	3.9	Greece (78%)
TUR-Counterfeit	56	38	42	58	75	45	18	-40	3.9	Turkey (58%)
SWE-Authentic	44	78	55	43	44	42	-46	-4.5	3.6	Syria (33%)
ALB-Forged	1	15	11	31	35	36	140	2.9	3.1	Albania (89%)
GBR-Forged	34	21	24	36	28	34	62	21	2.9	Afghanistan (74%)
ESP-Authentic	10	13	12	26	26	32	146	23	2.7	Spain (31%)
FRA-Forged	20	26	33	33	43	24	-7.7	-44	2.1	France (21%)
SYR-Forged	18	16	22	26	27	24	50	-11	2.1	Syria (75%)
MLI-Authentic	17	31	24	29	33	23	-26	-30	2.0	Not specified (74%)
Others	806	956	983	1 025	944	811	-15	-14	70	Not specified (13%)
ID CARDS	242	290	275	382	391	309	6.6	-21	12	Syria (17%)
ESP-Authentic	19	12	26	43	72	41	242	-43	13	Morocco (68%)
GRC-Counterfeit	2	15	10	11	25	25	67	0	8.1	Syria (60%)
ITA-Stolen blank	10	8	7	18	20	20	150	0	6.5	Syria (40%)
ITA-Counterfeit	21	51	33	34	26	17	-67	-35	5.5	Albania (41%)
FRA-Authentic	6	19	15	26	22	16	-16	-27	5.2	Algeria (31%)
BGR-Counterfeit	11	12	19	28	16	13	8.3	-19	4.2	Turkey (23%)
ITA-Forged	15	11	21	18	31	12	9.1	-61	3.9	Albania (67%)
FRA-Counterfeit	10	6	7	17	6	11	83	83	3.6	Algeria (27%)
ROU-Counterfeit	7	11	14	19	10	9	-18	-10	2.9	Romania (44%)
BEL-Authentic	2	8	7	13	14	9	13	-36	2.9	Morocco (33%)
Others	139	137	116	155	149	136	-0.7	-8.7	44	Syria (15%)
Visa	242	318	259	337	407	323	1.6	-21	13	Sri Lanka (12%)
POL-Authentic	0	0	0	0	96	53	n.a.	-45	16	Ukraine (55%)
ITA-Counterfeit	8	10	11	31	17	50	400	194	15	Sri Lanka (52%)
FRA-Counterfeit	24	34	37	63	71	45	32	-37	13.9	Afghanistan (13%)
DEU-Counterfeit	27	36	26	46	23	25	-31	8.7	7.7	Turkey (28%)
FRA-Forged	7	16	8	14	9	23	44	156	7.1	Morocco (35%)
ESP-Counterfeit	9	32	12	21	16	18	-44	13	5.6	Iran (28%)
ITA-Authentic	10	9	5	2	11	10	11	-9.1	3.1	Nigeria (20%)
FRA-No more details	9	7	13	16	8	9	29	13	2.8	Eritrea (44%)
SWE-Counterfeit	0	5	0	2	2	8	60	300	2.5	Nigeria (100%)
BEL-Counterfeit	12	21	14	10	3	8	-62	167	2.5	Iran (63%)
Others	136	148	133	132	151	74	-50	-51	23	Nigeria (9.5%)

Total: see Table 11B

Annex Table 11B. **Document fraud**

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2012	2013				2013 Q1			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on			
							year ago	prev. qtr		
Nationality Claimed										
RESIDENCE PERMITS	387	461	385	422	500	379	-18	-24	15	Syria (16%)
GRC-Stolen blank	58	57	58	52	59	49	-14	-17	13	Syria (43%)
GRC-Counterfeit	32	14	18	20	34	44	214	29	12	Syria (34%)
ESP-Counterfeit	14	16	28	14	58	39	144	-33	10.3	Morocco (31%)
FRA-Authentic	22	34	35	48	32	35	2.9	9.4	9.2	Not specified (57%)
ITA-Counterfeit	29	37	38	40	35	30	-19	-14	7.9	Morocco (37%)
ESP-Authentic	18	28	23	41	34	25	-11	-26	6.6	Dominican Republic (16%)
BEL-Counterfeit	25	23	14	22	26	22	-4.3	-15	5.8	Iraq (27%)
ITA-Authentic	11	22	12	6	13	14	-36.0	7.7	3.7	Egypt (36%)
DEU-Counterfeit	8	11	4	4	7	11	0	57	2.9	Syria (91%)
DEU-Stolen blank	36	60	24	12	8	10	-83	25	2.6	Pakistan (30%)
Others	134	159	131	163	194	100	-37	-48	26	Morocco (10%)
STAMPS	509	409	350	381	298	294	-28	-1	12	Albania (38%)
GRC-Counterfeit	352	251	200	159	131	107	-57	-18	36	Albania (90%)
POL-Counterfeit	27	15	30	30	19	16	6.7	-16	5.4	Ukraine (100%)
HUN-Counterfeit	5	10	9	12	5	15	50	200	5.1	Serbia (40%)
TUR-Counterfeit	10	2	7	0	4	14	600	250	4.8	Turkey (100%)
SVK-Counterfeit	9	1	3	8	26	14	1300	-46	4.8	Ukraine (100%)
ITA-Counterfeit	5	11	10	15	14	14	27	0	4.8	Albania (36%)
FRA-Counterfeit	13	9	14	21	10	9	0	-10	3.1	Sri Lanka (22%)
ESP-Counterfeit	4	8	6	9	7	7	-13	0	2.4	Russian Federation (29%)
HUN-Forged	3	7	8	13	3	7	0	133	2.4	Ukraine (71%)
DEU-Counterfeit	11	21	13	3	6	6	-71	0	2.0	Sri Lanka (33%)
Others	70	74	50	111	73	85	15	16	29	Ukraine (13%)
OTHER	134	71	63	57	58	60	-15	3.4	2.4	Syria (13%)
ITA-Counterfeit	78	16	13	19	12	12	-25	0	20	Sri Lanka (17%)
UKR-Counterfeit	0	3	1	0	3	4	33	33	7	Ukraine (100%)
GRC-Counterfeit	1	0	0	0	0	4	n.a.	n.a.	6.7	Iraq (50%)
ITA-Authentic	19	15	8	12	16	3	-80	-81	5.0	Bangladesh (100%)
FRA-Counterfeit	2	2	3	1	5	3	50	-40	5.0	Romania (67%)
BGR-Counterfeit	3	7	7	3	7	3	-57	-57	5.0	Romania (67%)
ALB-Counterfeit	0	1	0	3	0	2	100	n.a.	3.3	Albania (100%)
ROU-Counterfeit	2	1	0	1	0	2	100	n.a.	3.3	Romania (100%)
SYR-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.3	Syria (100%)
GRC-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.3	Senegal (50%)
Others	29	26	31	18	15	23	-12	53	38.3	Sri Lanka (13%)
Total	2 564	2 810	2 615	2 961	2 979	2 530	-10	-15		



Annex Table 12. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued reported by top ten nationalities

	2012					2014 Q1			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on		per cent of total
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	2 172	1 730	1 838	3 555	5 476	6 066	251	11	11
Albania	4 024	3 838	4 588	4 528	5 029	4 521	18	-10	8.1
Morocco	3 456	3 439	3 242	2 802	3 003	3 495	1.6	16	6.3
Pakistan	5 974	4 723	4 034	3 973	3 837	3 444	-27	-10	6.2
Afghanistan	3 207	2 253	2 238	2 592	2 218	2 585	15	17	4.6
India	2 713	2 901	2 625	2 182	2 485	2 477	-15	-0.3	4.4
Algeria	2 851	2 480	2 264	1 888	2 100	2 024	-18	-3.6	3.6
Nigeria	2 312	2 320	2 252	2 032	1 945	1 727	-26	-11	3.1
Ukraine	2 487	2 205	2 074	2 587	2 376	1 721	-22	-28	3.1
Russian Federation	2 029	2 131	2 145	3 270	2 430	1 635	-23	-33	2.9
Others	29 800	27 285	26 301	28 283	26 808	26 092	-4.4	-2.7	47
Total	61 025	55 305	53 601	57 692	57 707	55 787	0.9	-3.3	100

Data for Austria for Q1 2014 are not available at the moment.

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns**

Decisions issued reported by top ten nationalities

	2012					2014 Q1			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% change on		per cent of total
							year ago	prev. qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	4 166	3 478	5 891	4 845	6 330	4 523	30	-29	12
Pakistan	3 826	3 180	2 996	2 829	3 122	2 773	-13	-11	7.5
India	2 392	2 510	2 144	2 224	2 080	2 122	-15	2	5.8
Morocco	1 769	1 730	1 787	1 657	1 584	1 814	4.9	15	4.9
Russian Federation	1 813	1 698	1 777	2 410	2 331	1 759	3.6	-25	4.8
Serbia	1 977	1 653	1 751	1 643	1 465	1 567	-5.2	7	4.3
Ukraine	2 163	1 680	1 761	2 224	2 098	1 419	-16	-32	3.9
China	1 125	1 355	1 293	1 069	1 120	1 232	-9.1	10	3.3
Nigeria	1 160	1 293	1 356	1 292	1 293	1 139	-12	-12	3.1
Kosovo*	1 173	730	805	1 734	1 268	1 010	38	-20	2.7
Others	20 608	18 840	18 953	19 213	17 926	17 483	-7.2	-2.5	47
Total	42 172	38 147	40 514	41 140	40 617	36 841	-3.4	-9.3	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Data for Austria for Q1 2014 are not available at the moment.

Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries reported by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2012		2013			2014 Q3			per cent of total
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
TYPE OF RETURN									
Forced	22 840	19 544	22 502	22 157	23 262	14 209	-27	-39	39
Enforced by Member State	20 305	15 261	20 113	20 026	20 662	12 026	-21	-42	85
Not specified	2 192	3 936	2 074	1 865	1 957	1 902	-52	-2.8	13
Enforced by Joint Operation	343	347	315	266	643	281	-19	-56	2.0
Voluntary	17 127	16 435	15 687	17 119	15 347	15 697	-4.5	2.3	43
Others	9 782	9 405	8 428	8 480	8 302	9 719	3.3	17	62
IOM-assisted	3 761	3 607	3 917	4 711	3 800	3 264	-9.5	-14	21
Not specified	3 584	3 423	3 342	3 928	3 245	2 714	-21	-16	17
Not specified	2 205	2 168	2 325	1 864	2 008	6 935	220	245	19
Total	42 172	38 147	40 514	41 140	40 617	36 841	-3.4	-9.3	100
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES									
Forced									
Albania	3 649	3 246	5 609	4 524	5 917	1 418	-56	-76	10
Algeria	717	575	660	696	686	677	18	-1.3	4.8
Tunisia	935	668	880	823	752	671	0.4	-11	4.7
Pakistan	2 873	2 298	2 075	1 763	2 233	668	-71	-70	4.7
Morocco	817	748	745	726	724	647	-14	-11	4.6
Serbia	770	847	863	815	828	620	-27	-25	4.4
Nigeria	660	641	712	652	702	595	-7.2	-15	4.2
Kosovo*	765	422	316	903	625	565	34	-9.6	4.0
India	824	732	725	795	646	509	-30	-21	3.6
Turkey	398	453	375	433	402	392	-13	-2.5	2.8
Others	10 432	8 914	9 542	10 027	9 747	7 447	-16	-24	52
Total Forced Returns	22 840	19 544	22 502	22 157	23 262	14 209	-27	-39	100
Voluntary									
India	1 560	1 767	1 413	1 424	1 428	1 539	-13	7.8	10
Russian Federation	1 488	1 404	1 403	1 997	1 911	1 417	0.9	-26	9.0
Ukraine	1 765	1 356	1 419	1 806	1 667	1 133	-16	-32	7.2
Pakistan	918	862	892	1 057	852	1 132	31	33	7.2
Serbia	1 197	799	881	817	629	933	17	48	5.9
China	477	845	731	577	643	781	-7.6	21	5.0
Nigeria	444	609	566	605	541	482	-21	-11	3.1
Kosovo*	408	308	489	831	643	444	44	-31	2.8
Bangladesh	366	466	472	531	403	433	-7.1	7.4	2.8
Albania	447	226	269	303	373	427	89	14	2.7
Others	8 057	7 793	7 152	7 171	6 257	6 976	-10	11	44
Total Voluntary Returns	17 127	16 435	15 687	17 119	15 347	15 697	-4.5	2.3	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK. Data on inland detections are not available for the Netherlands starting with the year 2012.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, The Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM assisted and others) for Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.



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