



## Eastern European Borders Quarterly

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European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union



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Throughout the report, references to Kosovo\* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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## List of abbreviations used

**BCP** border-crossing point

CIS Community of Independent States

**EaP** Eastern Partnership

**EB-RAN** Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network

**EDF** European Union Document-Fraud

**EEU** Eurasian Economic Union

**EU** European Union

**FRAN** Frontex Risk Analysis Network

**Frontex** European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States

of the European Union

ICJ International Court of Justice
ID identification document

n.a. not availablePLN Polish zlotyQ/Qtr quarter of the year

**RAU** Frontex Risk Analysis Unit

**RUB** Russian rouble

**UNSCR** United Nations Security Council Resolution

**UK** United Kingdom

VIN vehicle identification number

## Introduction

#### **Concept**

The Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) performs monthly exchanges of statistical data and information on the most recent irregular migration trends. This information is compiled at Frontex RAU level and analysed in cooperation with the regional partners on a quarterly and annual basis. The annual reports offer a more in-depth analysis of the occurring developments and phenomena which impact the regional and common borders while the quarterly reports are meant to provide regular updates and identify emerging trends in order to maintain situational awareness. Both types of reports are aimed at offering support for strategic and operational decision making.

#### Methodology

The Eastern European Borders Quarterly statistical overview is focused on quarterly developments for the seven key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, (2) detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs, (3) refusals of entry, (4) detections of illegal stay, (5) asylum applications, (6) detections of facilitators, and (7) detections of fraudulent documents.<sup>1</sup>

The backbone of this overview are monthly statistics provided within the framework of the EB-RAN (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) and reference period statistics from common border sections of the neighbouring EU Member States (Norway, Finland,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). The data are processed, checked for errors and merged into an Excel database for further analysis.


#### **Structure**

The current issue of the Eastern European Borders Quarterly is the first following a new approach adopted for risk analysis quarterlies. The first part offers a general **Situational overview** broken down by main areas of work of border-control authorities and police activities related to irregular migration. The second part contains more in depth **Featured risk analyses** of particular phenomena. The structure of the report may still be subject to some readjustments.

Please note that the analysis of this indicator is now limited to EB-RAN countries only, given that EU Member States have transitioned to the European Union Document-Fraud (EDF) reporting scheme.

Figure 1. Geographical scope of the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network

Note on definitions: in the text 'common borders' refers both to borders between EU Member States and EB-RAN countries (covered by both sides) and borders of EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries with the Russian Federation (covered only by the EU/Schengen Associated Country side of the border)



## **Summary of EB-RAN indicators**

Table 1. Summary of FRAN, EB-RAN and selected EU Member State indicators for Q1 2015

Indicator	EU total	EU Member States (eastern land borders only) <sup>[1]</sup>	% of EU total	only EB-RAN countries <sup>[2]</sup>
Illegal border-crossing between BCPs	62 385	211	0.3%	563
Clandestine entries	1 103	1	0.1%	3 175
Facilitators	2 611	11	0.4%	41
Illegal stay	110 534	2 023	1.8%	5 732
Refusals of entry	27 424	8 084	29.5%	12 341
Applications for asylum	181 569	39 624[4]	21.8%	148
False travel documents	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	78
Return decision issued	63 843	7 630[3]	12.0%	n.a.
Effective returns	37 625	5 632[3]	15.0%	n.a.

Source: FRAN as of 19 June 2015

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Total numbers reported in FRAN by Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

<sup>4</sup> Over 60% refers to Kosovo\* nationals claimed asylum in Hungary in Q1 2015

<sup>\*</sup> This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on Kosovo declaration of independence.

## Situation at the border

## **Border surveillance**

## Illegal border-crossing


During the first quarter 2015, 774 persons were detected for illegal crossing of the regional and common borders between BCPs. Of this figure, 56% represented regional (CIS and EaP countries) nationals with the highest number of Ukrainian citizens, followed by Georgians and Russians.

The remaining 44% was linked to non-regional nationals, namely the Vietnamese (who continued to mainly target the Lithuanian-Belarusian section), and Syrians and Afghans (mostly reported at the Hungarian-Ukrainian border).

Overall, detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs decreased by 24% when compared to the last quarter of 2014. The most significant drop (66%) was observed for Afghans, while an increasing trend was recorded regarding Syrians (18%) and Vietnamese (3.1%).

Figure 1. Detections between BCPs at the common borders and EU Member States' land borders with the Russian Federation (data only from EU side) show that the pressure in Q1 2015 as compared to the same quarter last year was the highest at the Hungarian-Ukrainian section

Detections of illegal border-crossing at common and regional borders between BCPs in Q1 2015



#### **Facilitators**

The number of detected facilitators of irregular migration increased significantly in the first quarter of 2015 when compared to the same quarter of 2014 (from 11 in Q1 2014 up to 52 in Q1 2015). Most detections in the examined period were reported by Belarus (77%) at the border with Lithuania, where the highest increase among all common borders was observed.

As regards nationalities, 79% of all facilitators detected in the analysed period were regional nationals, with Russians and Belarusians constituting the majority, followed by Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.

Figure 2. The number of detected facilitators of irregular migration saw an almost fivefold rise in the first quarter 2015 when compared to the same period of 2014

Nationalities of facilitators in Q1 2015 compared to O1 2014



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 22 May 2015

## Situation in the Eastern European region

## **Border checks**

#### **Clandestine entries**

During the first quarter of 2015 there were just four detections of clandestine entries reported at the Eastern European borders. Reported cases included three migrants from Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan detected while attempting to cross from Ukraine to Romania hiding in a lorry (see Fig. 3), and one Russian citizen transported from Belarus to Poland in a suitcase (see Fig. 4).



Figure 3. Three irregular migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria detected hiding in a cargo trailer in an attempt to cross illegally the Romanian-Ukrainian border at the BCP Porubne

#### Refusals of entry

The number of refusals of entry issued during the first quarter 2015 at the common and regional borders decreased by almost 9% when compared to the fourth quarter of 2014 (from 22 380 to 20 425). Compared to the corresponding quarter of 2014, the numbers remained relatively stable.

The majority of refusals of entry was reported at the land borders (90%), while the remaining 10% was issued at air (6%) and sea borders (4%). The highest number of refusals was issued by Ukraine, Poland and Belarus. However, an increasing trend of

refusals of entry was observed in Ukraine, while Poland and Belarus reported a drop. Top five refused nationalities were citizens of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Moldova and Tajikistan.

The most significant drop in Q1 2015 referred to Georgians and Russians recorded by Poland, while the most remarkable increases were related to citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia refused entry to Ukraine.

The increasing outflow of Central Asian nationals from the Russian Federation can be explained by the current economic situation and the more restrictive migration policy. The deteriorating economic standing and rouble depreciation rendered working in the Russian Federation unprofitable, with migrants' wages almost halved and remittances send back home diminished. The outflow of labour migrants is also associated with new rules that came into effect on 1 January abolishing the former quota system and requiring migrant workers from outside the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) (apart from the Russian Federation including Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) to obtain work permits. Moreover, the new rules require migrants to pass Russian language and history tests, buy health insurance, and pay higher fees for work permits. In addition, citizens of non-EEU countries can no longer travel to the Russian Federation using domestic ID cards. Instead, they are required to use international passports, which are more expensive to obtain for labour migrants.

#### **Document fraud**

Quarterly detections of persons using fraudulent documents reported by the three EB-RAN countries (Belarus, Mol-



Figure 4. In March 2015, a Russian female was detected hiding in a suitcase transported by a French citizen (her husband) on the passenger train Moscow-Nice at the rail BCP Terespol. The claimed the reason for this clandestine entry attempt was lack of relevant documents to enter the EU

dova and Ukraine) increased by 8% in the first quarter 2015 when compared to the fourth quarter of 2014 (up from 72 in Q4 2014 to 78 in Q1 2015). Most detections were reported by Ukraine at air borders and at the land borders with Moldova and the Russian Federation.

As regards nationalities, Moldovans (mainly detected at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border section) ranked first among fraudulent document users, followed by Syrians (mainly on Moldova-Ukraine flights) and Ukrainians. The majority of commonly used fraudulent documents reported by EB-RAN countries were passports (78%) and ID cards (3.8%) and visas (3.8%).

## Illegal stay in EB-RAN countries

There were 5 732 detections of illegal stay in the first quarter of 2015 reported by the three EB-RAN countries, which represents over an 8.5% decrease when compared to

the previous quarter, and remained roughly similar in relation to the same quarter of 2014 (down from 5 896).

With regards to the top five nationalities, Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans and Azeris were most detected for illegal stay in EB-RAN countries. While citizens of the Russian Federation, Moldova and Azerbaijan were in the majority of cases reported by Ukraine. Ukrainians and Georgians, in turn, were mostly detected by Belarus.

# Sustained irregular migration movements by regional (CIS and EaP country) nationals

## The common eastern European borders

In Q1 2015, regional migrants continued to abuse legal travel channels to enter the EU rather than attempt illegal entry via the green border. Regional (CIS and EaP country) nationals accounted for almost 85% of the 10 076 refusals of entry issued at the EU's common eastern borders, but only for 38% of detected illegal entries between BCPs.

During the first quarter 2015, there were less regional migrants reported both under the refusals of entry as well as illegal border-crossings to the EU, diminishing the pressure on the EU eastern borders.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian crisis and difficult economic situation in Ukraine continued to increase the flow of Ukrainian nationals towards the EU in the analysed quarter.

As regards nationalities, refusals issued to Russians, Belarusians, Georgians and

Armenians decreased significantly, while refusals issued to Ukrainians increased, sustaining at the same time, the movements of regional migrants as a total towards the EU.

The most remarkable drop in refusals of entry was observed among Georgians (1878 in Q4 2014 to 96 in Q1 2015) and Russians (1 248 in Q4 2014 to 435 in Q1 2015). By contrast, Ukrainian nationals were refused entry to the EU in Q1 2015 slightly more frequently (6 095) than in the previous quarter (5 384).

### Inside the EU/ Schengen area

## Asylum application of regional nationals

The number of asylum applications lodged by the CIS and EaP nationals (regional migrants) in the EU/Schengen Associated Countries decreased of 8.8% in analysed period, when compared with the previous quarter. This figure was still on a relatively low level (over 11 200) taking into


account increasing trend of asylum applications filed by all nationals in the EU/Schengen Associated Countries in the first quarter 2015 (over 181 500).

Main applications' receivers of the regional migrants were Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden and Austria, with Ukrainians as dominating nationals, followed by Georgians and Russians. Nevertheless, the trends for different nationalities diverged strongly in particular top five EU countries, e.g. Russian and Georgian applicants increased in Germany, and decreased in Poland, Sweden and Austria, while Ukrainians applied less frequently for asylum in Germany and Sweden in favour for Poland, Italy and Austria.

## Illegal stay by regional migrants (CIS and EaP nationals)

During the first quarter 2015 there were 10 070 illegal stayers from the CIS and EaP countries reported in EU Member States/ Schengen Associated Countries, out of which 7 581 of the Ukrainians, Russians and

Figure 5. The number of applications filed in Q1 2015 by regional (CIS and EaP) nationals compared to Q4 2014, by top ten receiving EU Member States (left) and top three regional nationalities of asylum applicants, by main receiving EU Member States in Q1 2015 (right)



Georgians in total. The top three was represented by Ukrainians with 45% share of the total, followed by Russians and Georgians with 19.5% and 11%, respectively.

Poland, Germany and Sweden recorded the highest number of illegal stayers originating from Ukraine, Georgia and the Russian Federation. As in case of asylum applications Poland faced the highest number of Ukrainians detected for illegal stay. Russians targeted especially Germany and Poland to the lesser extent, while Georgians were mainly reported by Greece, Sweden and Germany.

## Document fraud by CIS and EaP countries

During the analysed period, there were 264 citizens of CIS and EaP countries reported with fraudulent documents on intra EU/Schengen travels. The most cases were reported by the UK and Italy.

As regards nationalities, the great majority of fraudulent document users recorded on intra EU/Schengen travels were Ukrainians, accounting for over 80% of all cases reported in the first quarter 2015. Around half of fraudulent documents presented by Ukrainian nationals was represented by Polish ID cards mostly belonging to other persons (imposters). The second most common group of fraudulent doc-

uments being in possession of Ukrainians represented Romanian travel documents.

#### **Outlook**

A significant drop of Russians, Belarusians, Tajiks, Kirgiz and Armenians refused entry (mostly to Poland) as well as a decrease in the number of Georgian and Russian nationals applying for asylum (mostly in Poland) indicates that the flow of these migrants towards the EU will continue at a lower level also in the coming quarter. However, as the situation in the eastern Ukraine remains uncertain, further increase in the Ukrainian flow towards the EU, accompanied by more cases of the abuse of legal travel channels, cannot be ruled out.

# Persistent smuggling activities at and between BCPs

#### **Tobacco products**

Q1 2015 was marked by seizures of significant amounts of illicit cigarettes most often smuggled on cargo trains or transported across border rivers. The typical places for illegal transport of tobacco goods did not change; however, cigarettes smuggled concealed in fuel tanks were increasingly detected.



Figure 6. 187 500 packs of cigarettes floating on the Neman River at the border with Lithuania detected by the Belarusian authorities

The largest shipment of illicit cigarettes was revealed by Belarusian border guards in February 2015. 187 500 packs of cigarettes were detected being rafted on the Neman River, on the border with Lithuania. The market value of the cigarettes was estimated at RUB 1 billion 237.5 million.



One of the most sophisticated *modi operandi* revealed in Q1 2015 was identified by the State Border Service of Ukraine, which prevented the smuggling of large quantities of tobacco products through the BCP Yagodyn-Dorohusk at the Ukrainian-Polish border section in March. A joint border and customs inspection of a 27-tonne shipment of timber logs revealed that 55 of them had cavities containing caches filled with tobacco products. Overall, 25 000 packs of 'Fest' cigarettes of Belarusian production with no excise stamps were discovered (see Fig. 7).

In another remarkable case of illicit cigarette smuggling in Q1 2015, over 17 000 packs of cigarettes were detected in a truck-load of pallets of wood by Ukrainian border guards at the BCP Krakovets at the Ukrainian-Polish border. In-depth inspection revealed that cigarettes were cleverly camouflaged as pieces of wood (see Fig. 8).

#### Stolen motor vehicles

Smuggling of stolen vehicles from the EU via its eastern borders continued in Q1 2015. Mercedes, Volkswagen, Audi, BMW and Toyota were the top five most trafficked makes, while the persons driving stolen vehicles were mostly citizens of





Figure 8. More than 17 000 packs of cigarettes disguised within a truck cargo of wood at the Polish-Ukrainian border

the Russian Federation, Belarus, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Poland and Kazakhstan. The detected vehicles had been stolen in different EU Member States, such as Poland, Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.

Car thieves applied various modi operandi to conceal the identity of stolen vehicles at the external borders, for example the manipulation of the VIN. In many cases, irregularities in car registration certificates or insurance policies were reported, as well as counterfeit powers of attorney authorising the driver to travel abroad.

Importantly, the first quarter of 2015 saw a new phenomenon: stolen cars were also detected on entry to the EU via the common borders, mostly from Belarus. The vehicles, not only luxury cars, were reported



Figure 7 25 000 packs of cigarettes hidden inside 55 timber logs in trailored-made cavities detected by the Ukrainian State Border Service at the Polish-Ukrainian border section at the BCP Yagodyn-Dorohusk

as previously stolen in the Russian Federation or Belarus.

## Illicit drugs and prohibited substances

In contrast to the last quarter of 2014, Q1 2015 was marked by relatively few seizures of drugs, especially hashish.

For example, an attempt of hashish smuggling was revealed by the Polish border guards at the BCP Korczowa in the direction to Ukraine. 31.5 kg of drugs, worth around PLN 880 800, were packed in 34 plastic bags and hidden in the body of a Renault with French registration plates. Hashish was smuggled by citizens of Portugal. Interestingly, the same *modus operandi* was observed in the final quarter of 2014, in September, when another citizen of Portugal attempted to smuggle 54 kg of hashish in a similar way, also at the BCP Korczowa.

Importantly, the first quarter of 2015 brought an increase in detections of medical pills containing substances whose importation into Belarus is banned. A number of such cases were detected at the BCP Brest on the Polish-Belarusian border and involving Russian citizens of Chechen origin legally residing in EU countries. They typically travelled in luxury passenger cars (Lexus, Mercedes, Chrysler, VW) registered in France, Belgium or Spain.

#### Outlook

The continuous smuggling of excise goods through the common borders can be explained by large differences in their prices between EU countries and their eastern neighbours, which constitute a major incentive. It can be assessed that this will not change significantly in the foreseable future, considering the weak economic situation in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. On the contrary, smuggling may even intensify if the profitability increases in the coming quarters.



Figure 9. 31.5 kg of hashish packed in 34 plastic bags hidden in the body of a passenger car detected at the Polish-Ukrainian border (BCP Korczowa)

Polish Border G

## STATISTICAL ANNEX

#### **LEGEND**

Symbols and abbreviations: n.a. not applicable

: data not available

Source: EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 11 May 2015,

unless otherwise indicated

**Note:** 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member

States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Table 1. Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by purpose of illegal border-crossing and top ten nationalities

							2015 Q1			
	2013		20	014		Q1	% change on		per cent	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		year ago	previous Qtr	of total	
Purpose of Illegal Bor	der-Crossing									
Irregular migration	337	408	344	503	613	372	-8.8	-39	48	
Other	424	389	353	352	238	240	-38	0.8	31	
Smuggling	120	84	100	99	113	86	2.4	-24	11	
Not specified	115	11	14	46	54	75	582	39	9.7	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>										
Ukraine	276	278	245	252	215	201	-28	-6.5	26	
Vietnam	55	33	35	181	96	99	200	3.1	13	
Georgia	113	59	60	108	149	68	15	-54	8.8	
Syria	35	63	29	40	56	66	4.8	18	8.5	
Afghanistan	89	79	44	37	196	66	-16	-66	8.5	
Russian Federation	97	83	79	104	68	57	-31	-16	7.4	
Moldova	120	139	129	111	67	56	-60	-16	7.2	
Belarus	28	26	27	25	22	28	7.7	27	3.6	
Not specified	44	32	34	21	15	24	-25	60	3.1	
Turkey	16	4	2	5	11	15	275	36	1.9	
Others	123	96	127	116	123	94	-2.1	-24	12	
Total	996	892	811	1 000	1 018	774	-13	-24	100	

Table 2. Illegal border-crossing at BCPs

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by purpose of illegal border-crossing and top ten nationalities

							20	15 Q1	
	2013	2014					% change on		per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Purpose of Illegal Bord	ler-Crossing								
Other	215	245	228	223	205	3 049	1 144	1 387	n.a.
Smuggling	68	84	86	65	65	91	8,3	40	n.a.
Irregular migration	44	33	17	20	39	35	6,1	-10	n.a.
Not specified	0	0	7	7	1	1	n.a.	0	n.a.
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Ukraine	155	148	141	158	117	2 948	1 892	2 420	93
Moldova	90	118	132	96	126	158	34	25	5
Romania	14	9	20	11	9	16	78	78	0.5
Russian Federation	13	18	11	10	20	9	-50	-55	0.3
Belarus	1	1	3	5	4	7	600	75	0.2
Azerbaijan	0	0	1	1		6	n.a.	n.a.	0.2
Syria	0	3	1	2	4	5	67	25	0.2
Afghanistan	0	0	0	2	4	5	n.a.	25	0.2
Turkey	0	0	0	1	1	4	n.a.	300	0.1
Not specified	9	9	5	4	3	3	-67	0	0.1
Others	45	56	24	26	22	15	-73	-32	0.5
Total	327	362	338	316	310	3 176	777	925	100

Table 3. **Facilitators**Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2013 Q4						2015 Q1			
		2013 2014						% change on		per cent
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total	
Place of Detection										
Land	15	9	20	49	32	49	444	53	94	
Air	0	0	0	0	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	5.8	
Inland	1	2	0	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	
Top Ten Nationalities										
Russian Federation	3	0	3	8	3	16	n.a.	433	31	
Belarus	1	1	1	12	1	12	1 100	1 100	23	
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	6	n.a.	n.a.	12	
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	0	5	n.a.	n.a.	9.6	
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.8	
Estonia	0	0	0	3	2	2	n.a.	0	3.8	
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.8	
Poland	3	0	3	1	3	2	n.a.	-33	3.8	
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.9	
Hungary	0	1	0	8	0	1	0	n.a.	1.9	
Others	9	9	13	17	23	3	-67	-87	5.8	
Total	16	11	20	49	32	52	373	63	100	

Table 4. **Illegal stay**Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

							2015 Q1		
	2013		20	2014			% change on		per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Place of Detection									
Land	6 041	4 359	4 315	7 604	7 395	5 996	38	-19	77
Air	5 394	2 604	1 025	1 188	1 616	1 558	-40	-3.6	20
Between BCPs	42	8	33	46	54	109	1263	102	1.4
Sea	111	61	46	105	76	55	-9.8	-28	0.7
Inland	389	422	416	176	15	37	-91	147	0.5
Top Ten Nationalities									
Ukraine	2 412	1 405	1 989	3 017	3 413	2 135	52	-37	28
Russian Federation	1 551	1 348	802	2 209	1 781	1 962	46	10	25
Georgia	1 653	794	388	443	840	627	-21	-25	8.1
Moldova	496	444	455	520	718	549	24	-24	7.1
Belarus	313	249	300	549	296	288	16	-2.7	3.7
Azerbaijan	619	332	131	147	188	286	-14	52	3.7
Hungary	80	120	85	94	109	159	33	46	2.1
Armenia	638	209	137	190	103	152	-27	48	2
Turkey	444	312	167	115	102	150	-52	47	1.9
Poland	140	99	107	215	143	132	33	-7.7	1.7
Others	3 631	2 142	1 274	1 620	1 463	1 315	-39	-10	17
Total	11 977	7 454	5 835	9 119	9 156	7 755	4	-15	100

Table 5. **Refusals of entry** 

Refusals reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by border type and top ten nationalities

							20		
	2013		20	)14			% change on		per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Border Type									
Land	17 617	17 269	18 651	21 166	20 192	18 410	6.6	-8.8	90
Air	2 031	1 827	1 720	1 312	1 093	1 204	-34	10	5.9
Sea	1 038	736	991	1 055	1 095	811	10	-26	4
Top Ten Nationalities									
Ukraine	5 317	4 760	5 295	6 331	5 384	6 095	28	13	30
Russian Federation	3 154	5 148	7 034	7 178	5 048	3 832	-26	-24	19
Uzbekistan	1 539	1 078	618	476	884	1 969	83	123	9.6
Moldova	1 089	1 904	1 416	1 744	1 699	1 521	-20	-10	7.4
Tajikistan	626	531	287	218	737	1 428	169	94	7
Belarus	1 248	1 131	1 241	1 490	1 393	890	-21	-36	4.4
Lithuania	1 020	1 014	1 147	1 051	898	702	-31	-22	3.4
Azerbaijan	418	343	335	326	352	628	83	78	3.1
Kyrgyzstan	315	227	114	141	626	613	170	-2.1	3
Armenia	757	489	306	385	596	353	-28	-41	1.7
Others	5 203	3 207	3 569	4 193	4 763	2 394	-25	-50	12
Total	20 686	19 832	21 362	23 533	22 380	20 425	3	-8.7	100

Table 6. **Applications for asylum** 

Applications for international protection reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by top ten nationalities

							20	15 Q1	
	2013 2014						% change on		per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Kosovo*	270	233	401	3 072	17 968	24 427	10 384	36	61
Afghanistan	1 439	1 440	1 167	2 402	5 098	4 394	205	-14	11
Syria	1 011	1 252	1 108	3 115	4 451	3 027	142	-32	7.6
Iraq	302	273	298	431	778	1 219	347	57	3.1
Ukraine	23	238	805	1 226	817	916	285	12	2.3
Russian Federation	1 042	682	710	880	953	760	11	-20	1.9
Pakistan	152	125	96	142	291	602	382	107	1.5
Not specified	195	195	263	354	760	533	173	-30	1.3
Bangladesh	166	42	40	122	265	381	807	44	1
Somalia	356	324	358	371	389	361	11	-7.2	0.9
Others	3 583	2 391	3 718	3 873	3 667	3 152	32	-14	7.9
Total	8 539	7 195	8 964	15 988	35 437	39 772	453	12	100

<sup>\*</sup> This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Table 7. **Document fraud**Detections reported by EB-RAN countries, by border type, document type, top ten nationalities and top ten countries of issuance

							20		
	2013		20	14			% ch	ange on	per cent
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	year ago	previous Qtr	of total
Border Type									
Air	31	47	25	17	35	37	-21	5.7	47
Land	57	38	18	38	31	31	-18	0	40
Sea	0	16	8	7	4	7	-56	75	9
Not specified	0	0	4	1	2	3	n.a.	50	3.8
Document Type									
Passports	53	85	49	47	58	61	-28	5.2	78
Not specified	29	9	0	1	6	9	0	50	12
ID cards	3	4	1	2	3	3	-25	0	3.8
Visas	3	2	4	7	2	3	50	50	3.8
Stamps	0	0	0	6	2	2	n.a.	0	2.6
Residence permits	0	1	1	0	1	0	n.a.	n.a.	0
Top Ten Nationaliti	es								
Moldova	16	17	18	16	19	16	-5.9	-16	21
Syria	1	13	1	5	8	10	-23	25	13
Ukraine	34	19	13	14	10	9	-53	-10	12
Iraq	0	4	0	0	3	7	75	133	9
Not specified	2	0	0	0	0	6	n.a.	n.a.	7.7
Congo	0	3	0	0	0	5	67	n.a.	6.4
Georgia	7	1	0	1	4	5	400	25	6.4
Afghanistan	6	5	0	0	1	4	-20	300	5.1
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	2.6
Russian Federation	5	6	2	2	4	2	-67	-50	2.6
Others	17	33	21	25	23	12	-64	-48	15
Top Ten Countries	of Issuance	of Doc	uments						
Moldova	2	5	5	15	11	11	120	0	14
Ukraine	21	20	15	15	9	9	-55	0	12
Not specified	27	9	0	1	5	7	-22	40	9
Bulgaria	1	2	1	2	2	6	200	200	7.7
Syria	0	2	0	1	1	4	100	300	5.1
Germany	0	1	0	0	0	4	300	n.a.	5.1
UK	7	0	0	0	1	4	n.a.	300	5.1
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	2.6
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	2.6
Tunisia	2	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	2.6
Others	28	62	34	29	43	27	-56	-37	35
Total	88	101	55	63	72	78	-23	8.3	100

## **Explanatory note**

Detections reported for Member States for indicators Illegal border-crossing between BCPs, Illegal border-crossing at BCPs, Refusals of entry and Persons using fraudulent documents are detections at the common land borders on entry only. For Facilitators, detections at the common land borders on entry and exit are included. For Illegal stay, detections at the common

land borders on exit only are included. For Asylum, all applications (land, sea, air and inland) are included.

For EB-RAN countries, all indicators – save for Refusals of entry – include detections (applications) on exit and entry at the land, sea and air borders.

Each section in the table (Reporting country, Border type, Place of detection, Top five border section and Top ten nationalities) refers to total detections reported by EB-RAN countries and to neighbouring land border detections reported by Member States.





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